DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 180 922 SO 012 303

AUTHOR	Butts, R. Freeman: And Others
TITLE	History of Citizen Education Colloquium Papers. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 19-20, 1978.
INSTITUTION	Research for Better Schools, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa.
SPONS AGENCY	National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	78
GRANT	OB-NIE-78-0207
NOTE	227p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Research for Better Schools, Inc., 1700 Market Street, Suite 1700, Philadelphia, PA 19103 ($14.00)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC10 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Citizenship: *Citizenship Responsibility: Conference Reports: Democratic Values: *Educational History: *Educational Objectives: *Educational Trends: Elementary Secondary Education: Public Schools: School Responsibility: Social Values: Values

ABSTRACT

The document presents four papers delivered at a colloquium on the history of citizen education in the United States. The first two papers were written by R. Freeman Butts. The first paper traces civic education from 1776-1976. Included in the historical perspective are objectives, curriculum development, descriptions of various teaching approaches, and excerpts from textbooks. The second paper offers comments on what educators can learn from the history of citizenship education including understanding of the conceptual framework of the historian, differentiating value claims of various interest groups, and becoming aware of modern trends such as political centralization, urbanization, and secularization. In the third paper, Clarence J. Karier critiques the political education of Americans from the late 19th century to the mid 20th century. He focuses on influences of the transcendentalists, the political economy, and educational reforms from 1890-1930, the psychology of social control, and selected citizenship education approaches. The final paper, by Marvin Lazerson, discusses American attitudes toward compulsory education, protestant and patriotic influences on thinking about citizenship, and citizenship in a pluralist world. A list of conference participants is included in the document. (DB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED180922

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

HISTORY OF CITIZEN EDUCATION

COLLOQUIUM PAPERS

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 19-20, 1978

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Research for
Better Schools
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Presentations by

R. Freeman Butts
San Jose State University

Clarence J. Karier
University of Illinois

Marvin Lazerson
University of British Columbia

SO 012 303

Winter 1978

Research for Better Schools, Inc.
1700 Market Street/Suite 1700
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Published by **RESEARCH FOR BETTER SCHOOLS, INC.**

Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the National Institute of Education, and no official endorsement by the National Institute of Education should be inferred.

The work upon which this publication is based was performed pursuant to Grant OB-NIE-78-0207 with the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Copyright© Research for Better Schools, Inc., 1978

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE. i

PRESENTATIONS

"Historical Perspective on Civic Education in the United States" by R. Freeman Butts. 1

The Revolutionary Ideal: Unum (1776-1826) 2
The Post-Revolutionary Reality: Pluribus (1826-1876). 7
The Civics of Progressive Modernization (1876-1926). 14
Recurring Calls for Reform of Civic Education (1926-1976). 23
References 34

"What Should We Learn from the History of Citizenship Education in the United States?" by R. Freeman Butts 36

The Revolutionary Ideal: Unum (1776-1826) 41
The Post-Revolutionary Reality: Pluribus (1826-1876). 43
The Civics of Modernization (1876-1926). 45
Recurring Calls for Reform of Civic Education (1926-1976). 48
Excerpts 49
References 61

"Education of the American Citizen: A Historical Critique" by Clarence J. Karier. 63

The Prussian System. 66
The American System. 85
The Transcendentalists 101
The Political Economy and School Reform: 1890-1930. 105
Towards a Psychology and Philosophy of Social Control. 116
Selected Approaches to Citizenship Education 131
Educating the Man or the Citizen?. 158
References 164

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

"Education for Citizenship" by Marvin Lazerson 171

- The Forging of Citizenship Education 175
- Protestantism and Patriotism 181
- Americanization and Schooling. 193
- Citizenship and Work 203
- Citizenship in a Pluralist World 210
- References 214

PARTICIPANTS 217

BIOGRAPHIES. 219

PREFACE

The papers collected in this report were prepared for, and summarized at, a colloquium on the history of citizen education, particularly in the United States. The colloquium was sponsored by Research for Better Schools as part of its Citizen Education effort. Citizen Education at RBS is funded by the National Institute of Education; its objectives and its affiliations are summarized in the front and back matter of the publication.

The colloquium was intended both to solicit information about and to report out significant events and trends in the history of citizen education, particularly in the United States, and to learn from them. To this end, three experts (R. Freeman Butts, Clarence J. Karier, Marvin Lazerson) in the historiography of education in general, and of citizen education in particular, were commissioned to prepare papers on the topic. They were charged with the responsibility of historically tracing the path of citizen education in this country, identifying major and/or important influences and developments in that history, and drawing inferences to help guide and shape current reconceptualizations and programs in the field. In other words, the experts were to extract from historical analysis illuminations, caveats, and directions for the present state of their art. The commissioned papers form the lion's share of this report.

The section by R. Freeman Butts appears in two parts. The first is his chapter (reprinted here with the permission of McGraw-Hill) in Education for Responsible Citizenship. (This publication is the 1977 report of the National Task Force on Citizenship Education, a project cosponsored by the Danforth Foundation and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation.) The Butts chapter sets forth one of the most prominent approaches to citizen education, of which Butts is perhaps the foremost spokesman. Rather than ask Butts to re-present these views in different words, it was decided to include his Task Force chapter, by reference, at the colloquium. His task then became to prepare a commentary on his already stated position. His "paper," then, consists of both the earlier Task Force chapter and the commentary on it prepared specifically for, and summarized at, the colloquium.

Five reviewers of national stature in education history (see list of participants) served as a colloquium review panel to critique the major papers. The reviewers' remarks appear in the colloquium transcript proper, as do the comments of a small number of invited observers.

The colloquium was held at the Holiday Inn - Independence Mall, Philadelphia, April 19 and 20, 1978.

The papers, both individually and as a cumulative group, represent a solid, and in many ways unique, contribution to the renaissance of interest in citizen education. Scholarly insight and pragmatic practicality here join together to help us go about the business of improving citizen education.

Diverging views? Certainly. Biases? Definitely. We believe that the researcher, the program planner, and the interested layperson will find the resulting brew stimulating and rewarding.

The editorial assistance of Iris Blumenthal is gratefully acknowledged.

Explanatory Note

As stated in the Preface, the presentation by R. Freeman Butts consists of two parts. The first is a reprinted book chapter which summarizes his position regarding citizen education. By reference and intent, it was an important colloquium contribution, a kind of basic text. The second part consists of the paper Butts prepared expressly for the colloquium. It grows out of, and comments upon, the position paper preceding it.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

R. Freeman Butts

San Jose State University

The author traces the founders' goal of an educated citizenry through the contradictions inherent in four major periods: the Revolutionary (1776-1826), which celebrated patriotic values and the ideal of national unity but left civic education largely to voluntary initiative; the Post-Revolutionary (1826-1876), which urged the establishment of common schools to carry out civic education but diluted its content rather than risk political controversy in a diverse and pluralistic society; the Progressive/Modernizing (1876-1926), which turned to historical and "social studies" approaches to expose the gap between political ideals and social realities in the face of rampant nationalism, aggressive industrial capitalism, and economic individualism; and the Social Reformist (1926-1976), which advocated the values of economic collectivity and interdependence while continuing to promote individualism and freedom on the personal and cultural levels through programs that included core curricula, "laboratory practice" projects, and the "new social studies."

From Education for Responsible Citizenship, by the National Task Force on Citizenship Education. Copyright © 1977 by the Institute for Development of Educational Activities, Inc. Used by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company.

The urge to promote civic education through the schools accelerates in times of crisis or rapid social change. It takes on special urgency in two quite different kinds of social situations in which the need for social cohesion and unity is seen to be particularly acute: (a) when liberal reformers see the need to mobilize disparate groups to achieve (in Robert Wiebe's words) "a new social integration, a higher form of social harmony," as in the Revolutionary Era, the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the Great Society, or (b) when conservative forces see the need for social cohesion to rally round their version of the American way of life and to stave off threats to it from alien sources, as in periods of massive immigration, militant radical movements, world war, or cold war.

The Revolutionary Ideal: Unum
(1776-1826)

As the founders of the Republic viewed their revolution in primarily political terms rather than economic or social terms they viewed the kind of education needed for the new Republic largely in political terms rather than as a means to academic excellence or individual self-fulfillment. They talked about education as a bulwark for liberty, equality, popular consent, and devotion to the public good--goals which took precedence over the uses of knowledge for self-improvement or occupational preparation. Over and over again the Revolutionary generation, both liberal and conservative in outlook, asserted their faith that the welfare of the Republic rested upon an educated citizenry and that republican schools--especially free, common, public schools--would be the best means of educating the citizenry in the civic values, knowledge, and obligations required of everyone in a democratic republican society.

The principal ingredients of a civic education, all agreed, were literacy and inculcation of patriotic and moral virtues; others added the study of history and the principles of republican government itself. The founders, like almost all their successors, were long on exhortation as to the value of civic education; but they left it to the textbook writers to distill the essence of those values for schoolchildren. Texts in American history and government appeared as early as the 1790s. And the textbook writers turned out to be very largely of conservative persuasion, more likely Federalist in outlook than Jeffersonian, almost universally in agreement that political virtue must rest upon moral and religious precepts. Since most textbook writers were New Englanders, this meant that the texts were infused with Protestant and, above all, Puritan outlooks.

Noah Webster's spellers, readers, and grammar exemplified the combination of faith in literacy (Americanized), didactic

10

moral instruction, patriotism, and Protestant devotion to duty. Immediately following the Revolution, the textbooks began to celebrate the values of national cohesion, love of country, and love of liberty. All things American began to be glorified. Even the staid New England Primer, which had brought up generations of Puritans to learn the alphabet by Biblical injunctions, changed its couplet for "W" from "Whales in the Sea, GOD's Voice Obey" to "Great Washington brave, His Country did save." Indeed, Washington became the object not only of extravagant praise but of virtually religious devotion. Ruth Elson quoted a 1797 textbook as saying of Washington: "The most unexceptionally, the most finished, the most Godlike human character that ever acted a part on the theatre of the world" (Elson, 1964, p. 195).

In the first half-century of the Republic's life, the most influential carriers of civic education in the schools were the spellers and readers. Their paramount theme was to "attach the child's loyalty to the state and nation. The sentiment of patriotism, love of country, vies with the love of God as the cornerstone of virtue: 'Patriotism...must be considered as the noblest of the social virtues'" (Elson, 1964, p. 282).

A less flamboyant but real faith in the study of history as a preparation for citizenship was expressed by Jefferson. In reviewing the reasons for his 1779 proposal of a Virginia law to establish public schools, Jefferson stated:

> Of the views of this law none is more important, none more legitimate, than that of rendering the people the safe, as they are the ultimate, guardians of their own liberty. For this purpose the reading in the first stage, where they will receive their whole education, is proposed, as has been said, to be chiefly historical. History, by apprising them of the past, will enable them to judge of the future; it will avail them of the experience of other times and other nations; it will qualify them as judges of the actions and designs of men; it will enable them to know ambition under every disguise it may assume and, knowing it, to defeat its views. In every government of earth is some trace of human weakness, some germ of corruption, and degeneracy, which cunning will discover, and wickedness insensibly open, cultivate, and improve. Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories. And to render even them safe their minds must be improved to a certain degree. This indeed is not all that is necessary, though it be essentially necessary. An amendment of our constitution must here come in aid of the public education. The influence over government must be shared among all the people. (Jefferson, 1794, pp. 215-216)

Proposing a state University of Virginia, Jefferson's first two purposes were:

> To form the statesmen, legislators, and judges, on whom public prosperity and individual happiness are so much to depend;
>
> To expound the principles and structure of government, the laws which regulate the intercourse of nations, those formed municipally for our own government, and a sound spirit of legislation, which, banishing all arbitrary and unnecessary restraint on individual action, shall leave us free to do whatever does not violate the equal rights of another. (Padover, 1943, p. 1098)

Jefferson urged that two of his ten proposed schools for the new university be devoted primarily to civic education, a school of government, and a school of law. Weary but adamant over the violent drumbeat of Federalist-Republican partisanship of thirty years, Jefferson wanted his Professor of Government to expound Republican doctrines and ideals in order to counteract the Federalist biases of most of the colleges of the day. He thus raised the most perplexing questions of civic education: Should teachers indoctrinate a particular point of view? Should teachers be selected on the basis of their political beliefs as well as their academic competence? Can political teaching be value-free or is it inevitably value-laden? In any case, Jefferson did not get his school of government, possibly because of conservative opposition in the state.

In the first half-century of the Republic, civic education emphasized the inculcation of civic values and relatively neglected political knowledge as such, with no discernible attempt to develop participatory skills. No particular account was taken of differences in student backgrounds.

Despite the call for free public schools, few were founded outside New England until the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, during the late eighteenth century, the trend was toward the voluntary approach to education through private schools for those who could afford it, separate religious schools for the respective denominations, and charity schools

13

for the indigent poor. It was not until the Jacksonian period that the campaigns for common public schools virtually took the form of a campaign for civic education itself, harking back to the founders' affirmation of the political goal of Unum.

The Post-Revolutionary Reality: Pluribus
(1826-1876)

In the middle half of the nineteenth century the political values inculcated by the civic education program of the schools did not change substantially from those celebrated in the Republic's first fifty years. In the textbooks of the day their rosy hues, if anything, became even more golden. To the resplendent values of liberty, equality, patriotism, and a benevolent Christian morality were now added (especially in New England) the middle-class virtues of hard work, honesty and integrity, the rewards of individual effort, and obedience to legitimate authority. Ruth Elson summed up hundreds of textbooks this way:

> Unlike many modern schoolbooks, those of the 19th century made no pretense of neutrality. While they evade issues seriously controverted in their day, they take a firm and unanimous stand on matters of basic belief. The value judgment is their stock in trade: love of country; love of God; duty to parents; the necessity to develop habits of thrift, honesty, and hard work in order to accumulate property; the certainty of progress; the perfection of the United States. These are not to be questioned. Nor in this whole century of great external change is there any deviation from these basic values. In pedagogical arrangements the schoolbook of the 1790's

> is vastly different from that of the 1890's, but the continuum of values is uninterrupted. Neither the Civil War nor the 1890's provide any watershed of basic values. (Elson, 1964, p. 338)

A single long quotation from the preeminent American of the day epitomizes the set of values which the school texts echo and re-echo. An ardent Jacksonian Democrat, George Bancroft wrote the following introduction to his projected ten-volume History of the United States in 1834. He saw no reason to change it in the succeeding editions and revisions during the next forty to fifty years. This quotation is taken from the six-volume edition of 1879:

> The United States of America constitute an essential portion of a great political system, embracing all the civilized nations of the earth. At a period when the force of moral opinion is rapidly increasing, they have the precedence in the practice and the defence of the equal rights of man. The sovereignty of the people is here a conceded axiom, and the laws, established upon that basis, are cherished with faithful patriotism. While the nations of Europe aspire after change, our constitution engages the fond admiration of the people, by which it has been established. Prosperity follows the execution of even justice; invention is quickened by the freedom of competition; and labor rewarded with sure and unexampled returns....Every man may enjoy the fruits of his industry; every mind is free to publish its convictions. Our government, by its organization, is necessarily identified with the interests of the people and relies exclusively on their attachment for its durability and support. Even the enemies of the state, if there are any among us, have liberty to express their opinions undisturbed and are safely tolerated, where reason is left free to combat their errors. Nor is the constitution a dead letter, unalterably fixed: it has the capacity for improvement, adopting whatever changes time and the

> public will may require, and safe from decay, so long as that will retains its energy....Religion, neither persecuted nor paid by the state, is sustained by the regard for public morals and the convictions of an enlightened faith. Intelligence is diffused with unparalleled universality: a free press teems with the choicest productions of all nations and ages. There are more daily journals in the United States than in the world beside. A public document of general interest is, within a month, reproduced in at least a million of copies and is brought within the reach of every freeman in the country. An immense concourse of emigrants of the most various lineage is perpetually crowding to our shores; and the principles of liberty, uniting all interests by the operation of equal laws, blend the discordant elements into harmonious union. Other governments are convulsed by the innovations and reforms of neighboring states; our constitution, fixed in the affections of the people, from whose choice it has sprung, neutralized the influence of foreign principles, and fearlessly opens an asylum to the virtuous, the unfortunate, and the oppressed of every nation.
>
> And yet it is but little more than two centuries since the oldest of our states received its first permanent colony. Before that time the whole territory was an unproductive waste. Throughout its wide extent the arts had not erected a monument. Its only inhabitants were a few scattered tribes of feeble barbarians, destitute of commerce and of political connection. The axe and the ploughshare were unknown. The soil, which had been gathering fertility from the repose of centuries, was lavishing its strength in magnificent but useless vegetation. In the view of civilization the immense domain was a solitude.
>
> It is the object of the present work to explain how the change in the condition of our land has been brought about and, as the fortunes of a nation are not under the control of blind destiny, to follow the steps by which a favoring Providence, calling our institutions into being, has conducted the country to its present happiness and glory. (Bancroft, 1879, pp. 1-3)

Of all the political values that the textbooks extolled, liberty was preeminent. Whenever they attempted to explain why children should love their country above all else, the idea of liberty took first place. Now this was undoubtedly of prime importance in promoting unity in an increasingly diverse and pluralistic society. Yet the loyalty to liberty was more in affective terms of feeling than in analytical terms of knowledge. Elson put it this way:

> All books agree that the American nation politically expressed is the apostle of liberty, a liberty personified, apostrophized, sung to, set up in Godlike glory, but rarely defined. To discover what liberty means in these books is a murky problem. The child reader could be certain that it was glorious, it is American, it is to be revered, and it deserves his primary loyalty. But for the child to find out from these books what this liberty is would be astonishing. (Elson, 1964, p. 285)

The predominant tone of the school textbooks of the nineteenth century was Federalist and conservative. Elson reported:

> Although schoolbook authors consider themselves guardians of liberty, they can be more accurately described as guardians of tradition. On social questions the tenor of the books is consistently conservative. The United States is always identified with freedom, but this freedom is best identified as that established in 1783 after separation from Great Britain. The 19th-century child was taught to worship past achievements of America and to believe in the inevitable spread of the American system throughout the world. But contemporary problems are conspicuously absent, and reform movements which would have profound social or political effects are either ignored or derided. While Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy agitated the adult world, the child was taught the necessity of class distinctions. Nor

> are Jefferson and Jackson ever ranked as heroes;... in the schools Hamilton and Daniel Webster governed the minds of the children. (Elson, 1964, p. 380)

None was more eloquent than Horace Mann himself on what he candidly called "political education." In 1848, summing up his conclusions from twelve years as secretary of the State Board of Education in Massachusetts, Mann began with the assumptions of the founders that citizens of a Republic must "understand something of the true nature of the government under which they live." He spelled out the civic program in terms which will sound familiar to all teachers of civics since that time:

> The Constitution of the United States and of our own State, should be made a study in our Public Schools. The partition of the powers of government into the three co-ordinate branches--legislative, judicial, and executive--with the duties appropriately devolving upon each; the mode of electing or of appointing all officers, with the reason on which it was founded; and, especially, the duty of every citizen, in a government of laws, to appeal to the courts for redress, in all cases of alleged wrong, instead of undertaking to vindicate his own rights by his own arm, and, in a government where the people are the acknowledged sources of power, the duty of changing laws and rulers by an appeal to the ballot, and not by rebellion, should be taught to all the children until they are fully understood. (cited in Cremin, 1957, p. 93)

But Massachusetts was already caught in a swirl of contesting forces occasioned by the immigration of Irish and Germans of Roman Catholic faith and by the changes in urban life attendant upon the industrial factory system. Mann knew all too well that "if the tempest of political strife were to be let loose upon our Common Schools, they would be overwhelmed with sudden ruin." He recognized that many would object to any study of political matters in the schools because the Constitution is subject to different readings. He saw the dangers of political partisanship in the appointment of teachers on the basis of their political fitness as measured by the school committee:

> Who shall moderate the fury of these conflicting elements when they rage against each other; and who shall save the dearest interests of the children from being consumed in the fierce combustion? If parents find that their children are indoctrinated into what they call political heresies, will they not withdraw them from the school; and, if they withdraw them from the school, will they not resist all appropriations to support a school from which they derive no benefit? (cited in Cremin, 1957, p. 95)

Mann could not admit that the public schools should avoid political education altogether, nor could he risk the destruction of the public schools by urging them to become "theatres for party politics." His solution was similar to that which he proposed for the religious controversies; the schools should teach the common elements that all agreed to but skip over the controversial:

> Surely, between these extremes, there must be a medium not difficult to be found. And is not this the middle course, which all sensible and judicious men, all patriots, and all genuine republicans, must approve; namely, that those articles in the creed of republicanism, which are accepted by all, believed in by all, and which form the common basis of our political faith, shall be taught to all? But when the teacher, in the course of his lessons or lectures on the fundamental law arrives at a controverted

> text, he is either to read it without comment or remark; or, at most, he is only to say that the passage is the subject of disputation, and that the schoolroom is neither the tribunal to adjudicate nor the forum to discuss it. (cited in Cremin, 1957, p. 97)

Mann was so intent upon getting common schools established for an ever wider range of the potential school populations that he would not risk the failure of the common school idea by bringing political controversy into the schools. Thus, it came about that the emerging public schools were largely content with a civic program that initiated the poor, the foreigner, and the working-class children into the political community by literacy in English, didactic moral injunctions, patriotic readers and histories, and lessons that stressed recitation of the structural forms of the constitutional order.

As the Civil War approached, the textbooks began to speak of the dangers of disunion, and being Northern in origin began to be more outspoken about the evils of slavery. Still the South continued to use Northern textbooks. During the war, Confederate books were written and published, but the political attitudes they expressed were not much different from those in the books that continued to flow from the North to the South--except on the subject of slavery. After the war, a common custom was for Southern teachers to pin pages together, expecting young readers to skip the Northern discussion of the Civil War and Reconstruction in favor of the truth delivered by the teacher. To make up for these gaps, the Southern books and teachers could easily expand on the Southern heroes in the Revolutionary War with Washington brooking no competition.

Up to the centennial celebration of 1876 the children of the underclasses were still largely blocked from the public schools and, thus, from civic education. The Reconstruction reforms had proposed extension of public school systems to the Southern states, but these hopes were largely dissipated by the 1870s. Northern states were slow to admit blacks to common schools, often preferring to establish separate schools for white and black. These evident failures of the educational system itself to put into practice the stated values of the political community helped to widen the gap between ideal and reality. Millions of immigrants were being incorporated into citizenship by civic education, despite the patronizing and often hostile ethnic images that the textbooks portrayed of Irish and immigrants from Southern Europe, but millions of racial minorities born in the United States were still beyond the pale of white citizenship education.

The Civics of Progressive Modernization (1876-1926)

In the fifty years straddling the turn of the twentieth century, the character of civic education programs began to undergo more searching examination. The earlier stress on love of a grand, free country became a more shrill and passionate devotion to a great and powerful nation. The doctrines of manifest destiny, winning of the West, empire overseas, and making the world safe for democracy led to exaltation of the United States as the superior nation of the world, imbued with the mission to lead all the rest and thus deserving, nay demanding, a loyalty to "my country, right or wrong."

Not only did the Spanish-American War and World War I stimulate a nationalistic and even militaristic fervor and flavor in civic education, but the massive immigration that characterized almost the whole period added an aspect that seemed, to many conservatives and liberals alike, a basic threat to the commitments of the democratic political community, to the stability of the constitutional order, and to the functioning of governing authorities. They could point to ghettos in the cities, crime in the streets, bloody strikes in the factories, corruption in local governments, and spreading of socialist, communist, and revolutionary doctrines by radical groups.

The lurking fear of the alien and foreign that was almost ever present was exaggerated by the millions upon millions of immigrants who poured in from Southern and Eastern Europe and from Asia. While civic education programs and textbooks attributed this influx to the search for liberty and equality, they also began to turn more and more to Americanization programs that demanded outward signs of loyalty and social cohesion. Stress upon the public pledge of allegiance, salutes to the flag, loyalty oaths, patriotic songs and marching, required instruction in English, and attacks upon foreign language teaching in the schools now were added to the more traditional and prosaic instruction of the textbooks.

A third shift in emphasis was a more prominent role given to the image of the self-made men, the self-reliant individuals, who had shifted from pioneering in the West to pioneering in the development of the industrial, urban, business system that was modernizing America so rapidly and thrusting her producing and consuming capacity ahead of all the other nations of the world in such a short time. The political side of this image was, of course, that it had all happened under auspices of a free enterprise system apart from government controls.

But another reaction to the social and political results of an aggressive industrial, capitalistic order led to the Progressive movements dedicated to popular political reforms in the electoral systems and civil service, social reforms in the cities, the prisons, the sweatshops, child labor, women's rights, temperance, and the rest. Underlying the Progressive reforms was a belief in the collective efforts of governments to control rampant business enterprise, protect the rights of the people, and bring about good government through honest and efficient civil service, bureaucracies, and regulatory agencies.

Meanwhile, educators had to deal with massive increases in school enrollments. Education was seen as a prime means to get ahead in American society; compulsory attendance laws were passed in hopes of abolishing the evil of child labor and achieving the good of assimilation through Americanization.

One response of the academically minded educators in the 1880s and 1890s was to stiffen up the study of history (and thus reduce the emphasis upon civil government) by introducing more rigorous scholarly attitudes into the history texts and the courses. Looking at this question in 1893, the Committee of Ten of the National Education Association (NEA), headed by President Eliot of Harvard, concluded that high school courses should provide the same strong mental discipline for the noncollege-bound majority as for the college-bound minority. The teaching of history was thus not primarily to develop good citizenship and love of country, but to teach high school students a historian's grasp of the nature of evidence.

For several decades the academic orientation of the Committee of Ten dominated curriculum thinking and curriculum making in civic education programs. In history, the emphasis was upon the use of primary sources to develop in pupils a historic sense and to train them in the search for historical materials, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of conclusions. In the effort to get children to think like historians, the flamboyant nationalistic and patriotic history of the previous century was to be counteracted. In 1899 a Committee of Seven of the American Historical Association urged the use of primary sources as supplementary to the textbook. The History Teachers Magazine (founded in 1909) and the work of Henry Johnson at Teachers College, Columbia University, both contributed to the new movement to stress historical problem solving and reasoned judgment in a laboratory or workshop setting.

Meanwhile, the study of civil government had an upsurge in the early 1900s as new ideas about civic education began to appear among political scientists, economists, and sociologists. In 1916 a committee of the American Political Science Association, reflecting the Progressive reform movements, argued that the standard courses in civil government should be shaken up. Existing courses started with the study of the United States Constitution and the formal organization of national government, and then proceeded to a similar study of state constitutions and governments. The new courses should reverse the order. The committee endorsed the study of "community civics," assuming that political affairs nearest to home are the most important and should be considered first. The Progressive-inspired Municipal League promoted this idea.

In the long run, however, the "social studies" movement was more influential. Its sponsor was the NEA's Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education, whose final report, Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education, was published in 1918. Its civic education sections had been developed from 1913 to 1916 by the Committee on Social Studies. Again reflecting Progressive views of reform, the committee explicitly brought citizenship to the forefront of the social responsibility of the secondary school. In a preliminary statement in 1913 the chairman of the committee, a sociologist, revealed the social reform intent to make civics much more than a study of government:

> Good citizenship should be the aim of social studies in the high school. While the administration and instruction throughout the school should contribute to the social welfare of the community, it is maintained that social studies have direct responsibility in this field. Facts, conditions, theories, and activities that do not contribute rather directly to the appreciation of methods of human betterment have no claim. Under this test the old civics, almost exclusively a study of Government machinery, must give way to the new civics, a study of all manner of social efforts to improve mankind. It is not so important that the pupil know how the President is elected as that he shall understand the duties of the health officer in his community. The time formerly spent in the effort to understand the process of passing a law over the President's veto is now to be more profitably used in the observation of the vocational resources

> of the community. In line with this emphasis, the committee recommends that social studies in the high school shall include such topics as the following: community health, housing and homes, public recreation, good roads, community education, poverty and the care of the poor, crime and reform, family income, savings banks and life insurance, human rights versus property rights, impulsive action of mobs, the selfish conservatism of tradition, and public utilities. (cited in Calhoun, Ed., 1969, p. 495)

In the final report of the committee, the term "social studies" was used to include not only history, civics, and government but also concepts from sociology and economics. History still held a major place in the course proposals for grades 7 through 12, but a problems approach was to infuse the whole program. Civics was proposed for junior high school years as well as a new course in "problems of democracy" for the twelfth grade.

Hazel Hertzberg summarized the influence of the committee's report this way:

> Instruction in the social studies should be organized around concrete problems of vital importance to society and of immediate interest to the pupil, rather than on the basis of the formal social sciences...the social studies should contribute directly to the "social efficiency" of the student, helping him "to participate effectively in the promotion of social well-being" in the groups of which he is a member, from his own community to the "world community"....The skills to be learned by pupils were those of good citizens participating in the building of an invigorated society, not those of historians carefully interpreting evidence, developing criticism, and arriving at synthesis....
>
> The Report of the Committee on Social Studies had a significant impact on the direction of educational reform. It represented many of the deepest, most pervasive, and most characteristic viewpoints

> of the Progressive period. No doubt it would have been exceedingly influential in any case, but the circumstances--that it was issued just before American entry into World War I--created a climate favorable to its concern with personal and social immediacy and utility and what is today referred to as "relevance." (Hertzberg, 1971, pp. 11-12)

While the general impact of the final, overall commission report in the Cardinal Principles of 1918 was great indeed in making citizenship one of the cardinal goals, the report tended to reduce the political concerns of civic education in favor of social and economic and practical personal problems:

> Civics should concern itself less with constitutional questions and remote governmental functions and should direct attention to social agencies close at hand and to the informal activities of daily life that regard and seek the common good. Such agencies as child welfare organizations and consumers' leagues afford specific opportunities for the expression of civic qualities by the older pupils. (National Education Association, 1918, p. 14)

At last, however, the skills of civic participation became part of the objectives of education. The Cardinal Principles found valuable

> ...the assignment of projects and problems to groups of pupils for cooperative solution and the socialized recitation whereby the class as a whole develops a sense of collective responsibility. Both of these devices give training in collective thinking. Moreover, the democratic organization and administration of the school itself, as well as the cooperative relations of pupil and teacher, pupil and pupil, and teacher and teacher, are indispensable. (National Education Association, 1918, p. 14)

While this approval of the study of problems and "socialized recitation" in classrooms may seem to be a modest proposal to modern teachers, it by no means swept the profession off its feet. Teaching by the book, lecturing, note taking, question and answer, recitation, memorizing, essay writing, and examination passing continued to be the prime methods of history and civics classrooms. And venturing out into the community was still more radical, especially if a zealous civics teacher actually ran up against the local politicians. Schools found that the study of "remote governmental functions" could be conducted more freely than projects treading on local political toes.

But at least the idea of participation could now take its place alongside the inculcation of values and political knowledge as the main ingredients of a civic program in the schools. And the way was being prepared for distinguishing and comparing the stated values of the political community with the actual operation of the governmental authorities, at least at the municipal level of community civics.

Above all, Cardinal Principles recognized that the high schools had to deal with a population very different from that of the secondary schools of the first 100 years of the Republic, that is, the non-college-oriented students. Assimilation of vast numbers of foreign immigrants, both youthful and adult, nearly engulfed the schools and exhausted their energies. Teaching English and the rudimentary structure of government were the easiest ways. For all the protestations of the progressives and the national committees and the teachers of teachers, the courses in American history, civics, and civil government (which were engrossing to countless thousands of adult immigrants) were boring to millions of high school students pushed through ritualized cycles of social studies: "communities" in the third and fourth grades, civics in the ninth and twelfth grades, American history in the fifth, eighth, and eleventh grades, with geography, state history, and European or world history sandwiched in, probably in the seventh and tenth grades.

The following fifty-year period was given over to all kinds of attempts to reform and break out of the social studies cycles on behalf of a better civic education, and, even more belatedly, to incorporate at last minority and disadvantaged groups that had long been "outsiders" to the mainstream of American political and educational life.

Recurring Calls for Reform of Civic Education (1926-1976)

The outpouring of proposals and projects to create more effective civic education programs during the past half-century would take volumes to relate. The variations of details are infinite, yet there is a sameness to the lists of goals and objectives set forth by one commission after another. After the brutal realities and disillusionments of Vietnam and Watergate, some of the earlier statements seem blatantly and grimly superpatriotic (others exude the bland optimism of Pollyanna herself). All that can be done here is to suggest the range of political outlooks that seemed to motivate some of the major approaches to civic education.

In the wake of World War I, citizenship education programs were subjected to almost constant attack by conservative civic and patriotic organizations whose views were antiforeign, antipacifist, anti-immigration, and antiradical. In the 1920s the American Legion led the campaigns to get Congress and the state legislature to require civic instruction, flag salutes, military training, and loyalty oaths. The dominant mood of civic education in the 1920s was to "rally round the flag," extoll the merits and successes and say nothing derogatory about the greatest country on earth.

In contrast, the 1930s witnessed a social reformist outlook sparked by the economic depression, the New Deal, and the onset of totalitarianism in the world. One of the most impressive examples of educational response was the Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical Association, which was funded by the Carnegie Foundation for five years from January 1929 to December 1933, and which issued seventeen volumes between 1932 and 1937. The dominant tone of the most widely read volumes (those by Charles A. Beard, George S. Counts, Bessie L. Pierce, Jesse H. Newlon, and Merle Conti) was set by the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commission (1934): the age of individualism and laissez-faire in economics and government was closing and a new collectivism requiring social planning and governmental regulation was emerging. The marshalled arguments struck now familiar notes: deprivation in the midst of plenty, inequality in income, spreading unemployment, wasted natural resources, rising crime and violence, subordination of public welfare to private interest, and international struggle for raw materials. No particular curriculum was promulgated; but it was clear that this view of life and this political/economic frame of reference were to guide specific curriculum making for civic education programs. The clear implication was that youth should be inculcated with the values of economic collectivity and interdependence in place of economic individualism, while promoting personal and cultural individualism and freedom.

Like-minded proposals were stemming from George S. Counts, John Dewey, Harold Rugg, William H. Kilpatrick, John L. Childs, and other social reconstructionists. Counts' Dare the School Build a New Social Order came out in 1932; The Educational Frontier edited by Kilpatrick, in 1933; and the magazine The Social Frontier in 1934, the latter specifically endorsing the Conclusions and Recommendations.

Naturally, the social frontiersmen set the profession by its ears and elicited vigorous and shrill counterattacks. But the major professional organizations responded on the whole positively in giving renewed attention to civic education. The National Education Association and the American Association of School Adminstrators jointly sponsored the Educational Policies Commission in 1935, enlisting Counts to membership along with several more conservative administrators. The pronouncements of the Educational Policies Commission softened the social reconstructionist economic views, but they did emphasize, over and over again, education for democracy. Charles Beard wrote the first draft of the Commission's historical volume entitled The Unique Functions of Education in American Democracy in 1937.

When The Purposes of Education in American Democracy was produced in 1938 (written by William H. Carr, executive secretary), the seven cardinal principles had been reduced to four objectives, but "civic responsibility" was retained as the fourth (in addition to self-realization, human relationship, and economic efficiency). The stated objectives of civic responsibility do not sound particularly daring today --there was little emphasis upon liberty or equality or due process--but for all the bland language there was scope for realistic civic studies (if teachers or communities had the stomach for them):

33

- Social Justice: The educated citizen is sensitive to the disparities of human circumstance.

- Social Activity: The educated citizen acts to correct unsatisfactory conditions.

- Social Understanding: The educated citizen seeks to understand social structures and social processes.

- Critical Judgment: The educated citizen has defenses against propaganda.

- Tolerance: The educated citizen respects honest differences of opinion.

- Conservation: The educated citizen has a regard for the nation's resources.

- Social Applications of Science: The educated citizen measures scientific advance by its contribution to the general welfare.

- World Citizenship: The educated citizen is a cooperating member of the world community.

- Law Observance: The educated citizen respects the law.

- Economic Literacy: The educated citizen is economically literate.

- Political Citizenship: The educated citizen accepts his civic duties.

- Devotion to Democracy: The educated citizen acts upon an unswerving loyalty to democratic ideals. (Educational Policies Commission, 1938, p. 108)

World War II broke into this movement, mobilizing the schools for the war effort. After the war, education for good citizenship became a rage in school systems in response to the cold war crusade against communism in the world and as a kind of defense against the onslaughts of McCarthyism at home. The hope was obviously that children could be taught the values of consensus on the principles of political democracy and the values of a free enterprise economy, reflecting the spirit of accommodation and good will of the Eisenhower years.

One volume admirably reveals these twin drives--a fierce opposition to communism in the world, and a hope that good will, cooperative actions, and positive democratic attitudes would strengthen democracy at home. Sprinkled with pictures of smiling, clean, well-dressed groups of white pupils and teachers, the 32nd Yearbook of the American Association of School Administrators, produced by its Commission on Educating for Citizenship, had this to say in 1954:

> At his best, the American citizen has always sought to realize the nation's historic ideals. Now, when communist imperialism threatens all security, he feels a new appreciation for the old ideals as a stable element in a shaky world. The public schools are the means on which the American leans most heavily to make sure that all children carry forward the American heritage. So now, even more urgently than in the past, the citizen demands that the schools educate for citizenship. (American Association of School Administrators, 1954, p. 5)

Echoing the Cardinal Principles of forty years earlier, the Commission opted for a broad concept of citizenship education that would include "all the mutually helpful social relationships with others which democracy assumes should be characteristic of human life and living." By opening the door of citizenship education to all kinds of social and personal relationships, the Commission forecast what often did happen in social studies programs. Whether adopting some version of the popular core curriculum that mushroomed in the 1950s or sticking to specific courses in civics and problems of democracy, these programs often drifted off to "problems of democratic living" involving the behavior and psychology of adolescents; their personal, marriage, and family problems, vocational interests; and personal values. The broad social conception of citizenship often became so broad and so social that it watered down or neglected the basic political questions of power, influence, and decision making.

This, of course, was not true of all proposals or projects having to do with citizenship education in the 1950s. The 22nd Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies in 1951 listed twenty-four characteristics of the good citizen, reflecting the composite thinking of 300 public figures as well as educators. The first thirteen stressed the values of equality, liberty, basic human rights, the law, and other political competencies; the other eleven had to do with economic, family, community, and international matters. One project in the 1950s focused upon the concept of liberty. The Citizenship Education Project (CEP) at Teachers College stressed the values and knowledge appropriate to the free individual, the free government, the free economy, and the free world. It documented from Constitution and law in great detail the premises of liberty under each of these headings.

What was most interesting to professional educators in the Teachers College project was the stress on participation skills, identified by the neutral term "laboratory practices." Hundreds of laboratory practices detailed how teachers and students could engage together in action-oriented problem solving in the schools and in the community. Workshops and training programs were conducted across the country for hundreds of schools and thousands of teachers during the decade of the 1950s. Taken seriously, the suggestions could have led to much more than bland good will: that is, studying the local congressional district to see if it provides fair representation of minority groups, making a tax map of the community to see if tax assessments are equitable, getting young people to join political clubs, helping to get voters to register and to cast ballots, providing citizens with nonpartisan political information, informing the community where candidates stood on issues, actually campaigning for candidates, drafting a real and not a sham school constitution, and the like. Unfortunately, the CEP had to combat a political neutralism and caution among educators during the McCarthy 1950s, its funds ran out just before the rise of political activism of the 1960s, and it never was incorporated well into the mainstream of teaching and research at Teachers College.

A curious coincidence of forces saw a general relaxing of explicit calls for more and better civic education in the 1960s. The "new social studies movement" and the rise of student unrest and activism undercut patriotism as an argument for civic education. Responding to the successes of the new math and the new science stimulated by Sputnik and funded so generously by the National Defense Education Act, the National Science Foundation, and the foundations, the new social studies took on the patterns of the social science disciplines: cognitive analysis, systematic acquisition of sequential and organized knowledge, conceptual analysis, "inquiry learning," "discovery method," and in general a stress upon thinking like a social scientist (reminiscent, as Hazel Hertzberg pointed out, of the primary sources movement in history teaching of the 1880s to 1900).

It is too early to make judgments about the relative value of various projects that could come under the heading of the "new social studies." But it is clear that the revived disciplinary approach to knowledge tended not only to belittle "soft," diffuse, and superficial programs of social studies in the schools, but also to downgrade citizenship education as a proper goal of the school curriculum. One of the most forthright and explicit statements of this view was made by the executive director of the American Political Science Association and his wife in 1962:

> There is a long-standing tradition according to which secondary school instruction in political science, or instruction based upon the knowledge political science provides, has as its main objective the making of good citizens. This tradition appears to be based on the belief that instruction in government, politics, the political process, and the important issues of public policy will produce citizens who will discuss, act, and vote rationally and intelligently and that we may thereby achieve a sane and effective democratic society. Without asserting that education in the field of government, politics, and public policy has no role to play in helping to form better citizens, we feel required to state at the outset, in the interests of clarity, that we regard this tradition and the beliefs upon which it is based as mistaken and misleading: first, because it is based on a distorted conception of how citizens are made; second, because it is based on a distorted conception of democracy; and, third, because it is based on a misconception of political science. (Hunt et al., 1962, pp. 99-100)

In other words, citizens are made by the total process of political socialization outside the schools; democracy like all big governments must rest upon the expert knowledge of specialists which cannot be encompassed by the average citizen; and political science is a very complicated intellectual discipline about political behavior, not a set of maxims about good citizenship. Caught between this view from the academic departments and the raucous nonnegotiable demands for relevance now from militant student activists, the traditional programs of civic education seemed pale, irresolute, and outmoded. Whether the new social studies could provide the answer was in doubt.

It is surely true that much of the work of the many curriculum development projects was more realistic than the civic education of the 1950s--more sophisticated, more analytical and skeptical, and more attuned to minority claims for equality and the struggles for civil rights. Whether they will emphasize sufficiently political values, political knowledge, and political behavior remains to be seen. Of twenty-six major curriculum centers and projects reported on and analyzed in Social Education (1972) seven or eight seemed to put special stress upon citizenship objectives. Some had headquarters at colleges and universities (Amherst, University of Southern California at Los Angeles, Carnegie-Mellon, Harvard, Indiana, and Tufts); others were independent projects of the Educational Development Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the Law in American Society Foundation in Chicago.

In the 1970s, law-related approaches to citizen education have been dominant. In 1975, Norman Gross and Charles White summarized recent developments as follows:

> In 1971, statewide programs were being organized or were under headway in only six states. Now (1975) 26 states have at least incipient statewide projects. In 1971, no more than 150 law-related education projects were active in the schools. Today there are almost 400. In 1971, only seven summer teacher-training institutes were held. Last year, 26 such institutes were offered....
>
> Curriculum materials have multiplied dramatically in the past decade....500 books and pamphlets suitable for classroom use....400 films, filmstrips and tapes....
>
> However, these developments do not necessarily mean that law-related education will ultimately

> become a part of the schools' permanent course of study...most of the task remains to be accomplished. Probably no more than five percent of American students have had the opportunity to take meaningful law-related courses, and most teachers have not yet received training enabling them to instruct effectively in this area....
>
> Most projects are not yet a part of the regular program and budget of school systems....It is important to train large numbers of future teachers while they are still in college....projects now in existence must become institutionalized....
>
> It has been estimated that any major educational reform cannot be accomplished without at least one generation of effort. (Gross & White, 1975, pp. 46-48)

What will the historian of year 2000 be saying about efforts in the generation following 1976?

References

American Association of School Administrators. Educating for American citizenship. Washington, D.C.: 1954.

Bancroft, G. History of the United States of America from the discovery of the continent (Vol. 1). Boston: Little, Brown, 1879.

Calhoun, D. (Ed.). The educating of Americans: A documentary history. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.

Cremin, L.A. The republic and the school: Horace Mann on the education of free men. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1957.

Educational Policies Commission, The purposes of education in American democracy. Washington, D.C.: National Education Association and American Association of School Administrators, 1938.

Elson, R.M. Guardians of tradition: American schoolbooks of the nineteenth century. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964.

Gross, N., & White, C. Law, education and participation. In Education for law and justice: Whose responsibility? A call for national action. Los Angeles: Constitutional Rights Foundation, 1975.

Hertzberg, H.W. Historic parallels for the sixties and seventies: Primary sources and core curriculum revisited. Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Education Consortium Publication 135, 1971.

Hunt, E.M. et al. High school social studies: Perspectives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962.

Jefferson, T. Notes on the State of Virginia (2nd American Ed.). Philadelphia, 1794.

National Education Association, Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education, Cardinal principles of secondary education. U.S. Bureau of Education Bulletin 35. Washington, D.C.: 1918.

Padover, S.K. The complete Jefferson. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pierce, 1943.

Social Education, November 1972, 36(7).

WHAT SHOULD WE LEARN FROM THE HISTORY OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES?

R. Freeman Butts

Distinguished Professor of Education

San Jose State University

The author asserts that civic education in America historically has been the product of a three-way tension among the value claims of a democratic political community, the value claims of segmented pluralisms, and the pressures of the worldwide modernization process. Thus there have been persistent dilemmas. Americans believe that universal education is fundamental to the welfare of the republic but draw back from political indoctrination in the schools (especially if it does not agree with their particular views). The urgency to promote civic education rises in times of national crisis or very rapid social change, with progressive reformers suggesting one kind of prescription and conservative traditionalists another. The author posits his view that the reformist trends have been more in tune with the best of our democratic goals and practices. Contemporary society, however, requires a much different kind of civic education from that of the past; it should deal with the political values, political knowledge, and skills of political participation required of a modern democratic political community.

The historical interpretation upon which this discussion paper is based has been set forth briefly in my chapter entitled "Historical Perspective on Civic Education in the United States," contained in the report of the National Task Force on Citizenship Education, Education for Responsible Citizenship (Butts, 1977b) (see preceding paper). That chapter in turn was based upon the more inclusive historical interpretation embodied in Public Education in the United States (Butts, 1978). Variations on the theme regarding prescriptions for the civic role of public schools have been sounded in several different articles of mine over the past five years (Butts, 1973b, 1973c, 1974, 1975, 1975-76, 1976, 1977d). If perchance anyone should have read the entire group, the reaction could easily have been, If you've seen one, you've seen them all. Nonetheless, I list the articles here (see References) because they were addressed to different public and professional audiences; and they were produced during the period when I was doing research and writing the larger single volume on the history of public education (Butts, 1978). The interaction between my concern for good history and good policy is obvious and, I believe, defensible.

It might be said that the first thing one should learn from history is to become aware of the conceptual framework of the historian. My own intellectual, historiographical, and political orientation is set forth in Public Education in the United States (Butts, 1978). I can only hint at it here, but I should say that this orientation is considerably different (and I hope improved) from what I set forth in The Education of the West and "The Public Purpose of the Public School" (Butts, 1973a, 1973b). In those pieces I was playing vigorously on the modernization theme. I still believe that the modernization process is an essential ingredient in social change; but a more satisfactory interpretation of the history of the civic role of public education can be achieved by viewing that history as a product of the three-way tension arising from the interplay of (a) modernization, (b) the cohesive value claims that undergird the overall democratic political community, and (c) the differentiating value claims of segmental pluralisms that give identity to various groups in the society.

For convenience of discussion I shall identify four ingredients of each of these three building blocks of the civic role of public education:

- The worldwide modernization process, including the mobilizing and centralizing power of the state, popular participation, industrial urbanization, and secularization;
- Cohesive value claims of the democratic political community, including liberty, equality, popular consent, and personal obligation for the public good;
- Differentiating value claims of segmental pluralisms, including religion, ethnicity, race, and localism.

Proponents of citizenship education in the schools almost always appealed in their rhetoric to the cohesive value claims of democracy as the rationale for a basic civic role for schooling. Sometimes this was wrapped in the authority of a particular religion (say Protestant Christianity), or ethnicity (Anglo-Americanism), or race (white superiority), or localism (states' rights). In these cases one segment of the pluralism sought to use the public schools to promote its particular version of democratic political values. When other pluralistic segments grew strong or resistant they often sought to break away from the cohesive push and form their own schools or promote their own values as the basis for building a sense of particularistic community. When the pluralistic pulls to differentiation seemed to threaten the cohesion of the overall political community, the claims of modernization (in the form of national unity, national strength, or economic development) often put an overweening emphasis on patriotic loyalty into the citizenship-education programs of the schools that sometimes led to a conformism stifling to dissent.

This analysis has led me to this generalization: For 200 years the American people have struggled with a tricorn dilemma of politics and education. They have believed that education is fundamental to the health and vitality of an ideally democratic political community; but they also believed in large measures of freedom of belief and action for segmental pluralistic communities; and, especially in times of real or fancied crisis, they have believed in civic education for national unity and loyalty.

The urge to promote citizenship education through the schools has arisen most insistently when threats to national unity seem to be most critical or when drastic social changes seem to endanger social or political stability. The threats, however, have been viewed from very different perspectives, and prescriptions for renewed unity have led to quite different conclusions.

One kind of approach has stressed the need for greater cohesion and mobilization of disparate groups in order to achieve liberal social and political reforms; in Robert Wiebe's terms, to achieve "a new social integration, a higher form of social harmony," releasing "powerful feelings of liberation from an inhibiting past and great expectations for a dawning new era" (Wiebe, 1975, pp. 124-125). Such were the Revolutionary, Jacksonian, early Reconstruction, Progressive, New Deal, and New Frontier/Great Society periods.

Another kind of approach has stressed the need for citizenship education (a) to reinforce the traditional or conservative cohesive values of the American past, its national destiny and power, its devotion to individual worth and effort, its free enterprise system, its superiority to other peoples and nations; and (b) to protect the American way of life from pluralistic threats from "alien" sources, whether of massive immigration, militant or subversive radicalism, hot wars, or cold wars.

Sometimes, of course, the motivations and prescriptions cannot be so easily distinguished. The complexity of the periodic urges to reform citizenship education increased the sharpness of the horns of the dilemma. As a result of this persistent three-way pulling and hauling among the claims of a democratic polity, of segmental pluralisms, and of aggressive economic and nationalistic modernity, the civic-education programs of the past have seemed to recent historians to vacillate between two kinds of didactic approaches: programs motivated by strong moral, national, or nativist fervor, which gave civic education a tone of preachy or pugnacious patriotism; and programs seeking to avoid political controversy in the schools, which turned civic education into pedantic, pallid, platitudinous, or pusillanimous exercises.

Now, there is no doubt that these two extremes have been exhibited in the history of citizenship education; Marvin Lazerson, David Tyack, Ruth Elson, and others have amply documented the examples. I believe that we can learn valuable lessons from this history about desirable as well as undesirable approaches to civic education. I shall try to point to a few of these in each of the four historical periods that I used for my chapter in the Task Force report and in my _Public Education in the United States_ (Butts, 1977b, 1978).

The Revolutionary Ideal: Unum (1776-1826)

I believe that _Unum_ is still a desirable goal for civic education. The regeneration of a sense of political community should be a prime goal for the education of each new generation of Americans. The sense of community, as I define it, is a commitment to the basic values of constitutional government as denoted by the concepts of liberty, equality, popular consent, and personal obligation for the public good. These were values promulgated by the founders of the Republic in the Revolutionary era and embodied in the Declaration, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. I believe that the welfare of the Republic does rest on an educated citizenry, as the founders argued. I believe that the prime purpose, the highest priority, for a genuinely public education is the political goal of empowering the whole population to exercise the rights, and cope with the responsibilities, of a genuinely democratic citizenship.

But we also should learn that society and government, and thus the nature of citizenship, have changed drastically in the past 200 years. So we cannot be content with the prescriptions for a civic curriculum that were produced in the late 18th or early 19th centuries. Simple literacy in the three Rs for elementary school white boys is obviously not enough. Simple history, as proposed by Jefferson, or the elements of civil government, as proposed by Washington, are not enough. Vague preachments on the glories of liberty, as described by Ruth Elson, are not enough. Didactic appeals to the moral, spiritual, or political virtues are not enough, and partisan indoctrination of particular economic or ideological platforms is not appropriate. Nor should textbooks be left to the socially or politically conservative authors.

Yet somehow the schools do have a responsibility for doing all they can to teach the values, the knowledge, and the participation skills required of a modern democratic citizenry. Such ingredients should not be left largely to political parties, newspapers, ministers, or coffee houses as they were in the Revolutionary period; nor to business or labor, or to Walter, John, David, Harry, or even Barbara today. My own guidelines for today's civic education will be summarized at the end of this paper.

The Post-Revolutionary Reality: Pluribus (1826-1876)

In reexamining the stated purposes used to justify the development and spread of the common public school in the middle decades of the 19th century, I believe that the citizenship argument is still valid. The highest priority for a genuinely public school is to serve the public purposes of a democratic political community. The "back to the basics" people should be reminded that the basic purpose for universal literacy is that it is essential for a democratic political community. If the fundamental purposes of schooling are preparing for a job, or preparing for college, or developing individual talents, these purposes could be achieved in private schools that select students for particular destinies. But I believe that the faith of the common school reformers, as of the founders--that the civic tasks can best be performed by public schools characterized primarily by a public purpose, public control, public support, public access, and public commitment to civic unity--was soundly based.

Now, it is obvious that the public school reformers did not achieve these goals. Horace Mann was on the right track when he argued for the necessity of what he candidly called "political education." But I believe that he fell short of what is needed (then as well as now). While he stressed the understanding of the constitutional regime and knowledge about civil government, he backed away from the discussion of controversial political or constitutional questions in the schoolroom. He thus helped to establish the tradition that the schools are not legitimate forums in which to discuss politically sensitive matters. This was a difficult issue for Mann, but he concluded that it was better to have "neutral" public schools than to have none, a dénouement he feared would come about if the schools became "theatres for party politics" (Cremin, 1957). I think we can and must find a way to surmount Mann's difficulties.

A second thing we should learn from the middle decades of the 19th century is that there were at least two lines of thought that influenced the civic role of public education with regard to assimilation of the immigrants who began to come in large numbers prior to the Civil War. It is undoubtedly true that a growing nativism in the period from the 1830s to the 1850s sometimes gave to the public school movement an anti-Catholic, anti-radical, and Anglo-superiority tone. But we should also remember with John Higham (1975) that there was another more democratic and more cosmopolitan point of view displayed by some proponents of the public schools, who argued that they should be a humane assimilative force. In the 1860s and 1870s ethnic rivalries declined, nativism was muted, modernization welcomed enormous new pools of manpower, and a Christian belief in the brotherhood of man was still alive and well.

All these influences flowed into what Higham calls "the Age of Confidence," i.e., confidence in the capacity of the Republic to accept great diversity and pluralism as a basic characteristic of the democratic political community. And the public schools could contribute to this cosmopolitan view of assimilation. Bilingual public schools in several states exemplified this faith.

The Civics of Modernization (1876-1926)

The main lesson we should learn from the Gilded Age and Progressive era is that there were two major pressures upon the schools to prescribe their citizenship education. The first and the most influential through most of this period emanated from the business-oriented and nationalistic nativism associated with a burgeoning modernization movement. The three significant changes in civic education noted in my historical chapter and book (Butts, 1977b, 1978) reflect these pushes to conformity: (a) the shrill and passionate patriotism owed to a great and powerful nation that was exercising its manifest destiny, winning the West, building an empire, and making the world safe for democracy; (b) the demand for instant Americanization of the millions upon millions of immigrants who flooded into the United States from the 1880s to the 1920s; and (c) the glorification of the self-made man who labored (and prospered) on behalf of free enterprise and a limited government. It is not difficult to see these trends illustrated in textbooks in American history and civil government.

For much of the period these elements of the modernization mood dominated the civic education in the schools as they did much of American public life. They overshadowed the value claims of the historic democratic political community and of the newly arrived and vastly varied pluralistic communities. Often, some business-oriented or economy-minded "progressives" joined in these views on behalf of "social control."

But, as Robert Wiebe so well points out (1975), there was a second strain of the new middle-class professionals who were welfare-oriented, or social-service progressives. Their concern was the use of liberal government on behalf of social reform (in reference to prisons, sweat shops, child labor, and temperance) as well as political reform (electoral innovations, civil service, women's suffrage, and compulsory school attendance directed toward universal education). This stream of progressive endeavor resulted in a number of efforts to reform citizenship education in the schools. These included the stiffening of history teaching by basing it on primary sources and thus combating the chauvinism of rampant nativism; the effort to develop a "community civics" to replace a sterile approach to constitutional structures; and the "new civics" embodied in the social studies movement and in the Cardinal Principles enunciated in 1918 by the National Education Association's Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education. Some welfare-oriented progressives even tried to reorient the Americanization process so that assimilation would be accomplished generously and sympathetically with respect for immigrant cultures and traditions. Thus was cultural pluralism born.

I hope that we have had done with the excesses of the nativistic and superpatriotic conformity that marked the aggressive modernization period. We could surely learn a good deal from the earlier progressive effort to stress reasoned problem solving on behalf of "all manner of social efforts to improve mankind" (Butts, 1977, p. 58). I hope that schools can take seriously the problems approach to social, economic, and political issues. But one result of all the reform movements in civic education of this period was to reduce the political concerns of history, civics, and social studies. There has definitely been a withdrawal from the study of the basic ideas of the constitutional regime and the political community. The general civic-education curriculum seldom dealt with the fundamental concepts and meaning of liberty, equality, justice, and obligation for the public good. Still less often did the practices of schools reflect these ideas in their governance or activities.

Recurring Calls for Reform of Civic Education (1926-1976)

The best way I can illustrate what I believe we should learn from the past 50 years of the history of civic education is to refer to two of my most recent articles and to quote excerpts from them here (see below). These comments should be considered in the light of my general historical judgment that the values of segmental pluralisms have been forcefully reasserted in the recent past and have gained enormous popularity among educators and the public. Witness the rise of the new ethnicity, a neoconservatism in social and political philosophy, cultural pluralism in educational philosophy, multiculturalism and bilingualism in curriculum, and the range of alternatives of all kinds, including alternatives to the public school.

In addition, some of the value claims of the democratic political community in relation to education have been reasserted. In the past half century the values of freedom (for parents, teachers, and students) have been enhanced. The values of equality have made considerable headway (dismantling the segregated school systems, equalizing financial support, compensatory education, affirmative action). But the values of political community have been diminished (Vietnam War, Watergate, campus unrest, corruption, violence in the schools). These generalizations have been discussed at length in Part IV of _Public Education in the United States_ (Butts, 1978) and briefly in a pamphlet entitled _The School's Role as Moral Authority_ (Butts, 1977d).

Excerpts

The following excerpts have been selected from Butts, 1976 and 1977a, as indicated.

> I happen to think that while economic problems are exceedingly important, the role of the public school should be basically _political_ rather than economic. In this I go back to the founders of the republic who viewed their revolution primarily in political terms rather than economic or social, and who thus viewed the kind of education needed in the new republic largely in political terms rather than as a

means to academic excellence or individual self-fulfillment or preparation for a job.

They talked about public education as a guarantor of the republican values of liberty, equality, and devotion to the public good. As liberal reformers they saw the need to mobilize disparate social and cultural and economic groups if greater political cohesion and unity were to be achieved. Subsequent periods of reform echoed the revolutionary faith; Jacksonian liberal reformers pinned faith on the universal common school as an integral part of the egalitarianism of the day; liberal Reconstruction reformers even hoped that the public common school could be extended to the South; the Progressive liberal reformers of the early 1900s turned to the idea of a common public secondary system as an extension of the common school; New Deal liberal reformers like Counts and the social frontiersmen saw the public school as a means to greater economic justice; and the New Frontier/Great Society liberal reformers hoped that open access, affirmative action, compensatory education, and desegregation would lead to greater social justice for the disadvantaged poor, for racial and ethnic minorities, and for women.

I believe all of these liberal reform movements were basically useful responses to the problems of their day. Now, however, I believe the problem is more acutely political than it has been since the Revolutionary era. The evidence mounts on every side--from scholarly studies to opinion polls to political party leaders--that there is today among all classes of people a deep and widespread disenchantment with government and with political institutions. Upon this, conservatives, radicals, and liberals all agree, the polls agree, and even President Ford and President Carter agree. What they disagree on is what to do about it. Conservatives in philosophy and politics (like Nisbet, Nozick, Ford, and Reagan) say, Let's turn the leviathan around and have less government in the interests of individual freedom. Radicals say, Let's have socialist or Communist government in the interests of equality for the masses of society, even if liberty must be restricted in the process. Anarchists say, Let's have no government. Nihilists say, Let's have terror in all your houses, for there is no way to achieve orderly political change.

Liberals (like Charles Frankel, John Rawls, Morris Udall, and Hubert Humphrey) say, Let's have an improved welfare state, a more vital and positive democratic government on behalf of freedom, equality, and social justice. Liberal scholars and journalists at the moment seem to be more forthright on the subject than the bulk of the teaching profession itself. Rawls argues that government should adhere to his general conception of justice: All social primary goods--liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect--are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.

The two contributing principles of justice are these:

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged...and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

I find it heartening that such diverse black leaders as Eldridge Cleaver, Jesse Jackson, and Bayard Rustin have recently expressed their belief that liberal political means may still be the preferred road to achieving justice and equality for blacks in America. After several years as a fugitive from the United States, Cleaver returned from abroad to say that despite its imperfections America had more liberty of thought and action than some "socialist" countries. In a letter to the Los Angeles Times, he said:

> Politically, in terms of the development of our democratic institutions, America is more than the hope of the world. By comparison, America is like an advanced civilization from another world.
>
> The greatest mistake we have made as a nation is to allow our shining principles to lapse so far into disuse that we misname them clichés.

Jesse Jackson recently called upon black Americans to become more self-reliant and more active in their own self-development. Political action is one key to the realization of their vision, and reassertion of their moral authority and ethical conduct is another; but, he said, "the greatest potential for self-development is to be found in the public schools in our cities."

And Bayard Rustin, president of Social Democrats, U.S.A., has said in his criticism of the doctrine of international "no-growth" economics:

> [The] willingness to abandon growth at once symbolizes and contributes to the weakening of the liberal will and liberal vision in the West. Above all else, liberals have fought for a society offering an increasing possibility for the fulfillment of individual potential within the context of a just legal and economic order. The failure to achieve perfect justice and perfect opportunity should in no way obscure the very real progress that has been made toward these ideals. Not the least of these achievements is the perpetuation of a democratic form of government that, whatever its flaws, has permitted ordinary people to have a voice in, and sometimes to dominate, the political system. It is, furthermore, a system that has reduced the influence of privilege without coercion or purges.

I have no doubt that the reformist liberal position requires both liberal government and liberal education to stand for and to work actively for social justice and for equality. This distinguishes liberalism from laissez-faire conservatism. But liberalism, as its very name proclaims, stands for political liberty as well. This distinguishes it from revolutionary radicalism. For me, the constitutional liberties enunciated in the Bill of Rights embody the essence of the political community that is liberal: the freedoms of religion, thought, investigation, speech, teaching, communication, assembly, due process, privacy, jury trial, suffrage, habeas corpus, and equal protection of the laws. Progress toward justice and equality cannot be made by sacrificing the constitutional liberties, but only by strengthening them.

This is no plea for "law and order" as code words for repression of dissident views or minority claims for greater freedom and equality. It is a plea for a genuine reform liberalism.

William V. Shannon of the New York Times editorial staff put it well indeed:

> Aside from exigent economic problems, liberals have to renew the authority of the nation's institutions and strengthen its sense of community. Patriotism, a natural and essential emotion, needs to be revitalized in intellectual terms as a legitimate ideal after the cruel excesses and misplaced sacrifices of Vietnam.
>
> Liberals have to develop education policies that lead to genuine learning in the schools, and health insurance, welfare, and housing policies that strengthen the family and the neighborhood.
>
> Conservatives fumble while nihilist shadows flicker. Can liberals meet the real needs of the nation's majority?

Two hundred years ago the liberal founders thought that they could meet the needs of the majority if they brought into being a political revolution providing self-government and individual freedoms and based upon a republican public education. One hundred fifty years ago the Jacksonian and Whig liberals thought that they could, if state governments were used for social reform purposes--for the redress of inequities and injustices --in common schools, prisons, poor relief, suffrage, crime, immigration, women's rights, and child labor. One hundred years ago Reconstruction liberals thought that they could, if the federal government would take active steps to achieve equal rights of citizenship for black and white alike, including among other things public schools. Forty years ago New Deal liberals thought that they could meet the needs of the majority if government and schools alike sought to build a new social and economic order.

What shall we say today? I hope we will say something like this: I believe that educational liberals can meet the needs of the nation if they will mobilize education's political role in achieving freedom, equality, and community. The highest priority should be given to the educational search for a viable, inclusive, and just political community. For me this means a special concern for community of nation above locality, state, or region, and of world above nation. A civic liberal education should be focused upon resolving the tensions between the principles of freedom and equality and promoting an active and normative commitment to constitutional rights, justice, and the principle of equal liberties. These principles should be applied to the whole range of knotty problems of access, control, support, organization, curriculum, teaching, and life of the schools in the effort to achieve the massive turn-around that the whole educational system requires. A good place to start would be to accelerate efforts to focus the liberal civic curriculum of the schools and colleges upon the values, knowledge, and skills of participation required of citizens in the promotion of their constitutional rights and civil liberties. (Butts, 1976)

* * *

My own view is that the political goal of civic education in American schools is to deal with all students in such way as to motivate them and enable them to play their parts as informed, responsible, and effective members of a modern democratic political system. This is to be achieved by orienting them to the values, the knowledge, and the skills of participation required for making deliberate choices among real alternatives in all three aspects of the political system.

The Political System

The political community: The group of persons drawn together by their common participation in shared governing processes and bound together by a common frame of political values. The "sense of community" is marked by feelings of mutual and distinctive identity and belongingness, sentiments supporting cohesion and solidarity, and commitments to the common welfare. Since the founding of the Republic we have affirmed that the American political community should be committed to freedom, equality, justice, popular consent, and personal obligation for the public good.

The long-range constitutional order: The actual operation as well as the formal and informal structure of the basic institutions (legislative, executive, judicial, bureaucratic), the norms, and rules by which political demands and interests are aggregated, regulated, and channelled into authoritative decisions. The political process (composed of parties, lobbying, negotiating, and compromising) is vastly more complicated in a modern technological society than it was 200 years ago.

The day-to-day governing authorities: The temporary occupants of offices of authority, ranging from those who have broad discretion in decision-making in their conduct of governmental agencies (president, legislators, judges) to those who have a narrower range of discretion in bureaucracies and the public service. These obviously vary greatly in the extent to which they exemplify or fail to live up to the values proclaimed by the political community and the principles underlying the constitutional régime.

The Educational Program

An efficacious civic education in the schools will include not only the curriculum classroom teaching and learning, but will embrace the whole educational system, its organization and administration, its activities and school government, its "hidden curriculum," and its relation to the community and to the other agencies concerned with civic education. It will not only exemplify democratic political values and impart valid and realistic knowledge but also teach the skills of political participation:

Political values are the sets of attitudes, feelings, beliefs, and commitments that contribute to the support of the political system. Without such support no political system can maintain itself without educating each generation appropriately through the processes of "political socialization." All modern nations have made great use of the schools as prime vehicles of civic education.

Political knowledge includes the various ways in which systematic information is transmitted through reading, thinking, inquiry, discussion, and the nonverbal media of communication. Social scientists like to speak of the "disciplines of knowledge"; psychologists speak of "cognitive skills." In either case the knowledge should be based upon the most rigorous, critical, analytical, and realistic processes available to modern scholarship, what my late colleague Lyman Bryson called "significant truth rather than plausible falsehood or beguiling half-truth."

Political participation includes the teaching and learning of practical skills of political behavior through realistic involvement of students in exerting influence in the public affairs of the society as well as in the governing of the schools themselves. This goes far beyond simply learning how to vote or to get out the vote but involves first hand practice in the arts of negotiation, compromise, aggregating power, decision making, and holding others as well as oneself accountable for the consequences of decisions made and power exerted.

The School Population

An efficacious civic education will take full account of the total range of students to be served, their different cultural backgrounds, socioeconomic statuses, ethnic and racial identities, and learning styles:

The college-bound: Despite gains for equality of educational opportunity there remains a high relationship between socioeconomic status and those students who expect or intend to go to college.

The non-college-bound: Political values, knowledge, and participation of working class youth have often been quite different from those of professional or middle class youth.

The "unincorporated": Those who for one reason or another have been blocked from access to the mainstream of American political and social life, the disadvantaged minorities, the blacks, and the continuing poor. (Butts, 1977a)

In the best of times this is no easy task. It is doubly difficult--and important--at the present time when so many citizens have lost confidence in the integrity, authority, and efficacy of public persons and governmental institutions, and when so many youth believe that our institutions do not practice what we preach or what our schools teach.

The shortcomings of most civic education in the schools have been aptly appraised by the Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education of the American Political Science Association:

> [It] transmits a naive, unrealistic, and romanticized image of political life which confuses the ideals of democracy with the realities of politics....
>
> In summary, the majority of civics and government curriculum materials currently in use at all grade levels either completely ignore or inadequately treat not only such traditionally important political science concepts as freedom, sovereignty, consensus, authority, class, compromise, and power but also newer concepts such as role, socialization, culture, system, decision making, etc.
>
> On the positive side, there has been an upsurge of effort to focus the civic instruction of the schools upon problems of civil rights of ethnic minorities, women, and youth, the basic concepts of law and justice, the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and the realities of the political process.

Fortunately elementary and secondary school educators are beginning to think seriously about citizenship education again. And they are beginning to do something about it. Two aspects of the renewal of interest in civic education are especially impressive to me.

In the 1970s, projects under the heading of "law-related education" have been snowballing under the assiduous leadership of several new organizations and old foundations which have been encouraging the joint efforts of social science scholars, practicing teachers, and representatives of the legal, justice, and education professions.

I have been especially impressed by the project on Law in a Free Society (Santa Monica, California), which is drawing up lesson plans, case books, course outlines, and teachers' guides on eight basic concepts that should pervade a comprehensive curriculum in civic education from kindergarten through the twelfth grade: authority, justice, freedom, participation, responsibility, privacy, diversity, and property. These fundamental ideas necessary for the understanding of a liberal polity should be the core of study in a liberal civic education. Such concepts could fruitfully bring to life the values, the knowledge, and the practice in real-life experiences that must go together in an efficacious civic education.

Another pedagogical movement that has gained widespread attention among professionals as well as the public has been the renewed interest in the "teaching of values." Of special significance for civic education is the work pioneered by Lawrence Kohlberg at Harvard and now being applied to civic education programs in schools in the Boston area under the direction of Kohlberg and Ralph Mosher of Boston University and their colleagues and in the Pittsburgh area under the direction of Edwin Fenton of Carnegie-Mellon. The work, based on a theory of six stages of moral/cognitive development, has caused considerable stir in psychological and philosophical circles.

The Kohlberg theory and experimentation over several years argue that the most effective teaching of values can be undertaken by direct confrontation of moral decisions in open discussions between teachers and students. Such a process, conducted in the setting of a just school community, will move students from lower levels to higher stages of development.

So if there is anything to the Kohlberg approach, and I think there is a great deal to it, it means that if the vast majority of American youths are ever to reach the higher stages, then a liberal education should not neglect the deliberate effort to develop a civic morality among all high school and college students. Not simply "clarifying one's values," not

65

simply acquiring a breadth of political knowledge, not simply acquaintance with the history and structure of government in the past. If we are to continue to have mass secondary and higher education, and I think we must, there should be a common civic core to it. If we are to continue to have a democratic political community, the schools must give priority to their civic task.

We well know that didactic moral instruction and outward expressions of patriotism through pledges of allegiance, loyalty oaths, or flag salutes have lost their savor among academics. We well know, too, the danger of attempts to use the schools for self-serving patriotism, manipulative propaganda, or partisan politicization. Yet, somehow, the schools must promote a strengthened sense of the importance of civic morality and political integrity--if you please, a revitalized civism devoted to the political virtues of constitutional self-government that have sustained us at our best, that we have ignored or desecrated at our worst.

In renewing a sense of political community, embodied above all in the Bill of Rights and successor amendments, a liberal civic education should help to build social cohesion without resort to coercion, without slavish adherence to a narrow party line, without succumbing to witch hunts against the deviant, without silencing the unorthodox, and without dwelling upon an ethnocentric preoccupation with American society to the neglect of the interdependence of the peoples of the world. A liberal civic education must rely upon scholarly knowledge and research without becoming bloodlessly intellectualized or rigidly circumscribed by the arbitrary boundaries of the separate and specialized academic disciplines, and without degenerating into random discussions or enticing games. We must protect the rights of privacy without retreating into the privatism of purely personal experience as the norm of public morality.

In a desirably pluralistic society, civic education must honor cultural Pluribus but it must also strengthen political Unum. Somehow, civic education must promote and protect the right of all persons to hold a diversity of beliefs, but it must also develop a commitment to actions that uphold the common bonds of a free government as the surest guarantee of the very holding of a pluralism of beliefs. It must, in Jefferson's words, render "the people the safe, as they are the ultimate, guardians of their own liberty."

On a recent occasion I argued that after all we have been through as a nation in the past decade I should think we could now face frontally and frankly the proposition that American education does have a political role to perform in achieving our historic ideals of political community. Such a proposition may well be criticized from the conservative right as being an effort to impose leftist ideology. If so, let conservatives say candidly where they oppose equality (as Nathan Glazer has just done in Affirmative Discrimination). It may well be criticized from the radical left as merely imposition of middle-class capitalist values or simply as wishy-washy liberalism. If so, let radicals openly say where they oppose the constitutional freedoms and due process. It may well be criticized by empirical social scientists or socially neutral scholars on the grounds that schools cannot effect social change; schools simply follow the dictates of society. If so, let them say to what agencies they would entrust deliberate efforts to build and generate a sense of democratic political community.

I would argue that if the teaching profession of two to three million persons took seriously the authority of the enduring ideals, sentiments, and moral commitments of our historic political community at its best, as embodied in the constitutional regime and especially in the Bill of Rights, the schools and colleges of this country could mobilize the majority of people on behalf of putting into practice our professed democratic ideals. This could indeed amount to a basic social change. But it would take the combined efforts of liberals in the legal profession, the scholarly and public service professions, the reform-minded wings of the political parties, labor, and the media, the good citizen groups, the civil rights and civil liberties organizations, the students, and civic-minded women's and ethnic groups.

The challenge today is even more political and cultural than it is economic. The challenge is to

> achieve what we proclaim to be our historic political goals: freedom, equality, justice, and community.
>
> The issue once again is what can and should the schools do to meet *this* challenge. No one argues that the schools can do it all or do it alone. What I *am* arguing is that the prime contribution of the schools is not to preach specific *economic* solutions favored by laissez-faire capitalism or revolutionary socialism; it is to enhance as far as possible the political capabilities of students to think and act as citizens who will support and improve the liberal political community, so that it will be the context within which the economic decisions will be made.
>
> This leaves open for study such questions as whether in the future the economic system of the United States and of the world should tip in favor of capitalism or socialism, economic planning by government or free rein for the market system, state ownership or private ownership or mixed ownership of essential industries, centralized control and regulation or decentralized autonomy or world-order coordination of economic affairs, hierarchical management by governmental or corporate bureaucracies or participatory decision making by worker-owners. All of these topics should be considered, studied, and discussed at appropriate levels in the schools and on the basis of the best scholarship obtainable, scholarship that ranges across the full spectrum from left to right. But what the schools should do above all is to try to build positive commitments in thought and action to the democratic values of the liberal political community and to the liberal political processes of the democratic constitutional order. (Butts, 1976)

References

Butts, R.F. *The education of the West*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973. (a)

Butts, R.F. The public purpose of the public school. *Teachers College Record*, 1973, *75*, 207-221. (b)

Butts, R.F. The public school: Assaults on a great idea. The Nation, April 30, 1973, 553-560. (c)

Butts, R.F. Public education and political community. History of Education Quarterly, 1974, 14, 165-183.

Butts, R.F. Foundations of education and the new civism. Educational Studies, 1975, 6, 131-145.

Butts, R.F. The search for purpose in American education. College Board Review, 1975-1976, 98, 2-19.

Butts, R.F. Once again the question for liberal public educators: Whose twilight? Phi Delta Kappan, 1976, 58, 4-14.

Butts, R.F. Education for citizenship. Vital Issues, 1977, 26(8), 1-6. (a)

Butts, R.F. Historical perspective on civic education in the United States. In National Task Force on Citizenship Education, Education for responsible citizenship. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977. (b)

Butts, R.F. Public education in a pluralistic society. Educational Theory, 1977, 27, 3-11. (c)

Butts, R.F. The public school as moral authority. In Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, The school's role as moral authority. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1977. (d)

Butts, R.F. Public education in the United States: From revolution to reform. New York: Holt, 1978.

Cremin, L.A. (Ed.). The republic and the school: Horace Mann on the education of free men. New York: Teachers College Press, 1957.

Higham, J. Strangers in the land. New York: Atheneum, 1974.

Wiebe, R. The segmented society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

69

EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN CITIZEN: A HISTORICAL CRITIQUE

Clarence J. Karier

University of Illinois

The author considers the issue raised by Rousseau concerning education of the man versus the citizen. The problem is analyzed as it is reflected in the lives of German educational leaders Fichte and Humboldt. Next to be considered is the education of the American citizen as it began to emerge conceptually in the early national period and the common school era; of particular importance are the ideas of Thomas Jefferson and Horace Mann. This historical framework leads to examination of the transcendentalist view that government is only a necessary expedient and therefore should be severely limited, and that the end of human existence is development of the individual rather than the citizen. America is seen as having moved from a 19th-century modified classical liberal position to the new liberal position of the 20th century, with certain educational consequences. The altered meaning of democracy and democratic participation is considered, and it is suggested that much 20th-century educational thought moves beyond the new liberal position into a type of totalitarian thinking that places few limits on the techniques of manipulation. A number of curricular approaches to citizenship training from the 1930s through the 1960s are analyzed, and current trends in citizenship are critically examined.

A central issue of this paper was clearly enunciated in the mid-18th century in these words:

> Everything should therefore be brought into harmony with these natural tendencies, and that might well be if our three modes of education merely differed from one another; but what can be done when they conflict, when instead of training man for himself you try to train him for others? Harmony becomes impossible. Forced to combat either nature or society, you must make your choice between the man and the citizen, you cannot train both. (Rousseau, 1762/1957, p. 7)

Here, in the opening pages of his *Emile*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau touched on a problem which has troubled virtually every major social thinker in the history of Western culture: Is it more important to educate the person for fulfilling his or her need for human development or for fulfilling the needs of organized society? At times in the history of the West these goals would not be seen as incompatible. Rousseau, however, standing in the dawning light of the national state, when national education lay just over the horizon, felt forced in *Emile* (1762/1957) to choose between nature and society; he chose nature. Later, in the *Social Contract* (1762/1975) and the *Considerations on the Government of Poland* (1773/1962), he chose society.

During an earlier era of Greek civilization this construction of the problem would appear strange. The Greek mind could no sooner conceive of the individual standing outside of his community than it could conceive of the human being without a body. For most Greek thinkers the education of the person had to proceed within the polis. The central issue was not that of choosing between the person and the community but rather between, on the one hand, the person and the community as they existed and, on the other hand, the person and the community as they potentially could be. The quest for excellence was fundamentally a part of Greek paideia. (The Greek term *paideia* may be defined as the ideal of training the physical and mental faculties so as to produce the highest cultural development, along with an enlightened and mature outlook.) Ultimately, as Plato argued in the Republic (387 B.C./1954), there could be no conflict between the ideal aim of the individual and the ideal aim of the community. So too did Aristotle argue in the Politics, "that the virtue of the good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state" (McKeon, 1947, p. 616). The Greek quest for human excellence always presumed a corresponding social excellence: The "good" man was thus the "good" citizen.

What then constituted the good man? What was virtue, and how was it to be achieved? Socrates, the teacher of Plato, argued that the characteristic which distinguishes man from other forms of life in nature was his ability to think and to know. Ultimately, he argued, knowledge was virtue. To know the truth would be to know the good, and to really know the good would be to do the good, thus achieving the highest form of human excellence. While the quest for truth in a perfect social order would in itself be a pleasant experience, such a quest in an imperfect social order was necessarily threatening to the stability of the existing order. Thus Socrates was found guilty of corrupting the youth of Athens. Truth is corrupting of any social order built on pragmatic compromises with vested interests. True to his educational ideal, Socrates took the hemlock and fulfilled the demands of society. He thus gave dramatic witness to a fundamental problem of Western culture, a problem which has been reenacted in one age after another in a variety of forms.

Thus, standing in the midst of the declining power of the medieval church and the rising tide of the modern state, Jean-Jacques Rousseau once again raised the question of loyalty in his Emile (1762/1957). In the end, however, he decided, as he did in the Social Contract (1762/1975), that men can be forced to be free. Some followed in the footsteps of Rousseau and argued for the unlimited power of the state to shape its citizens, as Rousseau had done in his recommendations for Polish education, but others were more concerned with the limits of such state actions. The following section will discuss the problem of the individual and the state as it unfolded in one of the first national systems of education.

The Prussian System

At noon on December 13, 1807, in an amphitheater of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, Johann Gottlieb Fichte began his series of fourteen Addresses to the German Nation (1807/1968). Thus began a quiet revolution in Prussia which would in time have profound consequences, not only for Germany but for all the world. Even while Fichte spoke, French soldiers stood guard at the gates of the academy. Napoleon had just defeated the Prussian armies and had forced Prussia to accept the humiliating Treaty of Tilsit (1807), which compelled her to support an occupation army of 150,000 soldiers and which limited her own standing army to 42,000 men. The spirit of a rising German nationalism hung heavy in the air as the cosmopolitan views of Lessing, Herder, Kant, and Goethe seemed to fade in the aftermath of war. Even Fichte had radically switched from his clearly cosmopolitan views in The Characteristics of the Present Age (1804/1889) to his extreme nationalistic position in the Addresses to the German Nation (1807/1968). The time had come for the birth of a new Germany. Within the decade Prussia would take the lead in moving from a feudal social system to a new national system. This was accomplished under the strenuous leadership of such men as Baron von Stein, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Fichte, and Süvern. Timing was most important, as Fichte never ceased to remind his followers. Out of the medieval ashes would arise the conditions which would make possible the new order, the new modern state.

While historians have debated the immediate effects of Fichte's Addresses, some placing upon them the entire blame for German nationalism and others negating his influence completely, it is perhaps safest to say that his Addresses charted the direction for a small, powerful governing liberal elite. Under the leadership of Humboldt, Prussia developed and organized the first national system of education (Reisner, 1922). As minister of public instruction, Humboldt was further responsible for the founding of the University of Berlin and the appointment of Fichte to the chair of philosophy. The reorganization of German education had profound consequences; as J. W. Burrow aptly put it, "If it was really the Prussian schoolmaster who defeated the French in 1870, it was Humboldt who licensed the schoolmaster" (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. ix).

Under Humboldt, Prussia had moved ahead of most Western nations in developing an efficient state-run educational system. That same leadership introduced and cultivated the development of Pestalozzian methods of education for the Volkschule. Horace Mann, after visiting these schools in 1843, ecstatically reported: "I never saw a child in tears, nor arraigned at the teacher's bar for any alleged misconduct" (cited in Cremin, 1957, p. 55). German state education, from the Volkschule to the Gymnasium to the university, had become the leading center of educational progress in the 19th century.

Just why, however, was such an authoritarian, caste-oriented society as Prussia using the soft methods of Pestalozzi in its schools? The answer is to be found in Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation (1807/1968). There, in his analysis of the "new education," Fichte makes the point that the only education that can fulfill the true destiny of the German people, which has its roots deeply imbedded in Teutonic soil, is that education which makes a real difference: that education which not only teaches knowledge, skills, and rational canons of persuasion but also molds and shapes the emotions, the will, and the very character of the individual. Only that education would be satisfactory.

Crucial here is the fact that Fichte explicitly criticized the older system because it pointed out to the student the "right" course and earnestly exhorted him to take it. If he did not choose the "right" behavior, then it was assumed by the old-fashioned educator that the student had acted on his own free will and was therefore alone responsible. Fichte argued that the old education was at fault here for not paying enough attention to specific behavior and controlled outcomes. The assumption of free will was seen as a fundamental error. In much the same vein as a modern 20th-century behaviorist psychologist, Fichte argued for the clear shaping of behavior, down to the point of eliminating freedom of choice in its entirety:

> Then, in order to define more clearly the new education which I propose, I should reply that that very recognition of, and reliance upon, free will in the pupil is the first mistake of the old system and the clear confession of its impotence and futility. For, by confessing that after all its most powerful efforts the will still remains free, that is, hesitating undecided between good and evil, it confesses that it is neither able, nor wishes, nor longs to fashion the

> will and (since the latter is the very root of man) man himself, and that it considers this altogether impossible. On the other hand, the new education must consist essentially in this, that it completely destroys freedom of will in the soil which it undertakes to cultivate, and produces on the contrary strict necessity in the decisions of the will, the opposite being impossible. Such a will can henceforth be relied on with confidence and certainty. (Fichte, 1807/1968, p. 17)

Thus the total person must be shaped and molded, his personality fashioned, and his "will" disciplined. The end was self-development, in harmony with the development of the perfect state--a perfect state yet to be unfolded in the hearts and minds of the young. Freedom to be right in that development was the only true freedom. Freedom to be wrong was to fade away as the real and ideal became one. As Fichte had written earlier, in Characteristics of the Present Age (1804/1889), "We do indeed desire freedom and we ought to desire it; but true freedom can be obtained only by means of the highest obedience to law" (Marriott & Robertson, 1965, p. 229). For Fichte the state was a positive actor with its own law and its own destiny to fulfill. Such a state, as it grows in strength, must equalize the status of its citizens. It must do so for the sole purpose of gaining and mobilizing the strength of all its citizens. As Fichte put it:

> A State which constantly seeks to increase its internal strength, is forced to desire the gradual abolition of all privileges and the establishment of equal rights for all men, in order that it, the State itself, may enter upon its true right, viz. to apply the whole surplus power of all its citizens,

> without exception, to the furtherance of its own purposes.... (Marriott & Robertson, 1965, p. 229)

Here, at the dawn of the modern German state, Fichte perceived an important tendency in Western nation states: i.e., each attempt to equalize rights usually brought an extension of governmental power. From Fichte's perspective, this was ultimately all to the good. He believed the liberal state which he was fashioning would ultimately satisfy the needs for development of all its people. Crucial for this development was the need to instill educationally the kind of patriotism and loyalty whereby the individual would willingly lay down his life for his country.

National education, rightly conceived and effectively employed, would make every citizen a soldier and every soldier a citizen. As Fichte put it, "The state posed by us, from the moment that a new generation of youths had passed through it, would need no special army at all, but would have in them an army such as no age has yet seen" (Fichte, 1807/1968, p. 163). The educational blueprint which Fichte laid before the leadership of Prussia called for education of the total man and woman so as to prepare all for national service. Definitely opposed to a caste system, Fichte insisted on the fullest development of the talents of all, paying attention to the moral, intellectual, vocational, and physical education of each citizen. Did Fichte's insistence on the equal opportunity of all to develop their talents to the fullest suggest a democratic ideal? Some have interpreted it as such. For example, Edward Reisner has said:

> To educate every individual to his fullest possibilities in order that the state might enjoy the service of such unrestricted powers,--that was Fichte's extremely democratic ideal. Mingled with a strong patriotic element this democratic ideal seemed to be influential in the earliest revival of Prussian public education. (Reisner, 1922, p. 140)

The question of whether a particular practice in education is or is not democratic depends, it seems, on a prior question: i.e., to what social end is the activity directed? It should be remembered that Fichte called for the extension of equal rights in order to extend the power of the state to achieve its "own purposes"; Reisner brought out that point when he described Fichte's goal: "to educate every individual to his fullest possibilities...that the state might enjoy the service of such unrestricted powers." The end here was not the individual but the state; indeed, one might more clearly say a totalitarian, educational state. This was Fichte's ideal, which he and others sought to implement within German education.

It is striking that although this ideal was propounded, and in many ways institutionalized in 19th-century Prussian education, the man who appointed Fichte to his chair in philosophy at the University of Berlin, Wilhelm von Humboldt, had propounded an opposite ideal only a few years earlier in

1792. Upon retiring from active life at the age of 24 to cultivate his self-development, Humboldt wrote a classic in Western political theory called The Limits of State Action (1792/1969).

In this remarkable essay, Humboldt clearly, concisely, and prophetically sketched the damaging consequences of state authority and power for human freedom and human development. Combining the analytic strength of a Kant with the humanism of a Goethe, Humboldt proceeded to describe his educational ideal. He first argued that the state itself has no transcendental existence or rights. It was merely a social contrivance to provide for some common good, a good rationally determined by individuals. Taking his basic tenets from Kant and the Greek classical tradition of culture, he argued that the ideal social system occurs when men and women cease to be means for other people's purposes and become ends in themselves. Furthermore, the ideal must hold out the full freedom for each to develop his talent for his or her own purposes.

> The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole. Freedom is the first and indispensable condition which the possibility of such a development presupposes; but there is besides another essential--intimately connected with freedom, it is true--a variety of situations. (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 16)

If man was to develop to his fullest, he needed freedom within a social environment that permits such development. The end, however, must always remain human development. Security of the state and community must be maintained, and it is the duty of each citizen to fulfill the legitimate requirements of security. However, Humboldt put definite limits on these kinds of activities.

The state authority must be limited to protect the community from outside attacks and from very limited kinds of dangers to individual freedom which might arise within the community. All important was the need to recognize that the true end of man was human development, and that very development rests on one's freedom to choose. Choice is important not only to sustain moral order but, indeed, human order. "Whatever does not spring from a man's free choice, or is only the result of instruction and guidance, does not perform it with truly human energies, but merely with mechanical exactness" (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 28).

J. W. Burrow, commenting on Humboldt (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 28), recognized this statement as very close to what John Stuart Mill wrote in 1859: "One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character" (Mill, 1859/1968, p. 118). The concept of the limited state, as explored by Humboldt, presupposes an ideal of human development which is possible only if and when the individual is free of state interference.

> I therefore deduce, as the natural inference from what has been argued, *that reason cannot desire for man any other condition than that in which each individual not only enjoys the most absolute freedom of developing himself by his own energies, in his perfect individuality, but in which external nature itself is left unfashioned by any human agency, but only receives the impress given to it by each individual and of his own free will, according to the measure of his wants and instincts, and restricted only by the limits of his powers and his rights* [italics in original text].
>
> From this principle it seems to me, that reason must never retract anything except what is absolutely necessary. It must therefore be the basis of every political system, and must especially constitute the starting-point of the inquiry which at present claims our attention. (Humboldt, 1792/1969, pp. 20-21)

John Stuart Mill, in his epigraph to *On Liberty* (1859/1968), quoted directly from Humboldt: "The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument hitherto unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity" (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 51). The state, when it utilizes its powers to coerce, to direct, or to guide, destroys that possibility. While all can plainly see the negative use of law to coerce as clearly limiting human freedom, what is not so clear for many is the fact that the positive use of state power is also limiting of human freedom and ultimately is fundamentally destructive of human development. The positive state has inherent dangers for freedom and human development.

> It may endeavor, for instance, to secure its ends directly either by coercion or by the inducement of example and exhortation, or it may combine all these sources of influence in the attempt to shape the citizen's outward life, and forestall actions contrary to its intention; or, lastly, it may try to exercise a sway over his thoughts and feelings, so as to bring his inclinations, even, into conformity with its wishes. It is particular actions only that come under political supervision in the first of these cases; in the second, the general conduct of life; and, in the last instance, it is the very character of the citizen, his views, and modes of thought, which are brought under the influence of State control. (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 22)

Humboldt notes that the thrust of the positive state is not only security but also the achievement of that security through the solicitude of the state for the positive welfare of its citizens. The positive state, in fact, is a welfare state. It is interesting that in 1791-1792, when analyzing the progressive steps through which the state extends authority over its citizenry, Humboldt virtually outlined the history of the growth of what was an essentially limited American state to that of a positive-welfare state. We will return to this at a later point in the essay.

What, then, were the damaging effects of the positive-welfare state on human freedom and development? First, such a state "invariably produces national uniformity, and a constrained and unnatural manner of acting" (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 23). Second, such a state with its positive institutions will "tend to weaken the vitality of the nation" (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 24). Third, such a state invariably destroys the inner aesthetic choice upon which work and occupations become artistic, human, creative contributions. Fourth,

> The solicitude of such a State for the positive welfare of its citizens, must further be harmful, in that it has to operate upon a promiscuous mass of individualities, and therefore does harm to these by measures which cannot meet individual cases. (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 32)

Finally, such a state "hinders the development of individuality" (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 33). The idea, then, of a national education was thus "very questionable." While Humboldt did not deny the beneficial effects of citizenship participation in the body politic, he insisted that it must be spontaneously arrived at, not contrived by state guidance or education. Humboldt rejected the notion that the state should shape its citizens. He believed there must always remain a dialectical relationship, indeed an adversary relationship, between man and the state if freedom is to survive. Citizenship education must always be limited. If man is to be free, he must maintain a dynamic interaction with the state as a free agent. As he put it,

> Now this interaction always diminishes to the extent that the citizen is trained from childhood to become a citizen. Certainly it is beneficial when the roles of man and citizen coincide as far as possible; but this only occurs when the role of citizen presupposes so few special qualities

> that the man may be himself without any sacrifice; which is the goal I have exclusively in mind in this inquiry.
>
> However, the fruitful relationship between man and citizen would wholly cease if the man were sacrificed to the citizen. For although the consequences of disharmony would be avoided, still the very object would be sacrificed which the association of human beings in a community was designed to secure. From which I conclude, that the freest development of human nature, directed as little as possible to citizenship, should always be regarded as of paramount importance. (Humboldt, 1792/1969, pp. 51-52)

From Humboldt's standpoint as well as from John Stuart Mill's, the consequences of a national education which shaped the civic character of its citizens was clearly destructive of the first condition upon which human development rested, i.e., human liberty (Humboldt, 1792/1969; Mill, 1859/1968). Henry David Thoreau later amplified this ideal when he said: "That government is best which governs least...." and "[t]hat government is best which governs not at all; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have" (Thoreau, 1906/1960, p. 235). At Walden Pond, Thoreau too was trying to discover the legitimate limits of organized society on individual freedom. Humboldt, in a similar vein, was attempting thoughtfully to assess the limits of state action which were consonant with human freedom and development. Mill, Humboldt, and Emerson would agree with Thoreau when, standing in the midst of much nationalistic fervor, he advised his fellow countrymen that they "should be men first, and subjects afterwards. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right" (Thoreau, 1906/1960, p. 236).

This was Humboldt's ideal. No one in Prussian Germany up to that time had so clearly and succinctly laid out the dangers and hazards of the progressive extension of state power. To be sure, Mill and others later followed suit, but it was Humboldt who first cut the intellectual path. Ironically, it was Humboldt some years later, as minister of public instruction, who implemented Fichte's educational state ideas.

During the period 1809-1810 Humboldt instituted the major educational reforms which created in Prussia the first real state-controlled and -financed national system of education in the West. State training and certification of teachers was instituted. C. A. Zeller, a disciple of Pestalozzi, was was appointed head of the new normal school at Königsberg. Compulsory school-attendance edicts were promulgated, as the financial support of public schools was put on a sound footing. Efficient administrative machinery for public inspection and control of the schools was also created, and under Humboldt's ministry the Gymnasium curriculum was reorganized. Süvern developed a proposal for a single-track ladder system of education for Prussia (rejected in 1819). Finally, the University of Berlin was founded, and Fichte was appointed to the chair of philosophy (Reisner, 1922; Seeley, 1968, pp. 426-433).

Marriott and Robertson (1965, pp. 228-229) are persuasive when they claim that what Scharnhorst did for military reform, Humboldt did for German education. They point out, too, the irony in the fact that it was Humboldt who literally instituted Fichte's educational ideas.

A further note: If behind the success of Bismarck's victory over France in 1870 stood the Prussian schoolmaster licensed by Humboldt, it is even more true that behind the progressive paternalism of the Bismarckian state--a state which many Wisconsin Progressives at the turn of the century adopted as their model--stood that same schoolmaster. As Germany became the educational showplace for 19th-century America, the contradiction between what Humboldt had said in The Limits of State Action (1792/1969) and what he did as minister of public instruction during 1808-1810 remained an enigma. In theory, Humboldt had laid the intellectual foundation for the classical liberalism which John Stuart Mill and others developed. Such a theory defined freedom, a prerequisite for human development, in terms of freedom from state interference. In action, however, Humboldt helped create the educational state that used its power to shape the character of its citizenry in the name of human development. The result was the Fichtean state, which carried all the essential ingredients of what became known in the 20th century as a totalitarian state.

Just how might Humboldt have explained this contradiction? In the closing chapter of his essay on The Limits of State Action (1792-1969) he discussed the practical application of his theory. Pointing to the fact that there are many true ideas which wise men would never attempt to put into practice, Humboldt insisted that even though his theory about freedom of the individual and the state was true, by necessity it could not be immediately implemented. Why? Because men were not yet able to receive the freedom which the theory suggests. Social upheaval had to be avoided. Freedom must gradually be extended in such a way that "no one at any time, or in any way, obtain a right to dispose of the powers or goods of another without his consent or against his will (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 137). The theory logically requires the extension of freedom, while practical "reality" requires coercion. When one observes the condition of humanity in the real world, Humboldt surmised,

> Man is more disposed to domination than freedom; and a structure of dominion not only gladdens the eye of the master who rears and protects it, but even its servants are uplifted by the thought that they are members of a whole, which rise high above the life and strength of single generations. (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 135)

Before the century was over, Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor would make a similar estimate of the human condition when he too made the claim that what the mass of mankind really needed for their happiness was not freedom but "miracle, mystery and authority."

Built into Humboldt's theory were at least three ways that could permit him to change with relative ease from a classical liberal position to a new liberal position, and then to a totalitarian position. First, the threat to state security from outside forces could always warrant the expansion of state powers. Second, the very clear distinction between theory and practice, or the ideal and the actuality, also allowed for state intervention. This was the case because the baseline of social justice was interpreted by Humboldt as that distribution of property which existed. If a revolution threatened the ownership of property, state power could be expanded. Last, it was clear that in the end it was Humboldt, the aristocrat under the guise of the state, who paternalistically doled out freedom to the masses only when and if those masses behaved themselves. In practice it was not the individual limiting his freedom to act by voluntarily giving up his power to the state; rather it was the state giving the individual freedom only when he proved himself ready for it. In actuality the power relationship was the opposite of Humboldt's theory.

Humboldt and Fichte, at the conception of German national education, had worked out in their thinking and acting some of the basic tenets of classical liberal, progressive liberal, and totalitarian theory. Each view has at one time or another tended to occupy the center stage of American history. The relationship between the state and the individual throughout American history has not been static, nor has it lent itself to easy generalization. From the intellectual origins of the constitutional system there has remained a dynamic tension which presupposes that the individual being is free of the state authority in any absolute sense. However, at various times, especially during times of threat, state authority has been radically increased, while during periods of relative security it has been allowed to wane. Over the 200 years of American constitutional history, however, state authority has grown far out of proportion to anything which the constitutional founders would have dreamed. During this corresponding period, some very limited steps toward greater equality have been taken by certain individuals, classes, and groups. Equalization from the standpoint of state-instituted homogenization should not be confused with the growth or decline of freedom on the part of the individual in relation to the state. In the latter case, individual freedom in relationship to the state in 20th-century America declined appreciably.

In many ways the 19th century may be characterized as democratic and the 20th century as totalitarian. Throughout this essay I am using the word totalitarian as that condition under which the state ultimately has power and control over the total life of the individual. The terms democratic and totalitarian are only relatively descriptive and should not be taken in any absolute sense in this discussion. Totalitarian, as used here, should therefore be taken as a benchmark, a point which we are more or less approaching. The totalitarian person in the 20th century is a public person, flexible, with few deeply held convictions, capable of adjusting quickly and easily to the conditions which surround his life. The private life of such a person is minimal, and his public life is structured by a prescribed set of alternatives. In such a condition the growing power of the state is evidenced by the extent to which the bureaucratic machinery of government exercises control in shaping not only the legal and political views of its citizens but also their total lives in terms of personality, moral character, feelings, and will to behave. The totalitarian person in this respect is a Fichtean-Spartan who ultimately loses his freedom to be wrong. The Spartan ideal of citizenship was perhaps no better put than when Rousseau, in Emile, recounted the story of the Spartan mother:

> A Spartan mother had five sons with the army. A Helot arrived; trembling she asked his news. "Your five sons are slain." "Vile slave, was that what I asked thee?" "We have won the victory." She hastened to the temple to render thanks to the gods. That was a citizen. (Rousseau, 1762/1957, p. 8)

The dialectical tension which existed between the Athenian ideal of Humboldt, as expressed in *The Limits of State Action* (1792/1969), and the Spartan ideal, as expressed in Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* (1807/1968), delineates the intellectual parameters through which much of the education of the American citizen will be historically analyzed.

The American System

The American colonialists who convened in the hot summer of 1787 to write the Constitution of the United States did so after several frustrating years under the government of the Articles of Confederation. For those political and economic leaders who met in the Constitutional Convention, the government under the Articles was clearly inadequate. It failed to make possible what Humboldt spoke of as "social justice." Private property and the developing commercial interests were not well protected. Use of state power to protect commercial interests was not new to colonialists; under English rule they had long experience with the merchant state. The revolution against that rule was not a revolution against the idea of the merchant state but rather a revolution against particular kinds of restrictions which would inhibit commercial development in the colonies. With that kind of experience behind them, it was understandable why the colonies were reluctant to extend power to a central government. Only after the threat of a social-economic revolution had occurred in the form of Shays' Rebellion in 1786 did they begin to fashion a stronger national government. Throughout the new national period there existed a continuing distrust of centralized national power and authority. The individual was viewed as a creature of God, governed by natural laws and rights. Government was most often perceived as a necessary expedient, limited to function only within the realm of delegated authority. The Constitution, with its principle of separation of powers, and the federal system, with division of powers between the state and federal levels, attest to this sense of limited authority.

Even here, however, the creation of a federal government was too much for some. Upon returning from his ambassadorship in Paris in 1789, Thomas Jefferson characterized the accomplishments of the Constitutional Convention as the work of a "den of demagogues." The principles of the Declaration of Independence, which emphasized man's rights, had been blocked, he believed, by the creation of a new federal authority (see Nock, 1973). Opposition to the Constitution was so strong that it had to be met by a tacit agreement on the part of its proponents to support a series of amendments that would explicitly protect the individual citizen against the newly delegated powers of the federal government. Thus the first Ten Amendments were created and passed within a short time after the Constitution went into effect. Jefferson's opposition to the expansion of federal power came from his belief that ultimately the individual's freedom is best protected by

> making himself the depository of the powers respecting himself, so far as he is competent to them, and delegating only what is beyond his competence, by a synthetical process, to higher and higher orders of functionaries, so as to trust fewer and fewer powers in proportion as the trustees become more and more oligarchical. (cited in Nock, 1973, p. 57)

Sovereignty rested with the people. For Jefferson, government was a necessary expedient created by the people to protect their rights from both external and internal threat. Government authority was to be used to provide the minimal condition under which human freedom might be exercised. Jefferson's ideal man was a free landed yeoman. He knew that one of the key factors which incited the Revolution was the English restrictions on land development in the West; he also believed that American historical destiny, at least for the next century, was going to be tied to land speculation in the West. He feared the age of industrialization, which would bring great cities in its train; as he put it, "The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body" (Ford, 1904, p. 86). Jefferson was in touch with some of the key developments of his age. He knew the significance of the workplace in the education of men and women, but he clearly missed the early beginnings of a generating force which was to shape profoundly his country's future, namely, industrialization. He believed a sound democratic republic could survive only if it remained agrarian, where the individual might remain free.

Although Jefferson did not argue for a national system of education, and the Constitution does not mention the word education (thus reserving the power of education to the states or the people by virtue of the Tenth Amendment), in a broader sense Jefferson tied the idea of a democratic republic with the idea of education. Education for all people, except blacks (Jordan, 1969), was for Jefferson the key to survival of the republic. Two things were essential: freedom of the press and a free education. The citizen must have free access to information, and he must have the education to enable him to interpret that information and act upon it. "Where the press is free and every man able to read, all is safe" (Jefferson, cited in Lee, 1967, p. 81). The citizen must be educated so as to "recognize tyranny and be able to revolt against it." Jefferson was a revolutionary who believed that "the tree of liberty must be watered from time to time with the blood of tyrants" (Boyd, 1958, p. 356). The right of the citizen to take up arms against his government, if and when that government became tyrannical, was a well-established principle with all the constitutional framers.

Jefferson also believed that every generation must write its own constitution. What kind of education was necessary to prepare people to recognize tyranny and be able to revolt against it? In his Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779), Jefferson called for the creation of a public system of schools in Virginia. The system which he proposed provided schooling under public control, at public expense, for all free children, male and female residents "within a district for a term of three years." Beyond that, a limited number of the best were to be "raked from the rubbish annually" to go on at public expense to a classical secondary school and then to the university. Those who could afford it could attend whatever school they chose. The teachers in the district schools were to be inspected for competency and were expected to take a loyalty oath to the commonwealth (Lee, 1967, p. 86).

What kind of curriculum did Jefferson propose? It was essentially a reading, writing, and arithmetic curriculum with a didactic history of the roots of the new nation. In Jefferson's view, literacy, arithmetic, and history taught by loyal teachers for three years was sufficient for basic citizenship education in order to recognize tyranny and be able to revolt against it. In retrospect, this seems naive indeed, but something is lacking in this analysis. Jefferson's educational views were primarily directed at the citizen obtaining the necessary skills by which he could interpret information and recognize his own self-interest. It presumed that once the citizen had these skills, he would develop and grow as a free person as he participated in the community. This education placed the emphasis not on specific behavior but on the prior conditions--the tools by which the individual exercises his choice, his freedom.

There were limits, however. The loyalty oaths for teachers were one example of such a limit; another was Jefferson's inordinate concern for the ideological nature of the textbook that was to be used in his favorite subject, political science, at his favorite institution of higher learning, the University of Virginia (Lee, 1967). In a letter in 1825 to Joseph C. Cabell, he cautioned about the attractiveness of possible "heresies being taught" that ran counter to the interest of the State of Virginia and the United States (Lee, 1967, p. 133). Jefferson's concerns here seem similar to many 20th-century concerns of the Daughters of the American Revolution and the American Legion in regard to the teaching of Communism as a "viable" alternative. In the first quarter of the 19th century, at his own University of Virginia, Jefferson argued that knowledge must be controlled so as to protect the interest of the state. He was not saying then, as he had earlier in his Bill for Establishing

Religious Freedom, that

> truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; ...she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of her weapons, free argument and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them. (Lee, 1967, p. 68)

Jefferson had clearly reached the point in his thinking where he viewed the security of the secular state as more important than the security of the religious state, or church. Freedom in religious matters should be exercised more fully. In such matters truth should be left to find its own course. Freedom in political matters, however, was not quite the same. The very term heresy was now applied by Jefferson to the state rather than to religion. Treason was defined as an overt act against the United States in the presence of two witnesses. The death penalty was to be exercised by the state against those who committed treason.

It should be clear that in the secular state of the 20th century, punishment of the religious heretic is unacceptable, while punishment of the political heretic is quite acceptable. We have not, in this sense, so much extended our freedom as merely changed our loyalties. Jefferson's remarks here are pivotal because they indeed reflect the beginnings of the rising tide of the secular state and its loyalty requirements. Jefferson's Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge is important not because it was instituted (in fact, it was rejected) but because it reflects what Jefferson as a knowledgeable, influential leader of his times thought was the role of the state in the education of the citizen.

While there were various reasons for the rejection of Jefferson's proposal, it should be understood that the tradition of private tutorial training of the elite, nourished and sustained by a slave culture--a culture which Jefferson still supported to the end, albeit reluctantly (Jordan, 1969)--stood in the way of the development of a public system of education in Virginia and much of the South. This was, of course, not the case for New England, the middle states, and the newly emerging territories. In these areas the pattern of public district schooling gradually emerged and by the third decade of the 19th century was fairly well established. Aside from the South, state laws were passed which exercised the right of the state not only to support schools but also to control them as public institutions. Public school as a form of education appeared in the first half of the 19th century.

What, then, was taught in these community schools moving into public status? With respect to approach, they were primarily didactic, emphasizing the three Rs with a heavy slant toward moral and social values. The strong feelings of nationalism were reflected in the school curriculum as America emerged in this period as a new nation. Alongside the Bible and the Lord's Prayer came the patriotic, symbolic practices designed to produce loyalty.

Even the children's readers changed; for example, R. Freeman Butts's (Note 1) study of the New England Primer over the period 1702-1825 was illustrative. The one couplet which remained constant was "In Adam's Fall we sinnèd all." Other couplets clearly reflected the rising influence of the nationalistic fervor in the schools. For example, in the 1727 Primer one could read, "Our King the good No man of Blood." In 1791 that couplet was changed to read "Kings should be good Not Men of blood," and in 1797, "The British King lost States thirteen." As the nationalistic fervor mounted, that couplet was changed in 1819 to read "Kings and Queens Lie in the dust," and finally in 1825 to "Queens and Kings are gaudy things." As Butts correctly notes, we had moved from a God to demos when the couplet "Whales in the Sea God's voice obey" was replaced in 1800 with "Great Washington Brave his country did save."

The key curricular instruments of the 19th and 20th centuries were textbooks. However, they were even more important for the early 19th century. Before the graded-school concept emerged, one determined one's place in school by the book he or she was reading. Each of these books, in a variety of ways, didactically set forth series of values which reflected the major interests and mores of the larger culture

(Elson, 1964; Kiefer, 1948). For example, if one read Noah Webster's American Speller, one learned that "idleness will bring thee to poverty; but by industry and Prudence thou shalt be filled with bread." Discipline too was important, as one reads further: "The rod and reproof give wisdom; but a child left to himself bringeth his parents to shame." Within that same spelling book could be found advice with respect to social-sexual relations. For example, under the caption "Advice to young men":

> Is a woman devoted to dress and amusement? Is she delighted with her own beauty? Is she given to much talking and loud laughter? If her feet abide not at home, and her eyes rove with boldness on the faces of men--turn thy feet from her, and suffer not thy heart to be ensnared by thy fancy. (Webster, undated)

Turning the page, one can read "Advice to young women":

> Listen to no soft persuasion, till a long acquaintance and a steady, respectful conduct have given thee proof of the pure attachment and honourable views of thy lover. Is thy suitor addicted to low vices? is he profane? is he a gambler? a tipler? a spendthrift? a haunter of taverns? has he lived in idleness and pleasure? has he acquired a contempt for thy sex in vile company? and above all, is he a scoffer at religion? Banish such a man from thy presence, his heart is false, and his hand would lead thee to wretchedness and ruin. (Webster, undated)

Noah Webster clearly intended to teach more than spelling. The values of the age were imbedded in the textbooks as well as in the teachers' manuals.

Barbara Berman's (1975) comprehensive analysis of the major teaching manuals for the 19th-century common school shows that the central values emphasized social-economic conformity and loyalty to a practicality-oriented business kind of culture. In 1887, A. C. Mason perhaps best characterized this thrust of the common school when he said,

> A school is a business institution created for specific purposes. It should be conducted in all of its management upon the principles of business. Its business is to assist, as being one of the many corporations created and fostered by the state, in increasing the wealth by increasing the productive power of the state....Intelligent economy does not require that our system cost less, but that it produce more....To keep the imp of mischief away, put the angel of business on guard. (Berman, 1975, p. 258)

Whether one looks at the common school textbooks, the teachers' manuals, recollections of adults about their school days, or the variety of public statements by leading educational reformers of the day, the common school did not so much emphasize intellectual virtue as it did conforming social and economic values. Daniel Webster defined public education as a "wise and liberal system of police, by which property, and life, and the peace of society are secured" (cited in Karier, 1967, p. 51).

The common school reform movement (1839-1848), led by Horace Mann, took as its central focus the teaching of the common values of American society. Reacting to the social, religious, ethnic, and economic conflict of the times, Mann effectively argued for school reform and the extension of state authority in education. Universal public education, he argued, could Americanize the new Catholic Irish immigrant who had been underselling and displacing native laborers. Thus social peace might be secured.

> Education, then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equalizer of the conditions of men--the balance-wheel of the social machinery. I do not here mean that it so elevates the social nature as to make men disdain and abhor the oppression of their fellow-men. This idea pertains to another of its attributes. But I mean that it gives each man the independence and the means, by which he can resist the selfishness of other men. It does better than to disarm the poor of their hostility towards the rich; it prevents being poor. (Horace Mann, cited in Cremin, 1957, p. 87)

Mann believed education would become the social safety valve of the American nation. He rejected the revolutionary notion that some people are poor because others are rich. The point, he argued, was not to redistribute the wealth but to allow the poor to become property owners, participate in the economy by becoming educated, and gain the ability thereby to increase their wealth. The solution for the maldistribution of wealth was to create the conditions which would increase it. An expanding gross national product stimulated by education, Mann surmised, would prevent social revolution. In his 12th Annual Report in 1848 Horace Mann had succinctly analyzed the social-economic rationale by which propertied interest would come to support public education throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Public education could thus protect property against the possibility of social upheaval (see Cremin, 1957).

From John Locke's standpoint, the protection of property was the first major function of the state. A second function was to protect liberties. This, Mann believed, was to be achieved by teaching the new immigrants to become American citizens (Cremin, 1957), by teaching not only patriotic history but also the political structure of the new constitutional system. Care had to be taken, Mann pointed out, that while constitutional principles were to be taught, "political proselytism" ought not become the function of the school (Cremin, 1957, p. 97). The common school was to be a school which taught the common elements of American culture, the common political, moral, and economic principles with which all could agree. The school might then provide the common ground, the "balance wheel," the steadying influence which could help unify a community that had so clearly been fractured by the influx of the Irish immigrants.

The idea of the common school developed by Mann carried with it the notion that the one primary function of the school was to produce a common citizen. Just how were the common features of that citizenship to be determined? They were to be determined on the basis of community agreement. Mann argued that the school ought to teach only those political principles upon which the community agrees and no

104

others, since the school is an instrument of the community. Common school teachers, as Mann pointed out, must avoid controversial issues:

> But when the teacher, in the course of his lessons or lectures on fundamental law, arrives at a controverted text, he is either to read it without comment or remark; or, at most, he is only to say that the passage is the subject of disputation, and that the schoolroom is neither the tribunal to adjudicate, nor the forum to discuss it. (Mann, cited in Cremin, 1957, p. 97)

Mann took essentially the same stand with regard to moral and religious education as he took with political education. A common morality, based on the common elements of all religions, was to be inculcated. Just what text was to be used to teach that common religion, and how was it to be taught without producing conflict? The answer was the King James version of the New Testament, to be read daily and without comment. Religious conflict, he believed, could thus be avoided. Of course it was not. Bible reading itself was a Protestant practice, and the translation used was Protestant. Throughout the latter half of the century Catholic and Jewish groups objected to Bible reading and often brought suit in state courts to prevent it. When one reviews the actual common school reading texts of the 19th century, it becomes clear that explicit anti-Roman Catholic material was being used. The moral basis of the common school was basically white, Protestant, and Anglo-Saxon. The emergence

105

of the private, parochial system of church-related schools developed in the 19th century, primarily as a reaction to this kind of common school socialization.

In the area of political education of the American citizen, the thrust of the common school practice tended to emphasize patriotic history including knowledge about the constitutional system. Much of the instruction was didactic and highly moralistic, exhorting the child to behave according to the practical temper of the community.

In many ways, the education of the citizen in relationship to the state was a limited one. It was limited, as we have seen, by eliminating controversial issues from the schools. It was also limited by the overall perspective of the educated citizen, whose view of the educational function of the state was formed by a classical educational ideal; even as a remnant, this ideal served as a counterconception to the growing educational power of the state. At its best, the classical educational ideal saw human development, contrasted to state development, as the ultimate end. The classical educational ideal of the orator, the courtier, the well-rounded man, the gentleman, and the liberally educated person was aimed at the creation of a free person.

Even though throughout the history of the West that ideal was adjusted and compromised to make way for the political realities of power wielded by church or state, it still served at times to check the absolute authority of each. It might be further noted that not only the classical tradition but also Judeo-Christian religious tradition has at times tended to check the growth of the notion that the state is, or should be, absolute. Both traditions have served to do so by offering competing institutional loyalties as well as alternative ultimate ends for existence; even more importantly, both have provided the ideological infrastructures that undergird the idea of a free person. Central was a conception of human nature that assumed a mind-body dualism. A strong case can be made that much of the intellectual basis of freedom in the Western tradition rested on a dualism which permeated the classical educational tradition as well as much of the Judeo-Christian conception of human nature and the social order. It is not an accident that the rise of the compulsory state in the 20th century was accompanied by two significant developments: First, the institutional power of the church fell into a steep decline. Second, the ideological expression of that view of life found in the religious as well as classical educational tradition was challenged and effectively discarded by the century's dominant educational philosophers and reformers.

In the 19th century, then, the notion of limited state action was very much alive. A caveat should be entered here.

This idea of limits is relative to what took place in the 20th century; i.e., America never did have a truly laissez-faire political economy. The American government as it functioned from the very constitutional beginnings was a merchant state which employed its power to enhance certain kinds of economic development. The history of western land speculation, railroad subsidies, and tariff policies all attest to this phenomenon. What we are discussing then is a conception of the state that had some characteristics of a Humboldt ideal. These characteristics were progressively eroded away and replaced in the 20th century by a more Fichtean ideal. However, the ideal of the individual as an independent free man, in juxtaposition to state government, remained alive in the 19th century and was repeatedly expressed by the transcendentalist thinkers.

The Transcendentalists

Emerson, Thoreau, and other 19th-century transcendentalists projected a view of man in relationship to society and government as fundamentally similar to that which Humboldt had delineated. Just as Humboldt pointed out that the actions of government ought to be kept to a minimum because every action taken subtracts from man's freedom--which in turn reduces his chance to develop himself--so too Emerson, in his oft-quoted essay "Self-Reliance," argued,

> Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators but names and customs. Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. (Emerson, 1929, p. 139)

The transcendentalists repeatedly warned mankind of the hazardous course of the developing industrial age. While Thoreau (1960) warned that in one sense "men have nothing to fear but fear itself," he also warned that the next age must fear "the age of the organization man." Government and social institutions were expedients. The most important value was that which respected the integrity of human life. The key here was freedom to be, to develop, to become a person. "Be a man first and a citizen only in one's twilight hours," said Thoreau. Men become enslaved not only by other men but also by things. In such a fashion they enslave themselves. Thoreau's search for freedom carried him to Walden Pond, where he explored the shackles that he, himself, society, and things had forged on his soul. Thoreau and Emerson, like many 20th century existentialists, looked into the depths of their souls and found an individual basis of freedom.

Ultimately the individual chooses to conform to society. He or she can choose in those same terms not to conform.

Mohandas K. Gandhi once said that the greatest American literary classic ever written was Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience." Thoreau recognized, as Jefferson had realized, that no state should be allowed the spurious and dangerous unconditional loyalty of its citizens. Revolution, indeed bloody revolution, must be kept an open option if men are to remain free. The individual must always stand ready to resist the state. As Jefferson put it in 1787, in a letter to William S. Smith: "What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned from time to time that this people preserve the spirit of resistance?" (cited in Bentley, 1972). And Thoreau argued, the citizen's first priority must be to be true to himself. The good citizen was not a person who dutifully followed the majority rule but rather one who followed his conscience. "I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterwards. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right" (Thoreau, 1906/1960, p. 236). Thoreau's view that the first duty of a citizen is to respect "the right" reverberated in the lives of such 20th-century leaders as Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Thoreau pointed out that the really "good" citizen is not the one who blindly says, "My country right or wrong," but rather the one who has both the will and courage to resist the state when it is in error. One cannot help but reflect on the Eichmann and My Lai trials when one reads

110

in "Civil Disobedience":

> Visit the Navy-Yard, and behold a marine, such a man as an American government can make, or such as it can make a man with its black arts--a mere shadow and reminiscence of humanity, a man laid out alive and standing, and already, as one may say, buried under arms with funeral accompaniments, though it may be,--
>
> Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,
> As his corpse to the rampart we hurried;
> Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot
> O'er the grave where our hero was buried.
>
> The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, *posse comitatus*, etc. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. Others--as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and officeholders--serve the state chiefly with their heads; and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the devil, without *intending* it, as God. A very few--as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and *men*--serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it. (Thoreau, 1906/1960, p. 237)

While some might claim that this was sheer anarchical individualism, it should be clear that Thoreau was not advocating chaos. The transcendentalists of the 19th century appealed to a higher law than that which was promulgated by the state. In so doing they reflected that dualistic sense of reality which had served--intellectually, at least--to maintain the freedom of the individual against the encroachment of the state. As Emerson put it:

> There are two laws discrete
> Not reconciled,--
> Law for man, and law for thing;
> The last builds town and fleet,
> But it runs wild,
> And doth the man unking. (cited in Babbitt, 1956)

Even as Thoreau studied himself and his freedom at Walden Pond, he noted ominously how the sounds of the locomotive disturbed the idyllic peace and tranquility of his natural environment. It was the "law for thing"--indeed, the machine and the machine culture it required--that would profoundly shape the destiny of America in the coming decades.

The Political Economy and School Reform: 1890-1930

By 1900 only 10% of American youth 14-17 attended a secondary school. Fifty years later approximately 90% of that age group were in secondary schools. The massive system of schooling that eventually put upwards of one-third of the population in school was economically based, to a large extent, on the rising development of corporations, which created the kind of productive systems that profoundly shaped American life.

The phenomenal growth of the corporation was critical in establishing the mass system of American production, distribution, and consumption in the 20th century. Charles Forcey points out that "in 1897 the total capitalization of all corporations individually valued at a million dollars or more came to only 170 millions. Three years later the same figure for total capitalization stood at five billions, and in 1904 at over twenty billions" (Forcey, 1961, p. xiv). Massive accumulation of capital was now employed to underwrite the creation of mass-production systems.

As Lawrence Cremin (1969) correctly concludes, it was indeed industrialization, urbanization, and immigration which were the central problems of the era from 1890 to 1930. The political progressive's solution to these problems was found in the notion of the regulatory state. This concept of the state, as it was fashioned by such Wisconsin Progressives as Ely, Commons, and LaFollette and later instituted by the national government, was itself historically rooted in the paternalistic Bismarckian state, which utilized government to rationalize and regulate the political-social economy. Behind that state was the Prussian schoolmaster--certified, as we have noted, by Humboldt.

The Wisconsin idea as expressed in Progressive legislation was modeled after its German counterpart. The corporate liberal state which thus emerged in America was, like the Bismarckian state, designed to prevent major conflict between fundamental competing economic and social interests. Along with it came the use of the state not only as a regulatory agency but also as a protective welfare agency which, in exercising its power, extended its compulsory authority to every realm of life from production to consumption. The larger corporations and larger unions found it to their financial advantage to suport greater governmental authority in many areas of life (see Kolko, 1963; Weinstein, 1968; and Wiebe, 1967, for general conditions of the period). That same compulsory state authority which regulated commerce also came to be used to regulate drugs, alcohol, tobacco, food, clothing, work, leisure time, communications, news, knowledge, research, as well as medicine, child labor, education, and social welfare. The concept of the regulatory liberal state could readily evolve into the concept of the totalitarian state in the 20th century. The logic was almost inexorable. The control and management of mass production ultimately required the control and management of mass consumption.

The new mass-production industries concentrated in the industrial centers of the North required the influx of the last great wave of immigrants from southeastern Europe. American life was thus rapidly being changed not only by industrialization but by urbanization and immigration as well. Out of this complex milieu evolved the demands for a new education and, indeed, a reintensified concern for educating the citizen and Americanizing the immigrant.

In a study of the urban school systems in the United

States between 1890 and 1920, drawn mainly from school surveys and reports by school boards and superintendents, Paul Violas (1978) found a close correlation between the settlement-house movement, the development of vocational education, and the variety of attempts to Americanize the new immigrants and their children. Violas points out, with R. H. Wiebe (1967), that the dominant public-institution goal of the period was a very real quest for order and stability. Within that context Violas suggests that the Americanization process was complex, involving differing approaches to the problem. Broadly, he indicates three major responses (Violas, 1978, p. 38). First were the exclusionists, who sought not only to effect immigration restriction but also to use those restrictions to discriminate against certain racial and ethnic groups; second were the assimilationists, who attempted to Americanize the immigrant; and lastly were the cultural pluralists, who thought of American citizenship in terms of a confederation of many ethnically different nationalities. Although many of the exclusionists justified their discrimination on the grounds that certain races and groups are difficult if not impossible to assimilate, those who thought in terms of assimilation were themselves not all of one mind. As Violas points out, some were interested mainly in "erase and color"; in other words, eliminate the language and traditions of ethnic origins as quickly as possible and replace them with the English language and Anglo-Saxon American traditions. Evidence for this position can be found not only in the curricular programs of the schools but also in state legislation that attempted to outlaw the use of foreign language in the public school.

The cultural pluralists insisted that one must recognize the contribution that the immigrant culture could make toward enriching American life; a measure of ethnic diversity should be encouraged while the immigrant's sense of loyalty to the United States was being developed. John Dewey (Karier, 1975) and Jane Addams (Violas, 1978) both called for "democratic participation" within the system so as to gain the immigrant's loyalty. A more extreme position of cultural pluralism, as enunciated by Horace Kallen, called for a loose confederation of fairly independent and fundamentally diverse ethnic groups; needless to say, the latter did not become the mainstream.

By and large, the democratic-participation emphasis as stressed by Dewey, Addams, and others implied very different meanings for both words than are usually attributed to them. Traditionally, the word democratic means "rule by the people." In this sense it mainly implies the holding and exercise of political power. The new meaning of democracy, as developed by Dewey and Addams, stressed not so much the holding and use of real power but rather the psychosocial effect of participation and its effect on cooperative community building. While we analyze this conception of democracy at a later point, Violas shows how the idea of democratic participation was applied in the settlement houses and settlement clubs so as to manipulate and shape the character of the child in order to meet his "individual needs." To meet those needs, an assumption was usually made, albeit an arrogant one, which suggests that educators know what each child needs because they know each child's future destiny. Starting with that assumption, the child is "tracked" and "guided" along the educational path the educator has determined. Repeatedly one is reminded that this is all done in the name of "meeting individual differences," "learning by doing," "relevant" education, and, indeed, being "practical." In analyzing the settlement house, Violas has said:

> Residents felt that they could provide the best "education for life" by training the children for the activities that they supposedly would perform in later adult life. Immigrant and working-class children would "learn by doing" rather than through inculcation of concepts or culture. (Violas, 1978, p. 55)

The Americanization programs that appeared in the public schools were linked with vocational education that tracked the immigrant youngster into relatively low-skilled occupations. While the immigrant child was required by law to attend school, the parents were encouraged to attend evening classes that featured English-language training as well as certain basic concepts about the structure of American government. These programs met with varying degrees of success.

The Americanization campaign, which worked through the schools, the workplace, the newspapers especially, the foreign language press, YMCAs, and so forth, gradually became orchestrated by the Bureau of Naturalization of the Department of Labor. Stock questions about the Constitution were learned and their answers given before a judge who swore in the immigrant as a new citizen. The Americanization aim was clearly expressed by the bureau in the 1916 annual report of the Commissioner of Naturalization: "America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American" (Violas, 1978, p. 61). The massive campaign to Americanize the immigrant took a variety of approaches, many of which not only used the schools but also made ample use of the immigrants' organizations. As George Creel recalled after World War I, "The loyalty of 'our aliens,' however, splendid as it was, had in it nothing of the spontaneous or the accidental. Results were obtained only by hard, driving work" (Violas, 1978, p. 63).

Violas points out that with respect to the immigrant's children, the schools served a twin complementary purpose. On the one hand, they helped to adjust the child and prepare him for an occupation; on the other, they aided him in identifying with American ideals and standards of citizenship. The Americanization of the immigrant proceeded within the overall context of rapidly expanding urban centers and fantastic increases in output per man-hours resulting from mass-production techniques. The holding power of the school was increased as child-labor laws were passed and compulsory-education laws enforced.

One of the first major attempts to organize and standardize the secondary school occurred in 1892, when the NEA Committee of Ten instituted its report recommending the division of the high school curriculum into four different programs: classical, Latin-scientific, modern languages, and English. Each program was considered useful as terminal education. In its report the Committee of Ten insisted that there should be no distinctions in course content or method between those students bound for college and those bound for the world of work. In overall perspective, the curriculum recommended was culturally oriented, tending to reflect the classical notion of a liberally educated person. While the recommendations included history, the report did not mention the term citizenship education. It assumed a psychological base of mental discipline; that psychology, in contrast to modern behaviorism, took as its educational goal the development of thinking individuals. In the final analysis the thrust of this report still assumed that the secondary school ought to provide a relatively similar cultural education for all students in its charge. (For a history of the American high school, see Krug, 1964, 1972).

Throughout the 1890s the secondary school rapidly increased in number and size; for example, in 1890 there were 2,526 public high schools serving 203,000 students, while in 1900 there were 6,005 schools serving 519,000 students (U.S. Office of Education, 1950, chap. 1). By 1898 the highly influential American Historical Association's Committee of Seven recommended that the high school curriculum remain heavily classical in orientation and incorporate four years of history. Shortly after the turn of the century, however, the newer social science associations, such as the American Political Science Association (1903) and the American Sociological Society (1905), were organized. By 1908 the APSA called for one course in American government in the high school curriculum, and shortly thereafter the ASS argued for a sociology course at the 12th-grade level that would help the "citizenry adjust to a complex and problematical social environment" (cited in Lewenstein, 1953).

The many recommendations and fundamentally significant policy changes in the function of the high school were perhaps best capsulated by the 1918 Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education of the NEA. The report of this commission set the basic direction of the American comprehensive high school for the 20th century. It clearly reflected the declining influence of the classical tradition and with it the psychology of mental discipline. With that decline went much of the intellectual culture that undergirded the idea of individual freedom. The new psychology of behaviorism and the new philosophy of pragmatic liberalism were clearly in evidence. The goal of the secondary school, the committee surmised, ought to be expanded from what was essentially an intellectual culture to include virtually all aspects of social life. The goals enunciated (Cardinal Principles of Education, 1918) were (a) health, (b) command of fundamental processes (communicative and computational skills), (c) worthy home membership, (d) vocation, (e) citizenship, (f) worthy use of leisure time, and (g) ethical character. The committee went on to say that the school

> should develop in the individual those qualities whereby he will act his part as a member of a neighborhood, town or city, state, and nation, and give him a basis for understanding international problems. For such citizenship the following are essential: a many-sided interest in the welfare of the community to which one belongs; loyalty to ideals of civic righteousness; practical knowledge of social agencies and institutions; good judgement as to means and methods that will promote one social end without defeating others; and as putting all of these into effect, habits of cordial cooperation in social undertaking. (Cardinal Principles of Education, 1918, p. 13)

Throughout the first half of the 20th century thousands of teachers in training were required to commit to memory this committee's aims and goals as a standard for all secondary schools of the nation.

The ideas of the committee were further reiterated by a variety of committees and commissions throughout the century. For example, in 1937, a list of objectives was prepared by the Joint Committee on Curriculum of the Department of Supervision and Directors of Instruction of the NEA and the Society for the Curriculum Study: (a) living in the home, (b) leisure, (c) citizenship, (d) organized group life, (e) consumption, (f) production, (g) communication, and (h) transportation (Lewenstein, 1953, p. 37). In 1938 the Educational Policies Commission (1946, p. 193) of the NEA outlined its view of the objectives of education in American democracy as self-realization, human relationships, economic efficiency, and civic responsibility. This list was further recast in 1944 by the National Association of Secondary School Principals into more detailed needs of youth:

> 1. All youth need to develop saleable skills and those understandings and attitudes that make the worker an intelligent and productive participant in economic life.
>
> 2. All youth need to maintain and develop good health and physical fitness.
>
> 3. *All youth need to understand the rights and duties of the citizen of a democratic society, and to be diligent and competent in the performance of their obligations as members of the community and citizens of the state and nation* [italics in original text].

4. All youth need to understand the significance of the family for the individual and society, and the conditions conducive to successful family life.

5. All youth need to know how to purchase and use goods and services intelligently, understanding both the values received by the consumer and the economic consequences of their acts.

6. All youth need to understand the methods of science, the influence of science on human life and the main scientific facts concerning the nature of the world and men.

7. All youth need opportunities to develop their capacities to appreciate beauty in literature, art, music, and nature.

8. All youth need to be able to use their leisure time well and to budget it wisely, balancing activities that yield satisfactions to the individual with those that are socially useful.

9. All youth need to develop respect for other persons, to grow in their insights into ethical values and principles, and to be able to live and work cooperatively with others.

10. All youth need to grow in their ability to think rationally, to express their thoughts clearly, and to read and listen with understanding. (cited by Lewenstein, 1953, p. 38)

Towards a Psychology and Philosophy of Social Control

During the 20th century the high schools not only grew in numbers and size, serving a larger and more diverse clientele, but also markedly expanded their function. All the needs of all the youth now were to be defined and met by the organized school. In this sense, there seemingly was no end to the school's presumed ability to meet students' needs.

Citizenship had come to be defined in many different ways. While some continued to think of citizenship education as limited to civic training, focusing on the individual and his understanding of his government, others considered it in terms of total behavior of the individual. Thus high school sports were justified on citizenship grounds (O'Hanlon, 1978), as were home-room activities, assembly programs, magazine sales, and school clubs. Here again the character-education movement and the mental-hygiene movement in the early decades of the 20th century joined forces in their concern for the development of the "citizen" (Yulish, 1975). Underlying much of this discussion was the basic tenet of the new psychology and new liberalism.

The reconstruction that occurred in both psychology and philosophy carried theoretical and practical problems with respect to the maintenance of the freedom and integrity of the individual as opposed to the needs of the social system. Increasingly one finds individual needs defined in terms of the needs of society; more ominous still was the apparent increasing concern with behavior rather than intellectual capability.

Although it is the case that the classical educational idealists also were concerned with shaping character, it should be restated that their central concern was with the development of the intellect, which was itself premised on the assumption of a free individual mentally exercising his freedom of choice. The new psychology of behavior, as developed by Thorndike, Watson, and later B. F. Skinner, fundamentally rejected the notion of freedom of choice on the part of the individual (see Skinner, 1972; and Watson, 1930, p. 303, on free speech). As Skinner argued:

> The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of scientific method to the study of human behavior. The free inner man who is held responsible for the behavior of the external biological organism is only a prescientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered in the course of a scientific analysis. (Skinner, 1956, p. 447)

On the surface this may appear as an interesting problem expressed by a few psychologists. When, however, the idea is translated into textbooks, teachers' guides, lesson plans--indeed, the very way teachers are taught to perceive the learning process--this idea has devastating consequences for freedom in education. The new psychology of behaviorism was a manipulative psychology appropriate for the management, control, and the education of man in a totalitarian social system. While Thorndike thought of education as a "stamping in" process and supposedly refuted the notion of mental discipline by replacing it with a theory of "identical elements" (a theory which provides the psychological basis for the social-efficiency and life-adjustment movement), and Watson and

Skinner thought of education in terms of conditioning, the new social behaviorism of George Herbert Mead (1932, 1934, 1938) developed the theory of transactional relationship.

Mead, along with John Dewey (1922), put the emphasis on the emergence of the social self and the way that the social self was transactionally shaped by interaction within one's social environment. It should be noted that even though Mead and Dewey both saw the individual more as an active agent than, for example, Skinner or Watson, their psychology was still behavioristic, putting the emphasis on controlled social environments for shaping the social self. "Control is the crux of our freedom," according to Dewey (1922, p. 311).

The social behaviorism of Mead and Dewey has become the psychology which undergirds the point of view of many of our leaders in political science, sociology, and anthropology. If one puts together the psychology of Watson and Skinner with the psychology of Mead and Dewey as distinctive types or forms of behaviorism, it becomes apparent that behaviorism represents the mainstream of American psychology in the 20th century. It can be shown practically that this kind of psychology, especially the Thorndike-Watson-Skinner variety of behaviorism, has had a profound impact on the curriculum of the public schools. Repeatedly, the primary emphasis is placed on specific behavior expected from an educational experience rather than on the understanding of a free human being who freely chooses to behave or not to behave as he or she wills. The educational profession as well as the governmentally supported agencies overwhelmingly reflects this mentality, insisting that all objectives be cast in behavioral terms.

In this respect, thought and action, as Watson (1930, p. 303) once claimed, have become one in our thinking. Under the circumstances there is no more reason to allow freedom of thought than there is to allow freedom of action. Some years ago, William James rightly warned psychologists that by their own theories of human nature they exercised the power of elevating or degrading that same human nature (Karier, 1967, p. 135). Modern behavioral psychology, even when it presumes an inner self which is transactionally related to environment, is still behavioristic and tends to be manipulative.

In terms of the modern community, the reconstruction in philosophy, as well as the reconstruction of psychology, was important. The key leader here was John Dewey. The new liberalism (Karier, Violas, & Spring, 1973), as developed by Dewey, was a comprehensive reconstruction of the old classical liberalism. While the old liberals thought of the individual in terms of "freedom from," the new liberals thought in terms of "freedom to." While the old saw individual freedom in relation to the state in negative terms, the new liberalism saw it in positive terms. Thus the new liberals intellectually laid the ideological foundation for the educational state in 20th-century America.

Dewey believed America suffered most from what was essentially an anarchic laissez-faire individualism. What was needed, he argued, was the creation of a new corporate individualism (Dewey, 1930). He recognized the need to reconstruct American philosophy, which he saw virtually in shambles, as the classical, religious conception of man declined in the face of the advance of scientific naturalism. Thus not only the school was changing; the very ideological framework through which educators perceived their work was to be reconstructed. This reconstruction in philosophy carried with it certain problematical weaknesses, perhaps even fatal flaws.

If in fact the meaning of an idea was to be determined by its consequences in action, as most pragmatists claimed, then one might ask what the social consequences were of this liberal philosophy when it came to action. The ethical questions involved in the use and abuse of power come quickly to the fore and are extremely difficult to assess (Karier, 1977). The failure to pragmatically evaluate pragmatic liberal philosophy was itself a problem. What, for example, has been the practical consequence of the destruction of dualism in our thinking on the intellectual basis of our freedom in the modern world? In the positive planned state, freedom itself becomes problematic. The limits of state action become pragmatically relative to survival interests of the state, which in turn are repeatedly cast into scientific efficiency terms.

Throughout Dewey's reconstruction of philosophy runs a conscious reconstruction in the meaning of words such as God, spirit, religion, freedom, democracy, science, and scientific method. These meanings were developed over time as he worked out his new philosophy. The word democracy, for example, took on a vastly different meaning for Dewey than what it had traditionally meant. In his 1888 "Ethics of Democracy" essay, Dewey (1969) began to reconstruct the meaning of the term. Democracy, he believed, must be understood less in terms of a majority or minority or the will of the people but rather as the way that the majority is created; less in terms of politics or power and more in broader cultural participatory terms. Emphasis should be placed on the quality and kind of participation rather than on a numerical power analysis.

Dewey was attempting, in a broad sense, to fashion a modern paideia. He hoped to do for democracy in his Democracy and Education (1916) what Plato had done for aristocracy in his Republic. Dewey attempted to fashion the educational ideology necessary for a social democracy. In such a state, class conflict was to be minimized, and indeed obscured, as the focus shifted from power analysis to the progressive requirements for the new emerging order. That order took as its guiding star the development and use of scientific method. By 1927, when Dewey published The Public and Its Problems, it was clear that behind his conception of democracy was a chief concern that the best method, the scientific method, become an integral part of the creation of a "public" mind.

The focus here was how the people "scientifically" come to make their decisions: how one participates rather than the power one wields. With this view of democracy in mind, Dewey visited the Soviet Union in 1928 and found "Russian school children much more democratically organized than our own" (Dewey, 1929b, pp. 105-106). When he spoke of the Soviet schools as more democratic, he was not using the term in the sense of "rule by the people" or what constitutes majority rule versus minority rule in any strict political sense. He did not ask questions about power or who controlled the schools and how representative the Communist Party was of the people. Rather he used the term democracy in the sense of social democracy as an organic community--a concept that he had been developing since his "Ethics of Democracy" essay in 1888; later in its educational aspects in Democracy and Education in 1916; and in its broader cultural aspects in The

Public and Its Problems in 1927 (Dewey, 1916, 1927, 1969). Dewey was not concerned with whether the Soviet Communists really represented the majority of the people--that was an "arithmetical" problem--but rather with how the schools "organically" related to those "forces" in the ascendancy.

The philosopher of American democracy looked at the formation of the totalitarian Russian educational system in the decade after the revolution and called it democratic. This, however, was no mistake. When Dewey examined the Russian schools in 1928 (Dewey, 1929b) he saw students and teachers --school and society--actively unified in purpose and aim and "scientifically" reconstructing their society. His idea of a social democracy which put emphasis on social participation without critically dealing with questions of power had, for him, come to life. There are, then, some particular hazards in using the term democracy in education to mean participation, without a corresponding critical look at who controls the power. Dewey's conception of power as well as his conception of science--especially as it was translated by many educators into the "method of intelligence," or indeed the idea of "critical thinking"--can be problematic. If and when these methods are used to emphasize participation in the name of democracy without a corresponding real analysis of the use of power, then it is clearly possible to call even a totalitarian system democratic.

While the citizenship literature in the 20th century abounds with the use of the words democracy and participation, it usually does not mean democracy in the old sense of political democracy but rather in the sense of the social liberal conception. Participation, in these terms, becomes more of a symbolic activity provided to help people feel as though they are making a real difference when, in fact, they are not. This kind of participatory experience is reflected in student councils, student government activities, and many of the organized planned school-related activities (Spring, 1976; Violas, 1978).

The liberal's reconstructed notion of democracy carries with it the idea that the crucial social problems we face in the 20th century can and ought to be solved by the application of scientific method to the political process of decision making. The older notion of political parties and public debates was passé, as Dewey put it:

> The idea that the conflict of parties will, by means of public discussion, bring out necessary public truths is a kind of political watered-down version of the Hegelian dialectic, with its synthesis arrived at by a union of antithetical conceptions. The method has nothing in common with the procedure of organized cooperative inquiry which has won the triumphs of science in the field of physical nature. (Dewey, 1935, p. 71)

Dewey's position carried with it a number of assumptions. For one, he assumed that most 20th-century problems are not so much raw power conflicts as they are problems of simply knowing the right answers; for the most part, he believed, these problems were amenable to scientific solution. Second, he thought that most of these problems resulted from cultural lag, which occurs when our institutional structures and certain areas of our thinking fail to keep pace with our advancing knowledge. The solution, Dewey believed, was to extend the application of scientific method to all realms of life. How, then, did the rule of the people fit into this process? The public must be educated to accept scientific evidence, according to Dewey. The role of the educator was to provide a "democratic" education that would help people accept the new scientifically directed social democracy. The role of the professional was vital. He or she stood as the key agent by which the majority was formed. Dewey pointed out that the real heart of the matter "is found not in the voting nor in the counting the votes to see where the majority lies. It is in the process by which the majority is formed" (1969, p. 234). That majority was to be formed by a democratic education, which did not mean power to the people; it meant scientific consciousness to the people. Dewey's conception of American democracy and education rested squarely on the teaching of this method of inquiry with all its ideological ramifications.

The views of George S. Counts, a close colleague of Dewey's, were even more explicit. In Dare the Schools Build a

New Social Order? (1932), Counts argued that the schools should not only teach the right scientific attitudes and values which could undergird a new scientific community but should also be explicit in blueprinting a new social order. The professional educator, according to Counts, ought to use his or her influence in fostering the commitment of youth to the scientific method and to its application in social planning. The process by which this would come about was what the new liberals called democratic education. Here again, this did not mean an education controlled by the people but rather an education to indoctrinate or inculcate those values and attitudes necessary for the majority to come to the right scientifically determined solutions.

Although Dewey did not believe in an oligarchy of experts, he never tired of emphasizing that the important thing is not the counting of votes; it is the way in which those votes were determined in the first place. Democracy is not simply the "rule of the people," who might be an ignorant mass; it is the "rule of the people" scientifically enlightened by virtue of a democratic education. The role of the professional educator as a democratic educator was to enlighten. Counts's basic meritocratic liberal views were well expressed when he said:

> If a democracy is to have democratic education, the school must be protected not only against the assaults of minorities but also from the caprice and ignorance of the majority. A central task of

> democratic education is to educate a democracy to desire, to support, and to defend a program of democratic education. (Counts, 1946, p. 142)

Aside from the circularity of the argument, it seems clear that while the professional educators guided the vast majority of young people to accept the values of democratic education, those educators must be protected from the "caprice and ignorance of the majority." The role of the professional in fashioning the new meritocratic order was here evident. That role was as midwife to the truth and must be protected against the machinations of an ignorant majority. Participation of the majority must be encouraged only when that majority makes enlightened decisions; it must be discouraged when it makes the "wrong" decisions. The tension between the older meaning of democracy as rule by the people and the new liberal view of democracy with its problematic relationship of the people and those who are knowledgeable is evident. Throughout much of the citizenship-education literature there is a pronounced call for student participation. The current literature abounds with such concerns, even to suggesting intern programs in citizenship education. For the most part, these activities are symbolic acts shorn of real or significant power, effective in creating--for some, perhaps--the illusion of self-government.

There are times, however, when the older notion of democracy comes to the fore; and when it does--as in the 1960s, for example, at Ocean Hill-Brownsville and elsewhere in both the civil rights and antiwar movements--the role of the expert is sure to be challenged. So Samuel P. Huntington, a Harvard professor of government, in writing a report to the highly influential Trilateral Commission[1] analyzing The Crisis of Democracy (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975) in America in the 1960s found that American democracy suffered from too much participation of its people in its government. What was needed, Huntington argued, was a return to more respect for the expert and less participation on the part of the majority. As he put it, the "democratic system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups" (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 114). It was clear to Huntington, as it was to others on the commission, that too much participation was dangerous to social stability; he said:

> The vulnerability of democratic government in the United States thus comes not primarily from external threats, though such threats are real, nor from internal submission from the left or the right, although both possibilities exist, but rather from the internal dynamics of democracy itself in a highly educated, mobilized, and participant society. (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 115)

The threat to liberal democracy was too much old-fashioned democracy of rule by the people. Participation, if taken seriously, could be a dangerous thing. While Huntington called for less participation, other liberal educators called for more participation of the student in citizenship education. This, however, was not a contradiction. Huntington was talking about real power, while the educators were talking about symbolic exercises in the use of power. In both cases it was tacitly assumed that the majority was going to be protected from itself by the professional experts.

---

[1] The President, the Vice-President, and most of the Cabinet belong to this commission.

Although George S. Counts's notion of a democratic education was in many ways similar to Dewey's basically liberal views, Counts went further. While Dewey more often tended to stop inculcation of values at the methodology level, Counts, along with other social reconstructionists, went further in spelling out the immediate solutions to a variety of problems. Even before Counts gave his epoch-making speech, "Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?" before the Progressive Education Association, another liberal social reconstructionist, Harold Rugg (1931), had finished a social-studies textbook series based upon a similar philosophy.

Working with a team of specialists, Harold Rugg developed a comprehensive set of social-studies textbooks in the 1920s which can easily be counted as one of the most successful textbook series of the next decade, selling over 5 million copies. These texts represented the single most ambitious attempt to implement the liberal-social-reconstructionist

137

philosophy directly into educational practice.

Much critical research needs to be done in citizenship texts, guides and tests, school board and school superintendent reports, and school surveys on the actual citizenship-education programs in use in the schools during the 20th century. One suspects that a differentiated-curriculum program existed in citizenship education that followed along ethnic, racial, and class lines. The verification or rejection of such a hypothesis awaits much more extensive and intensive empirical research than is done here.

Selected Approaches to Citizenship Education

Not all citizenship-curricular experts thought of democracy and participation in exactly the same way as did Dewey, Counts, or Rugg; for most, however, the meaning of democracy had radically changed from its former usage. Under the mantle of democracy, not only was a lesser concern for the political understanding of the citizen manifested but also, and more importantly, a greater concern for the citizen's personality, character, and emotional development was expressed. Not much seemed to be missed when the Educational Policies Commission defined the "hallmark of democratic education" in 1940 as follows:

> 1. Democratic education has as its central purpose the welfare of all the people.
>
> 2. Democratic education serves each individual

with justice, seeking to provide equal educational opportunity for all, regardless of intelligence, race, religion, social status, economic condition, or vocational plans.

3. Democratic education respects the basic civil liberties in practice and clarifies their meaning through study.
4. Democratic education is concerned for the maintenance of those economic, political, and social conditions which are necessary for the enjoyment of liberty.
5. Democratic education guarantees to all the members of its community the right to share in determining the purposes and policies of education.
6. Democratic education uses democratic methods, in classroom, administration, and student activities.
7. Democratic education makes efficient use of personnel, teaching respect for competence in positions of responsibility.
8. Democratic education teaches through experience that every privilege entails a corresponding duty, every authority a responsibility, every responsibility an accounting to the group which granted the privilege or authority.
9. Democratic education demonstrates that far-reaching changes, of both policies and procedures, can be carried out in orderly and peaceful fashion, when the decisions to make the changes have been reached by democratic means.
10. Democratic education liberates and uses the intelligence of all.
11. Democratic education equips citizens with the materials of knowledge needed for democratic efficiency.
12. Democratic education promotes loyalty to democracy by stressing positive understanding and appreciation and by summoning youth to service in a great cause. (Quillen & Hanna, 1948, p. 22)

The citizen was to be shaped by the state to conform to "democratic education," whatever that included. Lost here was any sense that the state was only a necessary expedient and that the citizen ought to be free as much as possible from its controlling influence. The power of the state to do things to its citizens seemingly appeared limitless. Some, however, held more limited views. Especially was this true of those who thought of civic education in terms of the standard discipline of history or the newer emerging social-science disciplines--political science, economics, and sociology. Throughout the century various committees have attempted to create standards for what ought to be considered social studies. One such committee was the 1913 Committee on Social Studies working under the NEA Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education. Another very important such group was the Commission on Social Studies of the American Historical Association, which grew out of the work of A. C. Krey in 1929. From 1932 to 1941 this commission produced some 17 volumes. These commissions and committees usually attempted to set guidelines and standards within a framework of applying the social-science disciplines to elementary and secondary schools.

In contrast to these discipline-oriented programs, there were many programs which took as their central focus moral and spiritual character, attitudes, habits, skills of participation, and values clarification. While a few programs had taken the idea of a classical liberal education seriously and had attempted to construct programs on the notion of using knowledge to help develop a free-thinking, -judging, -willing and -acting individual, most programs tended toward a central concern for specific habits and behaviors which preclude judgment on the part of the individual. Vernon E. Jones came close to a Fichtean model of citizenship, focusing his attention on character education as he said:

> Character is less extensive than personality, but it covers a certain segment of thought and overt behavior more intensively. Character deals particularly with the volitional and inhibitory phases of human behavior and concentrates on values which give direction, order and meaning to life. It stresses creativeness in mind and action. In character we are always conscious not only of what is but of what ought to be both in conduct and conditions of life. (Jones, 1950, p. 2)

If the state could only shape people's character, what people willed, then in fact the proper behavior would be secure. The overall concern was to teach people how to feel, how to will, what to think, and how to act.

A number of patriotic organizations such as the DAR, the American Legion, and Veterans of Foreign Wars have been actively involved in the schools. Through a variety of activities these organizations have espoused a conception of citizenship in terms of unfailing loyalty. For example, the Legion, in its 1952 Americanism Manual, defined Americanism as

> An unfailing love of country, loyalty to its institutions and ideals; eagerness to defend it against all enemies; individual allegiance to the flag; and a desire to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity. (cited in Lewenstein, 1953, p. 102)

The citizenship literature of this kind of organization usually abounds with much concern for the emotional zeal and commitment the citizen ought to have towards his country. In 1948, in the early days of the cold war, just before the McCarthy era, Commissioner John W. Studebaker of the U.S. Office of Education launched a program labeled the Zeal for Democracy, in which he voiced the following concern:

> A nation cannot be strong unless it is united in support of a common civic and social creed. The American creed is that of a democracy and human liberty. That creed cannot be viewed with apathy and indifference. It must be propagated and supported with an individual and collective passion by all good Americans. The propagation of that creed is a fundamental objective of American Education. (cited in Lewenstein, 1953, p. 104)

In a similar vein, Philip H. Falk, superintendent of the Madison, Wisconsin, public schools, registered his view of the citizenship training in the schools when he said, "Equally important is the need for indoctrinating youth with conviction regarding American democracy. There are basic principles for which America stands. There should be no doubt in the minds of youth as to what these principles are" (cited in Lewenstein, 1953, p. 104). Neither Falk nor many others seemed to find much incongruity in indoctrinating for American democracy. Their chief concern from this standpoint was loyalty--indeed, emotional loyalty. As J. J. Mahoney put it in For Us the Living (1945), "The dominant purpose should be to cause children to feel as they ought to feel" (cited in Lewenstein, 1953, p. 105).

While many educators had clearly passed into a totalitarian view of the purposes of citizenship training, sometimes this view clashed with other loyalties. These clashes centered on certain school practices that ultimately pitted state authority against the individual's freedom. Some of the more critical problems eventually found their way to the Supreme Court. The recent Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969)[2] case was one such instance that finally established the right of the student to protest government action peaceably and symbolically while attending government-owned schools.

An earlier series of cases involving the exercise of the state authority to compel citizens to express their loyalty symbolically occurred in the form of the flag-salute cases. In these particular cases, religious conviction was pitted against the power of the state. The question was posed: Does the citizen have a constitutional right, on grounds of religious conscience, to refuse to salute the flag in an educational institution when the state requires such action?

---

[2] Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 89 Sup. Ct. 733 (1969).

In Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)[3] the court concluded, in an eight-to-one decision, that the state educational authority may in fact require, as a condition of school attendance, saluting of the flag in the interest of "national feeling and unity." In the Minersville case, the religious beliefs of a Jehovah's Witness were directly opposed to the state practice. The biblical prohibition against bowing down before graven images, found in Exodus 20:4-5, is interpreted by the Witnesses as applying to the flag salute.

Only 3 years later, in essentially the same kind of case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,[4] the Court reversed itself in a six-to-three decision. What accounted for one of the quickest reversals in Supreme Court history? Two new justices joined the Court, and three justices changed their opinion. It is reasonable to suspect that the latter justices viewed the consequences of the Minersville decision, did not like what they saw, and reversed their earlier opinions on that basis. There were, however, some differences between the two cases. Minersville involved a local board, while Barnette involved a state law that carried explicit penalties for violators.

---

[3] Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1011 (1940).

[4] West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. (1943).

The consequences of the Minersville decision were immediately apparent. Within one week, hundreds of Jehovah's Witnesses--men, women, and children--were physically attacked and abused in most inhumane ways. Jehovah's Witnesses' meeting places were burned and their leaders driven out of town, usually with the law-enforcement agency of the community leading the way. For example:

> In one town, the chief of police and the deputy sheriff forced a group of Jehovah's Witnesses to drink large doses of castor oil and then paraded them through the streets tied together with police-department rope. In another, a local judge warned a group of Witnesses that unless they compelled their children to salute the flag he would take the children away from them and place them in an institution where they would be taught to understand what Americanism is. (Pfeffer, 1963, p. 51)

A wave of religious persecution, fanned by wartime nationalistic fervor, swept the country. It should be noted here that the real test of religious tolerance of a community, like a test of individual character, is not what the community does to powerful individuals or groups with the means to fight back but what it does to those who cannot defend themselves. The question is how much freedom politically weak religious groups have within a society. In the 1830s, Roman Catholics were in the position of threatening the community and having their churches burned. A century later, in the 1940s, Jehovah's Witnesses were in a similar position. The main defense this religious sect has had against local community attacks has been the federal courts. Thus, between 1938 and 1950, Jehovah's Witnesses have been involved in over 20 major cases concerning religious liberty (Spurlock, 1955, p. 101). Perhaps the real test of the American sense of religious tolerance is not whether we can elect a Catholic president but rather how we treat the Witnesses within our communities.

Objecting to the Supreme Court's reversal in the Barnette decision, Justice Frankfurter argued:

> As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard. The duty of a judge who must decide which of two claims before the Court shall prevail, that of a State to enact and enforce laws within its general competence or that of an individual to refuse obedience because of the demands of his conscience, is not that of the ordinary person. It can never be emphasized too much that one's own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one's duty on the bench. Most unwillingly, therefore, I must differ from my brethren with regard to legislation like this. I cannot bring my mind to believe that the 'liberty' secured by the Due Process Clause gives this Court authority to deny the State of West Virginia the attainment of that which we all recognize as a legitimate legislative end, namely, the promotion of good citizenship by employment of the means here chosen.... (W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, pp. 1189-1190)

On the other hand, in delivering the majority opinion of the court, Justice Robert Jackson argued that this was not so much a case involving freedom of religion as a case involving freedom of speech, which includes the freedom not to speak.

Does the state have the authority to coerce its citizens to say that which they do not believe? While it may be that the national unity which officials foster by persuasion and example is a desirable end, Jackson argued the following:

> As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. (W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, pp. 1186-1187)

Jackson went on to point out that freedom cannot be limited to only those things which make little difference but must be extended to those things which we view as important.

> To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
>
> If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,

> nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us. (W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, p. 1187)

The Barnette decision was based, then, on both freedom of religion and freedom of speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment (see Pfeffer, 1953, pp. 524-528; 1963, p. 89). This mixture of freedom of speech and freedom of religion further complicates the issue. Can a state compel a student to salute the flag if he objects on other than religious grounds? New York State has a compulsory flag-salute law (chap. 874, No. 801 and 802 of the New York laws of 1963), which requires a daily flag salute. According to the state's attorney general (Opinion of Counsel No. 135, April 8, 1964) the school board may coerce all children to salute the flag except those who object on religious grounds. The constitutionality of this practice is yet to be tested.

While at critical moments the courts have drawn a line placing limits on the state in the exercise of its authority, the bulk of the thrust of educational literature came up on the side of the social system and required conforming behavior. Emotional health and mental hygiene have often been tied to citizenship education (National Council for the Social Studies, 1949, chap. 2, pp. 10-31, which contains a discussion of use of the home room for mental health). Most of this literature uses behavioristic psychology tending to specify behavioral outcomes. As we have noted, the guiding educational psychology of the 20th century has been a behavioristic psychology which is fundamentally premised on the notion that man is not free.

We shall now turn to an analysis of three sample approaches to citizenship education that were used during the period 1930-1960. No claim is made as to these being the only programs in the schools; nor has the exact extent been indicated to which any program was dominant in the curriculum of the schools. As our analysis unfolds, our focus will be on a life-adjustment approach, then a social-reconstructionist approach, and finally a method-of-inquiry approach. Each approach was philosophically rooted and has historically occupied a significant place in the schools during the period under study.

The identical-elements curricular notions of Thorndike (which assume that for the school to be effective its curriculum must consist of the identical elements of real-life tasks) and the behaviorism of Watson and Skinner have directly contributed to the social-efficiency thinking that undergirds much of the life-adjustment curriculum. This curriculum is closely tied to vocational competency and social efficiency. It had its strongest exponents in men like Franklin Bobbitt (1918, 1924) and Charles A. Prosser in both vocational and civic education. (See also Krug, 1964; Spring, 1972, 1976; Violas, 1978.) This approach to citizenship education is behavioristic, focusing on specific behavior. It is "practical," that is, concerned mainly with practices; it places emphasis on participation and tends to sloganize the educational jargon of "learning by doing," with the overall thrust on adjustment to the social order. Perhaps the best way to see this emphasis is to look briefly at the table of contents of a citizenship text that employs this life-adjustment approach. The chapter titles and examples of chapter subdivisions from *Living Your Life* (Crawford, Cooley, Trillingham, & Stoops, 1953, pp. v-xiv) speak for themselves:

> *School. How to Fit into the Educational Scene*
> Rah! Rah! Rah! How to take part in school songs and yells..
>
> *Study. How to Plan and Do Your School Work*
> New tools. How to use the school's equipment and facilities..
>
> *Leadership. How to Influence and Direct Others*
> Politics. How to get votes for student offices.........
>
> *Personality. How to Be Happy and Liked by Others*
> A rag, a bone. How to adapt your clothes to your figure..
>
> *Etiquette. How to Do the Right Thing the Right Way*
> Diamonds in the rough. How to behave so that you will not be thought crude, that is, ignorant or rude..
>
> *Bad Habits. How to Write Your Declaration of Independence*
> How to keep your tongue from wagging and your ears from itching..
>
> *Dates. How to Meet the Boy-Girl Problem*
> Two's company. How to manage the family while you visit with a friend..

Home. How to Live with Your Family
Honk, Honk! How to get your share of the family car....

Citizenship. How to Be a Stockholder in America Incorporated
Election day. How to get your mother, father, and neighbors to vote correctly..............................

Vocation. How to Take Your Place in the World of Work
Swivel chair. How to get a raise and a promotion.......

Money. How to Save, Use, and Spend
Golden sunset. How to provide for your old age.........

Health. How to Keep Well and Strong
Schoolgirl complexion. How to avoid or treat acne (pimples)...

Safety. How to Protect Yourself and Others from Accidents
Slippery bathtubs. How to reduce accidents at home.....

Leisure. How to Do What You Want to Do
Tuning in. How to get the best from the ether waves....

Those who adopted this life-adjustment curriculum were concerned with day-to-day problems of living ranging from how to buy a car to "how to be dated, dined, and danced," even how to share a bathroom. The how-to emphasis was practical and highly relevant. Manipulative behaviorism is clearly in evidence, as is the implicit totalitarian view of the limitless function of the school.

In fundamental philosophy, the life-adjustment educators were usually liberals who saw their educational mission as adjusting the student to the practical world as they saw it. For the most part, that world turned out to be a benign, dreamlike world of the white middle class. Emphasis was placed on solvable personal problems of living rather than on controversial social and economic issues.

In contrast, the social reconstructionism of Harold Rugg (1931, 1938) placed heavy stress on the larger issues. He too believed that the function of the school was to adjust the student to live successfully in his age; but in order to do so, Rugg believed, it was necessary to face squarely the many social and economic problems that have been a by-product of the century's great advances in science and technology. As the student read Rugg's textbooks, he came to confront a variety of social and economic problems. Invariably he did so in the context of what Dewey and others called "cultural lag." He was told, for example, that the problems were usually caused by the failure of certain groups, beliefs, people, or institutions to keep up with the progress of science and technology. He also was told that there were solutions to all these problems, whether they were problems of unemployment, poverty, disease, medical services, urban congestion, propaganda, immigration, law enforcement, honesty in advertising, or big-business excessive profits; problems could be ameliorated in the end and solved through scientific planning. Rugg's approach was that of an engineer, socially engineering what he perceived to be a better world.

It is important to realize that Rugg's first experimental edition was worked out from 1921 to 1923 and the second from

152

1923 to 1926. The work was accomplished by a large team of research associates who utilized curriculum materials developed in a variety of school settings and then shaped and reshaped through the decade of the 1920s. When Ginn published Rugg's *An Introduction to Problems of American Culture* in 1931, the entire Rugg social science series was available for the schools. It included six textbooks designed for different grade levels, with an accompanying workbook and teacher's guide for each text. The work was a major accomplishment and was used extensively through the 1930s. These textbooks were not just a response to the Great Depression, nor were they a response to Counts's *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?* (1932); rather they were a clear attempt to institutionalize educationally the liberal reconstructionist philosophy. Here again this approach can perhaps be best sensed by looking at the table of contents of one of Rugg's texts. The unit titles and a selection of chapter titles for volume 6 of *An Introduction to Problems of American Culture* (1931) are as follows:

American Culture and Changing Group Life
  The Immigrant in Community and Neighborhood Life........
  The Changing American Family............................

The American and His Work
  Machines, Men, and Their Jobs...........................

Government and Changing Town and City Life
  Some Problems of Law Enforcement and Crime..............

The Press and American Culture
  The Story of American Newspapers, Magazines, and Books..

Public Opinion and American Life
How Public Opinion Is Formed..........................

Other Aspects of Our Changing American Culture
The Rise of the Fine Arts in America.................
Assimilation of Different Nationalities and Races.....
Looking Ahead: The Age of Planning...................

Rugg (1931) took the reader through economic and social problems of neighborhood, family living, work, government, the mass media, the shaping of public opinion, and the fine arts, as well as the problem of ethnic and racial differences. The causes for these problems were repeatedly found in the advancing new industrial revolution and its impact on social life. Progress, through scientific technology, had wrought positive change and improvement in the American standard of living. Modernization was treated as a positive good. There are problems, however, as Rugg is quick to note. He describes the home life of Mr. Very Poor Man, Mr. Average Worker, Mr. Average White Collar, Mr. Prosperous Business Man and Mr. Cultured Man. Various socioeconomic classes are represented in the texts, along with the impact of technology on the world of work and family. But throughout, class is not represented as a group out of which one's own self-interest is to be politically organized. More often it is part of a social ladder upon which one tries to move to a higher standard of living and social power over one's fellow men. This view of society was a given, rooted in the very nature of man. As Rugg put it in a later text:

> Man's struggle for a better living has been partly influenced by his desire for power over his fellow man. So it has been in all times and in all places throughout the life of man on earth....Now all these things that a man desires and struggles to get can be described in one phrase, "standard of living."
>
> What a man wants and struggles everlastingly to get is his standard of living. (Rugg, 1938, pp. 540-541)

Rugg's view of the social-class system was that of a meritocratic liberal, who saw the social-class system structured as a ladder upon which men struggled for a place. Throughout his analysis runs a fundamental commitment to this understanding of the social hierarchy. Even as conditions at each rung on the ladder can be improved--and perhaps the rungs moved closer together through progress in science, technology, and corporate life--the ladder itself remains.

Undergirding Rugg's textbooks was a fundamental acceptance of the corporate system. There were, of course, many social problems, as Rugg pointed out (1931): problems of the changing family, the breakdown in neighborhood life, assimilating the immigrant, unemployment, honest and efficient community government, law enforcement, controlling and improving the press, propaganda and censorship, controlling the use of advertising, the increasing extravagance of the public, educating the consumer in scientific buying, managing the increasing restlessness of the populace and the speed of life, an interest in accumulating money and property, and intolerance and interference in individual and group life. Rugg repeatedly emphasized that the solution to these many problems was more sound economic and social planning. The state power was to be used not only to regulate business and social life for efficiency purposes but also to redistribute income somewhat so that all might live as well as possible.

> We must have plans which will help divide the national income among the people so that every person will have the best standard of living in respect to comfort that the great wealth of the nation now makes possible. (Rugg, 1931, p. 598)

This redistribution would come about as scientific planning would be employed in all areas of life. Even before the New Deal began in 1932, a series of proposals for government planning appeared in the Rugg textbooks, presented as the solution to most social ills. There is, Rugg surmised, "a need for a great multiplication of governmental agencies to aid the man on the street in his purchasing" (Rugg, 1931, p. 603). Closely attuned to the major social, economic, and liberal policy direction America was about to take, the Rugg textbooks, created in the 1920s and used in the 1930s, certainly appeared to fit the social views of the times, at least for those who had adopted the liberal view of the positive welfare state. From the very beginning Rugg seemed self-consciously aware of the liberal philosophical underpinnings of his social ideas and the new education. A new society was to be engineered by the new education under the leadership of "wise" educational philosophers. Closing his 1931 text, he said:

> The launching of far-reaching plans depends upon one fundamental step--education! The education of grown-ups! The education of young people! Already a new education is appearing in our progressive towns and cities. Under the leadership of wise educational philosophers and thousands of progressive teachers and administrators, new kinds of elementary and secondary schools are appearing. The spirit of these new schools is one of active work. Young people in them play an important part in every aspect of school work--in the work of the classes, in the various organizations, even in the government of the school. Thus they learn to live in a democracy by learning to govern themselves. (Rugg, 1931, p. 605)

By 1940 the social climate had changed. As the uncertainty of America's position with respect to the war raging in Europe combined with the growing awareness of the repressive policies of the totalitarian states that had emerged in Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan, the notion of state planning and state authority had begun to lose its luster. In his own life, the average American had witnessed a decline in personal freedom. More and more areas of personal freedom were eroded away as the welfare state emerged, within a larger bureaucratic, corporate organization that moved to manage and control production and consumption. Under such circumstances that populist root of American consciousness, which usually held a strong distrust of central government and eastern banking conglomerates, came to the fore. Perry Miller (1959) has suggested that America never really decided between classical individualism (as reflected in the works of William Graham Sumner) and the new liberal scientific collectivism (as in Lester F. Ward). Perhaps Miller was right.

With America reflecting all kinds of insecurity and fears, the American Legion, the DAR and others such as the Guardians of American Education charged the frontier liberal thinkers at Columbia University with subversive activities. At this same time, while Counts, Dewey, and others were carrying on strong anti-Communist campaigns within the Teacher's Union (Iversen, 1959), the thrust of the anti-frontier-thinker campaign was directed at Rugg and his textbooks. Within the year 1940, not only was Rugg publicly maligned and repeatedly refused the opportunity to speak in communities across the country but his textbooks were also effectively eliminated from the schools (see Rudd, Hicks, & Falk, 1940, for an example of the kind of attack carried on).

More than a decade later, and shortly after the Korean War truce was signed, another text for teaching high school social studies was published, which was to become a landmark text for the 1960s. Maurice P. Hunt and Lawrence E. Metcalf (1955) took as their central concern the development of the individual citizen's ability to think reflectively. Along with that focus went a special concern for the application of reflective thought to areas of American life that have tended to be controversial, which the authors termed "closed areas." Here once again the table of contents reflects, in its part and chapter titles, this very different approach to citizenship education (Hunt & Metcalf, 1955, pp. v-vi). Some examples are presented below:

The Problem of Method
Learning as Development of Insight.......................
The Reflective Method....................................
Values and Reflection....................................
Discussion as a Tool of Reflective Learning..............

The Problem of Content
The Closed Areas: Race and Minority-Group Relations....

Special Problems
Adapting the Reflective Method to the Standard
Social-Studies Subjects...............................
Building and Maintaining Academic Freedom in the
High School...

Unlike the life-adjustment texts, which placed a heavy emphasis on specific behaviors in terms of how-to activities in virtually every aspect of life, the Hunt and Metcalf text emphasized reflective thinking. By this emphasis they were assuming that the most important characteristic of the citizen is his freedom to think clearly, accurately, and critically as a prerequisite for decision making and choice. The authors did not preclude or short-circuit choice, as most behaviorists had done by advocating a social-conditioning process; rather they placed their emphasis on how to think instead of what to think. Unlike Rugg and other reconstructionists who presented solutions to social problems in their texts, Hunt and Metcalf turned the student's attention to a critical examination of ways of viewing controversial areas, leaving open the final solution. While the discussion of closed areas is clearly limited by the liberal views of the authors, especially in the areas of economics and social class, and the alternatives are clearly liberal-perceived choices, they still are choices.

Hunt and Metcalf knew very well that the use of this method presupposes a community which accepts the reflective process. Therefore in the closing section of the book can be found an extensive discussion of the need for academic freedom in the high school. If, in fact, the method of reflective thinking is used effectively in education, it could undermine those social beliefs, attitudes, values, and institutions based on existing arbitrary uses of power--as Socrates knew. John Dewey suggested as much when he said, "If we once start thinking no one can guarantee what will be the outcome except that many objects, ends and institutions will be surely doomed" (Dewey, 1929a, p. 1). Just where the practitioners of this method stop short of taking the hemlock is usually determined by the way the realities of social issues are structured. The liberal's social ideas set the boundaries and are, in fact, the limiting dimension of what constitutes reflective thought. The extent to which those in power feel secure with such limits is the extent to which they will permit the use of the reflective-thinking method.

The underlying philosophy that permits this approach is, as Hunt and Metcalf (1955, p. xii) contend, that of Dewey, Bode, Hullfish, and Griffin. One might further surmise that they perhaps have taken the best, especially of Dewey and Bode, to delineate their position. It was, after all, Dewey's contention in The Public and Its Problems (1927) that "method" was the key to the development of his dream of a free public. One of the many problems with this liberal philosophy, as it was applied to the social issues of the time, was not only the matter of where that philosophy intersected with power but also, as we have seen, the extent to which the liberal reconstruction of democracy and positive freedom could be used to move easily from the conception of a positive liberal state to a modern totalitarian state. In this regard, Hunt and Metcalf (1955), in placing the emphasis on method and keeping open the idea of choice, not only developed the best in Dewey's liberalism but also stopped short of the unlimited conception of the state that tends to dominate much of the current literature in citizenship education. The Hunt-Metcalf work, then, can be viewed as a kind of benchmark from which others in the 1960s and 1970s have worked.

In the decades of the 1960s and 1970s various citizenship-education proposals were created out of the curriculum-development centers at Teachers College (Columbia), Amherst, University of Southern California at Los Angeles, Carnegie-Mellon, Harvard, Indiana, Tufts, and others. The overall basis and direction of these proposals would require a comprehensive research project in itself; our analysis here is therefore limited to only a few of the broader tendencies that appear to cut across many different proposals in the area of citizenship education.

Many social studies educators in the schools in the 1960s tended to follow Edgar Wesley's definition of social studies as "the social sciences simplified for pedagogical purposes" (quoted by Quillen & Hanna, p. 16). Educators generally thought of social studies in terms of geography, history, economics, sociology, civics, and/or various combinations of subjects. Still others moved away from the disciplines, as Krug and Quillen did in Living in Our Communities (1946). This text was an outcome of the authors' involvement in the Stanford 5-year Social Education Study financed by the General Education Board. Living in Our Communities came fairly close to a modified life-adjustment approach. An analysis of the text reveals, for example, a 30-page chapter devoted to "Having a Good Time" and only two pages devoted to the federal judicial system. On the other side, the work of Jerome S. Bruner in The Process of Education (1963), emphasizing the "discovery method," as well as Edwin Fenton's work in the 1960s, which utilized a "mode of inquiry" approach, seemed to cut closer to the traditional disciplines than Hunt and Metcalf had done.

By the late 1960s political scientists began once again to become more actively interested in the public schools and produced a variety of literature on the political socialization of children (Adler & Harrington, 1970; Dawson & Prewitt, 1969; Dennis, 1973; Easton & Dennis, 1969; Hess & Torney, 1967; Langton, 1969; Merelman, 1971). While much of this literature and research has developed interesting and helpful material on how children learn political concepts, for the most part these studies are basically descriptive surveys of what was taking place at a given time. They are not experimental, exercising rigid controls, and therefore they can be only suggestive. To universalize these findings is a serious mistake. To say, for example, that all children can conceptualize the principles in the Declaration of Independence at a given grade level because a sample of 1,500 cases indicates this to be true, and that therefore we should create a curriculum program accordingly, is to commit the same error of the curricular experts during the 1920s-1950s, who universalized their findings based on limited data. Furthermore, even if the sample is adequate, there is still the problem of confusing what is with what can be--and, indeed, what ought to be. Thus a double error is committed by proposing that a study of the principles of freedom should be restricted to a particular age level.

This problem is further compounded when some, such as Lawrence Kohlberg, confuse conceptual development with a prefabricated hierarchical scheme of moral development. The mistake is enlarged when Edwin Fenton claims (in Brown, 1977, p. 101) that "these stages are natural steps in ethical development, not something artificial or invented" (italics mine). Invoking the support of nature to what amounts to a very shaky theory without hard experimental evidence is, to say the least, highly questionable. While Kohlberg's work is heuristically interesting and suggestive of more careful and critically controlled research and experimentation, the credibility of research at the present level hardly warrants building a social studies curriculum around it, as Fenton proposes (in Brown, 1977, pp. 97-127). To do so, it seems, is to succumb to the bandwagon effect, which so often has caricatured previous curricular efforts in this area.

There are a number of political socialization studies which are suggestive and warrant more extensive and intensive treatment. One such study was done by Edgar Litt, entitled "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination (reprinted in Adler & Harrington, 1970, pp. 163-169). Looking at the citizenship-education program in a working-class community in comparison with a middle-class and an affluent upper-class community, Litt found pronounced differences in educational treatment, especially in the level and kind of participation. While this study does not provide sufficient empirical evidence upon which to make curricular judgments, it supports a belief held by many observers in the schools: that a differentiated curriculum in this area does in fact exist. If it does, steps ought to be taken to counteract such a condition. It is interesting to note that the committee which produced Education for Responsible Citizenship recommended that "in all school activities dealing with civic competence and school-directed community experiences, students should be associated heterogeneously" (Brown, 1977, p. 9). Here one suspects the committee assumes that a differentiated curriculum exists and is responding to that condition. Very likely a comprehensive historical-research project in this area of citizenship education will reveal that we have been using a social-class-differentiated curriculum for some time.

Educating the Man or the Citizen?

Richard Remy in "The Challenge of Citizenship Education" concluded his summary, in part, by remarking:

> The task of citizenship education in a democracy involves paradoxes. Can such education instill orientations supportive of American democracy and also teach critical thinking skills? Can such education teach participation skills which are both effective and acceptable to the majority of citizens and their representatives in government? (Note 3, p. 31)

The paradox Remy found came to the fore in the Vietnam War protests and the civil-rights movement, when effective participation required "violation of generally held norms for acceptable citizen action" (Remy, Note 3, p. 30). This problem is necessarily paradoxical only when one ultimately holds divided and somewhat balanced loyalties to the individual and the state. There is no paradox when one's ultimate loyalty is to the individual, as in the case of Humboldt and John Stuart Mill. Nor was there a paradoxical problem in the mind of Thoreau when he said: "I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterwards. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for law, so much as for the right" (Thoreau, 1906/1960, p. 236). Or, as Martin Luther King said in his letter from the Birmingham jail, that respect ought to be paid to the right law, the just law, but not to the unjust law. How does one determine the difference?

> An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of Saint Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. (King, 1964, p. 85)

There was no paradoxical problem here. The appeal was to a higher law than the state law, and the test of that law was human dignity.

Without oversimplifying a very difficult and complicated process, one should recognize that there is a very different conception of citizenship at work here from that held by Richard Remy (Note 3). The individual and the state are not balanced as equals; rather the state is only a necessary expedient against which one must forever be on guard. The right of revolution, indeed ultimately violent revolution, must be preserved in this latter conception of citizenship. No state ought to have ironclad guarantees that its citizenry will not take up arms against it. The citizen, as Jefferson argued, should be so educated as to recognize tyranny and be able to revolt. To be sure, the price of revolution is costly, and as a rule people do not take up arms against their government for light, transitory reasons, as Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence. The right of revolution as a last resort, however, must be preserved.

Given, then, the ideas of citizenship that Humboldt beautifully analyzed in The Limits of State Action (1792/1969) and the ideas reflected by John Stuart Mill, Thoreau, Emerson, Martin Luther King, and many others, one cannot help recognizing, when looking at the course of American history, that America has witnessed a profound expansive development in the power of the state over the individual. While it is arguable that political, social, economic, and practical problems have given rise to the expansion of those powers, and at times seemed to justify that expansion, the tenuous, problematic nature of individual freedom today must be recognized. As America moved from a merchant to an industrial state, a corporate liberal, positive state developed. In the name of social welfare, a conception of the relationship between individual and state began to emerge that was no longer paradoxically balanced, as it was for many liberals such as Remy. More often the right of the state became so superior that there seemed to be no reasonable grounds upon which the state educational authority should be limited. Thus today the state is given a free hand to manipulate its citizens in education to whatever extent the market will bear. Without a guiding educational, philosophical ideal, the end comes to justify the means, as drugs, "time out," solitary-confinement boxes, and all kinds of psychic-manipulation techniques take their place in the schools.

Earlier in the century, Charles Edward Merriam, a leading liberal reformer of citizenship-education programs, argued that our new knowledge of personality development must be used in the schools because, in the end, all knowledge is useful to the race. As he saw it, one should not take a stand against progress. In 1931, before Buchenwald, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Hiroshima, and My Lai, he wrote:

> It may be said that an unscrupulous or corrupt government endowed with these far-reaching powers to shape personality might inflict incalculable injury upon the race and set it far back. But the same argument may be made as to high explosives of any sort, capable of use against the very intelligence that unearthed their secret. The inventions

> of mechanisms either material or of social and political control will not stop because they may be turned to anti-social uses; for in the long run the assumption must be that they are useful for the race. (Merriam, 1931, p. 334)

Merriam had crossed over rather early to a totalitarian view of the individual and the state when he said:

> The anti-social and non- or apolitical types are a central problem in political and social education, and they cannot be omitted in any scheme of political education whether in the school or without it. It is not merely the enemy or the criminal outlaw who obstructs the development of orderly relations of co-operation among men, but also the type who is neither; who may be called a disorganizer, a nonconductor, a resistant to the general process of socialization. How to deal with him, and how to integrate him into the political community without destroying the individuality and the eccentricity that may border upon genius, is one of the central problems of modern social and political education; and unless this is solved, relatively little progress can be made in other directions. This is the limiting factor in the construction of the citizen. (Merriam, 1931, p. 330)

The citizen's personality must be constructed so that he fits into the "democratic" community. His thinking must be engineered so that he will become a valued contributor to that community. Edward Bernays, once honored by the American Psychological Association for his contribution to science and society, reflected a similar totalitarian view in 1947 when he said that engineering of consent

> quite simply means the application of scientific principles and tried practices to the task of getting people to support ideas and programs....The engineering of consent is the very essence of the democratic process, the freedom to persuade and suggest....A leader frequently cannot wait for

> the people to arrive at even general understanding. ...Democratic leaders must play their part in...engineering....consent to socially constructive goals and values. (Bernays, cited in Chomsky, Note 2)

Within the context of the decline of both the classical and Judeo-Christian traditions and a corresponding emergence of the compulsory secular state, the notion of the totalitarian society was born. With it a new totalitarian person emerged, whose satisfactions, wants, feelings, ideas--indeed whose very will--were to be engineered. In the process, words were made to take on new and different meanings, as we have seen. Freedom meant control; a word like democrary no longer meant rule by the people but rather how human beings come to relate to each other in groups. Participation was to be measured effective not on the basis of any real political difference such participation achieved but by the psychological feeling of belonging that it produced in the participants. The problem of freedom and integrity of the individual in the modern totalitarian world is profoundly difficult, and thus the education of the citizen in such a world is no less difficult. Erich Fromm capsulated the problem when he said:

> In a successful manipulation of the mind the person is no longer saying the opposite of what he thinks, but he thinks the opposite of what is true. Thus, for instance, if he has surrendered his independence and his integrity completely, if he experiences himself as a thing which belongs either to the state, the party or the corporation, then two plus two are five, or "Slavery is Freedom," and he feels free

> because there is no longer any awareness of the discrepancy between truth and falsehood. (Fromm, 1961, p. 265)

Given the conditions of the modern world, Rousseau might have been correct when he said, "Forced to combat either nature or society, you must make your choice between the man and the citizen, you cannot train both" (Rousseau, 1762/1957, p. 7). Perhaps Humboldt was even more accurate when he said, "The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument hitherto unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity" (Humboldt, 1792/1969, p. 51).

References

Adler, N., & Harrington, C. The learning of political behavior. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1970.

American Legion. Americanism Manual. Indianapolis: Author, 1952.

Babbitt, I. Literature and the American college. New York: Regnery, 1956.

Bentley, E. Are you now or have you ever been? New York: Harper, 1972.

Berman, B. Fortress: Public school professional and social objectives, 1830-1890. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, 1975.

Bobbitt, F. The curriculum. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918.

Bobbitt, F. How to make a curriculum. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924.

Boyd, J.P. (Ed.). The papers of Thomas Jefferson. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958.

Brown, B.F. (Ed.). Education for responsible citizenship: The report of the National Task Force on citizenship education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.

Bruner, J.S. The process of education. New York: Random House, 1963.

Cardinal principles of education (U.S. Bureau of Education Bulletin No. 55). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1918.

Counts, G.S. Dare the schools build a new social order? New York: John Day, 1932.

Counts, G.S. The education of free men in American democracy. In National Education Association, Educational Policies Commission, Policies for education in American democracy. Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1946.

Crawford, C.E., Cooley, E.G., Trillingham, C.C., & Stoops, E. Living your life. New York: Heath, 1953.

Cremin, L.A. (Ed.). The republic and the school: Horace Mann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957.

Cremin, L.A. The transformation of the schools. New York: Random House, 1964.

Crozier, M.J., Huntington, S.P., & Watanuki, J. The crisis of democracy. New York: New York University Press, 1975.

Dawson, R.E., & Prewitt, K. Political socialization. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969.

Dennis, J. Socialization to politics, a reader. New York: Wiley, 1973.

Dewey, J. Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan, 1916.

Dewey, J. Human nature and conduct. New York: Holt, 1922.

Dewey, J. The public and its problems. New York: Holt, 1927.

Dewey, J. *Character and events* (Vol. 1). New York: Holt, 1929. (a)

Dewey, J. *Impressions of Soviet Russia*. New York: New Republic, 1929. (b)

Dewey, J. *Individualism old and new*. New York: Minton, Balch, 1930.

Dewey, J. *Liberalism and social action*. New York: Capricorn Books, 1935.

Dewey, J. *The early works, 1882-1898* (Vol. 1, 1882-1895). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.

Easton, D., & Dennis, J. *Children in the political system*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.

Elson, R.M. *Guardians of tradition: American schoolbooks of the nineteenth century*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964.

Emerson, R.W. *The complete writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. New York: William H. Wise, 1929.

Fichte, J.G. *Addresses to the German nation*. New York: Harper, 1968. (Originally published, 1807.)

Fichte, J.G. The characteristics of the present age. In *The popular works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte* (Vol. 2, 4th ed.). London: William Smith Philosophical Library, 1889. (Originally published, 1804.)

Forcey, C. *The crossroads of liberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Ford, P.L. (Ed.). *Works of Thomas Jefferson* (Vol. 4). New York: Putnam, 1904.

Fromm, E. Afterword. In G. Orwell, *1984*. New York: New American Library, 1961.

Hess, R.D., & Torney, J.V. *The development of political attitudes in children*. Chicago: Aldine, 1967.

Humboldt, W. von. *The limits of state action* (J.W. Burrow, Ed.). London: Cambridge University Press, 1969. (Originally published, 1792.)

Hunt, M.P., & Metcalf, L.E. Teaching high school social studies. New York: Harper, 1955.

Iverson, R.W. The Communist and the schools. New York: Harcourt, 1959.

Jones, V.E. Character and citizenship education: A syllabus for use in teacher training. Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1950.

Jordan, W.D. White over black. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969.

Karier, C.J. Man, society, and education. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1967.

Karier, C.J. John Dewey and the new liberalism: Some reflections and responses. History of Education Quarterly, 1975, Winter, 417-443.

Karier, C.J. Making the world safe for democracy. Educational Theory, 1977, 27(1), 12-47.

Karier, C.J., Violas, P., & Spring, J. Roots of crisis. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973.

Kiefer, M. American children through their books, 1700-1835. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948.

King, M.L., Jr. Why we can't wait. New York: Harper, 1964.

Kolko, G. The triumph of conservatism: A reinterpretation of American history 1900-1916. New York: Free Press, 1963.

Krug, E. The shaping of the American high school (Vol. 1). New York: Harper, 1964.

Krug, E. The shaping of the American high school (Vol. 2). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972.

Krug, E., & Quillen, I.J. Living in our communities. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1946.

Langton, K.P. Political socialization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Lee, G.C. Crusade against ignorance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.

Lewenstein, M.R. An analysis of some concepts of citizenship education. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois, 1953.

Marriott, J.A.R., & Robertson, C.G. The evolution of Prussia. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

McKeon, R. Introduction to Aristotle. New York: Modern Library, 1947.

Mead, G.H. The philosophy of the present (E. Murphy, Ed.). Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1932.

Mead, G.H. Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

Mead G.H. The philosophy of the act (C.W. Morris, Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Merelman, R.M. Political socialization and educational climates. New York: Holt, 1971.

Merriam, C.E. The making of citizens. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931.

Mill, J.S. On liberty. London: Everyman's Library, 1968. (Originally published, 1859.)

Miller, P. American thought: Civil War to World War I. New York: Holt, 1959.

National Council for Social Studies. Developing citizenship through school activities (L.M. Shufelt, Ed.). Washington, D.C.: Author, 1949.

National Education Association. Policies for education in American democracy. Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, Educational Policies Commission, 1946.

Nock, A.J. Our enemy, the state. New York: Free Life Editions, 1973.

O'Hanlon, T. The good citizen as team player: Interscholastic athletics and the shaping of meritocratic consciousness. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois, 1978.

Pfeffer, L. Church, state and freedom. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953.

Pfeffer, L. The liberties of an American: The Supreme Court speaks. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.

Plato. [The republic] (B. Jowett, trans.). New York: Random House, 1954.

Quillen, I.J., & Hanna, L.A. Education for social competence. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1948.

Reisner, E.H. Nationalism and education since 1789. New York: Macmillan, 1922.

Rousseau, J.-J. [Emile] (B. Foxley, trans.). London: Dent, 1957. (Originally published, 1762.)

Rousseau, J.-J. Considerations on the government of Poland. In W. Boyd (Ed.), The minor writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. (Originally published, 1773.)

Rousseau, J.-J. [The social contract] (E. Barker, trans.). New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. (Originally published, 1762.)

Rudd, A., Hicks, H., & Falk, A.T. Undermining our republic. New York: Guardians of American Education, 1940.

Rugg, H. An introduction to the problems of American culture (6 vols.). Boston: Ginn, 1931.

Rugg, H. Our country and our people. New York: Ginn, 1938.

Seeley, J.R. Life and times of Stein (Vol. 2). New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.

Skinner, B.F. Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1956.

Skinner, B.F. Beyond freedom and dignity. New York: Bantam Books, 1972.

Spring, J. Education and the rise of the corporate state. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.

Spring, J. The sorting machine. New York: David McKay, 1976.

Spurlock, C. Education and the Supreme Court. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955.

Thoreau, H.D. *Walden and civil disobedience*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960. (Originally published, 1854 and 1906.)

U.S. Office of Education. *Biennial survey of education: 1946-48*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

Violas, P. *The training of the urban working class*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1978.

Watson, J.B. *Behaviorism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.

Webster, N. *American speller*. University of Rochester Treasure Room, Rochester, N.Y., n.d.

Weinstein, J. *The corporate ideal in the liberal state, 1900-1918*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.

Wiebe, R.H. *The search for order*. New York: Hill & Wang, 1967.

Yulish, S. *The search for a civic religion: A history of the character education movement in America, 1890-1935*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois, 1975.

Reference Notes

1. Butts, R.F. *The New England primer reflects changing political and religious doctrine*. Unpublished manuscript.
2. Chomsky, N. *Intellectuals and the state*. Huizinga lecture, Leiden, December, 1977.
3. Remy, R. The challenge of citizenship education. In U.S. Office of Education, *Citizen education today*. Draft of unpublished manuscript, 1978.

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

Marvin Lazerson

University of British Columbia

Americans have always been ambivalent about the concept of pluralism. They claim that diversity has given America flexibility and vitality, but diversity has only been acceptable as it contributed to unity and common citizenship. While individuals were permitted to be different, groups were not. Until recently America has been a pluralist society refusing to acknowledge the meaning of its own pluralism. This paper examines the basis upon which education for citizenship has occurred historically. Nineteenth-century assumptions about citizenship and schooling are examined, especially with regard to the relationship between patriotism and Protestantism. Also examined are the Americanization movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the role played by education for work in shaping citizenship education. The paper concludes in a discussion of the intercultural-education movement of the 1930s and 1940s, the development of multiculturalism as a new phase of citizenship education, and dilemmas posed by current efforts in defining citizenship in multicultural terms.

Almost a century and a half ago, in 1837, Francis J. Grund noted and recorded:

> There is probably no better place than a schoolroom to judge of the character of a people....Whatever faults or weaknesses may be entailed upon them, will show themselves there without the hypocrisy of advanced age, and whatever virtue they may possess is reflected without admixture of vice and corruption. In so humble a place as a schoolroom may be read the commentaries on the past, and the history of the future development of a nation.

Americans have never been comfortable with the concept of pluralism. On the one hand, they admit that their society is heterogeneous, built upon different peoples with different cultural backgrounds. Indeed, it is this diversity, they claim, which has made America strong, given it the flexibility and vitality to meet new challenges and conquer new worlds. On the other hand, Americans' treatment of diversity has always been conditional and tempered. Diversity is acceptable only as it contributes to unity and common citizenship. It must conform to established patterns of behavior or enter the melting pot to be shaped to an American identity. If individuals were permitted to be different, their eccentricity acceptable in a society which applauded individualism, groups were not. This society, built and dependent upon heterogeneity, has tended to reject a conceptual framework for allowing group differences to flourish. America has been a pluralist society refusing to acknowledge the meaning of its own pluralism.

Since the American Revolution, schools have played an important role in reflecting and shaping these views of citizenship. Popular education and citizenship, schooling and social cohesion, have gone hand in hand. The expansion of educational opportunity was deemed essential to the fiber of democratic life, enhancing the republic by teaching individuals the essentials of citizenship and forging common values among heterogeneous people. Unlike 18th- and 19th-century Europeans, Americans did not debate whether education for

179

the masses was a good thing but rather assumed that it was necessary. Whereas Englishmen expressed concern over whether education would unfit the lower classes for their occupational and subservient social roles, Americans assumed that education was essential for a republic to function. About education, one historian has noted that in the early 19th century there was a

> wide-spread consensus among American elites about its desirability. Unlike the English Tories, conservative Americans generally advocated schooling for social stability. They feared ignorance, not instruction. The more skeptical they were about the survival of the republic, the more they favoured mass education. (Kaestle, 1976)

The consensus that schooling was a good thing was intensified during periods of social and economic instability, when traditional institutions like the family and church seemed less effective socializers than previously. Where morality seemed in decline, where class or ethnic conflict was developing, the school had a role as an agent of stabilization. Schooling was thus essential to citizenship and crucial to the development of moral character for social stability.

But schooling in America was also viewed as a means of social mobility, a partially *de*stabilizing process. Especially after the mid-19th century, educational opportunity and economic advancement were conceived of as synonymous. What was learned in school--i.e., behavioral and attitudinal traits, literacy, or occupational skills--furthered economic progress for the individual and society. Certain that schools were necessary for social stability, Americans also viewed them as the means whereby sons did better than their fathers, daughters achieved more than their mothers, and the children of minorities surmounted their limitations and the discrimination against their group.

Schools have thus been supported because they are believed crucial to political socialization and economic advancement; they preserve the social order by converting differences into commonalities, rendering questions of social reform and the distribution of economic rewards into educational problems. Reforming the school and providing greater opportunities to attend have become the dominant American response to social instability and to ethnic, class, and racial tensions.

While faith in schooling has been widespread, the consensus has always been beset by conflicts and ambiguities. What political homogeneity meant and how to educate for it have always been open to question. Not until the 20th century was schooling thought essential enough for all states to make attendance compulsory. Ethnic groups have been at odds with governmental and educational authorities over the teaching of alternative cultural values, often centering on the questions of bilingualism and biculturalism. When applied to black slaves, education in the decade before the Civil War was seen by Southern whites as destabilizing; they rejected the idea that schooling for blacks enhanced social stability. Instead, they argued, education would unfit blacks for their place in the social hierarchy. For women, citizenship was often tied to "domesticity." Women were less citizens than the mothers of future citizens; their role was to protect the home, succor the male, and rear children. Social-class differences have also caused divisions over the types of education to be offered and over the benefits to be derived from expanding educational opportunity. Questions have been raised over who should control the schools and over what curriculum and pedagogy best teach citizenship and assure economic advancement. Although they were often argued in political and pedagogical terms, these conflicts went beyond questions of schooling, for they touched fundamental assumptions about the United States as a melting pot, the nature of opportunity in American society, and the role of formal education in the creation of citizens.

The Forging of Citizenship Education

Although it had received attention earlier, the expected relationship between citizenship and education was most explicitly formulated following the American Revolution. On one level the Revolution had been, as John Adams believed, effected before the outbreak of war, an event already "created in the minds and hearts of the people." On another level, the process of creating and fighting the Revolution developed a cultural cause. The Committees of Correspondence, the Sons of Liberty, the handbills, pamphlets, and newspapers taught the colonists what it meant to be American (Cremin, 1977). But independence and a sense of being American stood alongside the tenuousness of the experiment in republican government. Revolutionary leaders turned to forging institutional structures to insure social stability and cultural unity. "We have changed our forms of government," wrote Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, "but it remains yet to effect a revolution in principles, opinions, and manners so as to accommodate them to the forms of government we have adopted" (Tyack, 1967).

The accommodation took place in a variety of ways: new constitutional structures at the federal and state levels, the forging of political parties, an ideology of equality for whites and slavery for blacks, a search for a peculiarly American culture. Schools, too, had a special role in the dissemination of republican citizenship. By 1800 seven of the fourteen states that adopted new constitutions had provided for public aid to education, while the American Philosophical Society ran a contest in 1795 on proposals for a national system of education. An "American-centered" education was urged on the populace. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson opposed European study as leading to dissipation, extravagance, and resistance to republican government and liberty. In his last annual message to Congress in 1796, Washington proposed a national university under federal sponsorship to train the nation's leaders, and he ultimately bequeathed land for that purpose. The state of Georgia took steps to reduce foreign study (and thus, alien influences) when, in 1785, it disbarred from civic office for an equivalent number of years anyone who studied abroad. Old World textbooks met similar hostility. Such books would "stamp the wrinkles of decrepit age upon the bloom of youth and...plant the seeds of decay in a vigorous constitution," wrote Noah Webster, America's first major textbook author (Tyack, 1967).

Fear of Old World contamination and the call for a distinctive American character based on an American language and literature were reinforced by the notion that a republic placed greater responsibilities upon the individual than did other forms of government. A society dependent upon the franchise would always be menaced by an ignorant and unsocialized citizenry. Education, Jefferson wrote, was thus

> the most certain and most legitimate engine of government. Educate and inform the whole mass of the people, enable them to see that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve it, and it requires no very high degree of education to convince them of this. (cited in Welter, 1962)

The educational necessities varied. Noah Webster believed the need was for a national identity through a national language. Benjamin Rush found that "the form of government we have assumed" required us to lay "foundations for nurseries of wise and good men, to adapt our modes of teaching to the peculiar form of our government." A prize-winning essay in 1795 on the most suitable plan of education concluded that a national curriculum should be developed with common texts, lessons, fees, and administrative procedures. "An entire, general uniform national plan" would produce

> not only harmony of sentiments, unity of taste and manners, but also, the patriotic principles of genuine Federalism amongst the scattered and variegated citizens of this extensive republic. (Rudolph, 1965)

Such proposals reflected a belief in youthful malleability. Drawing upon ideas made current by John Locke, Americans defended the necessity for early education as a sure means of socialization. "The principle of patriotism stands in need of the reinforcement of prejudice, and it is well known that our strongest prejudices in favour of our country are formed in the first one and twenty years of our lives," Rush asserted. Noah Webster reaffirmed that argument: "The impressions received in early life, usually form the characters of individuals" (cited in Tyack, 1967).

All of these concerns--the uniqueness and tenuousness of the American experiment, the need to escape from Old World corruptions, the establishment of a unified nation and a national character, and the expectation that youthful experiences shaped later behavior and beliefs--fostered numerous proposals for institutions to assure the creation of patriotic citizens. Although a national system of education was never formalized--the Revolution, after all, had been fought against the expansion of state power--schools themselves took on greater significance. Whether one viewed universal suffrage and republican government with pessimism or optimism, schools seemed excellent agents of political socialization. The concern was neither unique to America nor a unique function of schooling. European countries in the process of nationalization showed similar interests; between 1763 and 1797 France engaged in numerous debates over a national identity. Pleas for a uniquely American literature, art, and architecture were common. But increasingly the school became a focus for patriotism, the institution where individuals would learn how to become citizens.

This focus was one of the great innovations of the 19th century. During the colonial era, Americans had viewed schooling in much less exalted terms, as part of a configuration of educational institutions within which children and youth were socialized. Seventeenth-century English colonists had arrived in the New World with the understanding that schools were important to the advancement of literacy, social mobility, and religious enthusiasm. But they also assumed that the family was the primary educator. In an economy which saw work organized around the household and family farm, youth learned their essential social roles within families--their own as well as someone else's. The church's role as educator was subordinate to that of the family but was nonetheless essential in a society in which religious beliefs and denominational distinctions were important. Through the church, public and private responsibility were blended together, the moral values of the community transmitted and upheld. Schools were considered more marginal in these educational endeavors. Most children never attended school; most of those who did went for brief periods to learn a bit of reading and writing. To a very small but increasing number of 16th- and 17th-century English youth, however, schools were a route to economic and social success, a development not lost on the colonial settlers (Cremin, 1970).

The transference of English institutions to the colonies and their transformation varied from place to place. New England Puritan villages fostered mutually reinforcing educational institutions in ways that the dispersed Virginia population or the heterogeneous cities of New York and Philadelphia could not. As the immigration of non-English peoples multiplied, the pattern of English institutions was itself challenged. Pennsylvania Germans, for example, threatened English Quakers and Anglicans, forcing compromises around questions of schooling and church allegiances. Denominational competition forced an uneasy acceptance of voluntarism in religion, the freedom of individuals to affiliate with the church of their choice without government coercion. But for all the complexities of socialization in 17th- and 18th-century America, one theme stands out: the expectation that children and youth would learn their social roles as "citizens" through the interaction of familial and community institutions. While schools increased in number and importance in the decades before the Revolution, they were usually extensions of church responsibilities, adjuncts to apprenticeships, agents of charity to the poor, or, less often, the organized wishes of homogeneous communities. Youth might go to school, but before the 19th century, there was little expectation that what was learned there was strikingly different from, or more important than, what was learned in other parts of the community.

Protestantism and Patriotism

The expansion of and systemization of schooling after 1800 were closely tied to an emerging consensus on the importance of Protestantism to national identity. Although

Americans had no formal state religion--the heterogeneity and competitiveness of religious denominations had forced them to reject a state-supported church--they nonetheless expected their society to be religious, and Protestant. Freedom from the coercion of an established church, it was argued, would allow each individual voluntarily to choose his or her religious affiliation. With denominations flourishing by choice, individuals would be affected more intensively by religion than had previously been true. Although the jeremiads and revivals of the 18th and 19th centuries revealed considerable concern over whether religion was indeed advancing, most Americans by 1820 accepted the assumptions underlying disestablishment and voluntary church organizations, and there was never any perceptible movement toward an established church.

Voluntarism, however, confused the means whereby the young would be inculcated with religious and ethical values. It raised questions about how institutions outside the family would teach morality, and whether morality could be separated from the doctrinal tenets of particular denominations. In terms of schooling, the question was simply put: How could religious and thus moral values be assured in the schools when the state was committed to nonsectarianism? The answer led to a reassessment of the relationship between theology and morality which distinguished between denominational tenets and generalized moral values. Being a good citizen meant upholding common "golden rules" which tied Americans together no matter what their religious affiliation. Out of this compromise--the acceptance of a common Protestantism which minimized the importance of doctrinal distinctions--the public school emerged as America's established church, making Protestantism and patriotism synonymous. The forging of a common Protestantism and its association with national identity thus allowed non-Protestants to become Americans by identifying with Protestant values. But it also meant that groups which found their particular religious doctrines essential to morality, most prominently Roman Catholics, would be forced to challenge, modify, or reject the dogmas of public education.

The nature of the consensus over Protestantism in the common school and the conflicts which it engendered were apparent by the mid-19th century. The underlying assumption was that morality could be taught on a nondenominational--or more accurately, interdenominational--basis and could thus be distinguished from theological practices associated with particular sects. The process appeared first among religious charity organizations. In urban areas, denominations turned over responsibility for schooling the poor to Protestant interdenominational missionary societies. By the 1840s, these had begun to transfer their educational work to public authorities, with little substantive change in the Protestant orientation of the educational system.

Protestant cooperation also occurred on the frontier and in small towns, where ministers worked to establish schools which served the whole community. Clerics were often the most educated men in their communities and found their pastoral and educational duties inseparable. Church and school served similar functions; the task was to gather in young and old and teach them to read. Ministers petitioned state legislatures for funds to establish public schools. In many areas they were the teachers, superintendents, and textbook authors. On a larger scale, the American Home and Baptist Missionary Societies crossed denominational lines to organize Sunday schools and distribute Bibles. Protestant colleges in the Midwest stressed the training of teachers for the common schools. Since the colleges drew primarily from local areas and needed whatever tuition-paying students they could find, they frequently moderated the particular denominational basis upon which most were founded. Timothy Smith states:

> By their establishment and control of both public and private schools, churchmen stamped upon neighborhoods, states, and nation an interdenominational Protestant ideology which nurtured dreams of personal and social progress. By the middle of the nineteenth century, leading citizens assumed that Americanism and Protestantism were synonymous and that education and Protestantism were allies. (Smith, 1967)

One minister asserted that "primary instruction in the United

States owes almost everything to Religion as the most efficient of all the principles that prompts to its promotion," while the Congregational minister Lyman Beecher phrased it even more succinctly, calling for "a Bible for every family, a school for every district, and a pastor for every thousand souls" (Smith, 1967; Tyack, 1966).

The organization of common schools in the 19th century was thus part of a broader evangelical movement that also included Sunday schools, religious revivals, and missionary, Bible, and temperance societies. In homogeneous Protestant communities this quest for a common Christianity was accomplished harmoniously by blurring denominational distinctions and creating a kind of pan-Protestantism. Americans there achieved a consensus on such issues as Bible reading, prayers, and holiday observances. In more polyglot urban areas, where local schools virtually functioned as independent entities, a strong majority with common religious beliefs could achieve a similar consensus on the relationship between religion and schooling. But in these more heterogeneous communities, this association between Protestantism and patriotism could evoke sharp conflict. Events in New York City during the 1830s and early 1840s provide a striking example.

Between 1806 and the 1840s, the Public School Society of New York, an interdenominational Protestant organization, received public funds to school the city's poor children. The society's educational program was predicated upon the assumption that moral values could be taught separated from religious doctrines and theology, thereby allowing schools to overcome divisive religious sectarianism. Although the Public School Society was run by a self-regulating, self-perpetuating board of trustees, the close association of interdenominational Protestantism and citizenship education, the society's near monopoly on public educational funds, and the large number of children enrolled in its schools (more than 20,000 by 1839) made the society the foremost provider of free schooling in the city. After 1830, however, its position came under heated attack, especially among leaders of the growing Catholic community. Initially, Catholics sought a compromise whereby they would play a greater role in the education of Catholic children. Rejected, Catholics under the leadership of Bishop John Hughes escalated their demands, attacking the society and seeking public funds for their own schools.

The ensuing conflict of the early 1840s was bitter and complicated, pitting the affluent philanthropists of the Public School Society against a largely immigrant Catholic church, nativists against foreign born, and Democrats against Whigs. Repeated in various ways in countless communities across the nation, the New York conflict revealed some of the most fundamental tensions of mid-19th century citizenship education. In their fight against the society, Catholics claimed that before the 1820s public funds were apportioned to church schools which were responsive to parental values, that religion and education were inseparable, and that the society's schools were simultaneously infidel (failing to teach religion) and sectarian (Protestant). The society, Catholic spokesmen argued, had labeled its own schools "public schools" as if they belonged to the community at large rather than to a private corporation which sought to monopolize the education of youth. Condemning the anti-Catholic books used by the society and use of the King James Bible, the Catholics asserted that their children were being deprived of an education because parents refused to send them to biased Protestant schools (Ravitch, 1974).

The Catholic attack was met by attempts to show that the sectarian division of public funds would undermine the basis for a common citizenship and that a common moral code could be taught separate from religion. The society implied, moreover, that it was dangerous to give control of schools to the agents of the immigrant poor. The conflict quickly got caught up in municipal and state politics, and its outcome only partially resolved the issues. In 1842, the state legislature divested the Public School Society of its public-fund monopoly but rejected the church's appeal for funds. Education explicitly in the interests of sectarian aims was not to be supported with public money, which was instead to be given to locally elected school officials. What was taught was now explicitly open to the political process.

The rejection of public funds for church schools sharpened the distinction between public and private education, a distinction only haphazardly made during the 17th and 18th centuries. Minority groups that lacked sufficient political power to force compromises in the public system could resort to their own schools, but they could no longer claim they functioned in the public interest and therefore should receive public funds. During the 19th century, immigrant Catholics as well as other denominational groups determined to keep control over their children's schooling and were active in establishing their own schools. They, along with a small but influential group of high-tuition schools for wealthy Protestants, were the major alternatives to the rapidly expanding public school system.

That public education intricately tied Protestantism to patriotism seems to have suited the views of the majority of 19th-century Americans. Since, as Tyack (1976) has noted, "God had chosen America to be the Christian nation," citizenship meant being a moral individual in a Christian community. The nation was a state of mind; its central educational concern lay in the development of character, the nurturing of Christian, republican individuals. Such a view was especially congenial to the men who emerged as the leaders of American education in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Overwhelmingly native born, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and raised in homogeneous small towns, the white males who became superintendents of schools viewed themselves, like the ministers of their era, as imbued with a value system that was self-evidently American. The curriculum, textbooks, and pedagogy whose implementation they supervised manifested similar assumptions (Tyack, 1976).

A prime example was school textbooks. Until well into the 20th century, these were often the sole curriculum and pedagogical guides available to the inexperienced and transient individuals who comprised the teaching force. The texts were for school children to memorize and recite, and their most constant theme was national unity. Students were told that the United States, despite moments of dissent, had achieved a consensus on all moral, political, and economic issues. To substantiate this, schoolbooks discussed and indeed created folk heroes, men who stood above the disputes of their time. The Revolutionary heroes--the self-made Franklin, the tolerant Lincoln, and above all Washington, resembling Christ--were the models for America's youth. One text told its readers, "Begin with the infant in his cradle/Let the first word he lisps be Washington."

The textbooks placed America's national destiny on a divine level. Americans were the chosen people. The Constitution and the Mosaic code were treated analogously. God acted directly in the American Revolution, preparing Washington for his role and America for its destiny. As one history of the United States concluded, "We cannot but feel that God has worked in a mysterious way to bring good out of evil. It was He, and not man, who saw and directed the end from the beginning." This was an ethical rather than a theological God, concerned with moral behavior and linked almost exclusively with Protestantism. Even as the texts became more secular, this intimacy between God and nation persisted. The Revolution thus stood as the preeminent event of American history. As an act of creation it seemed a logical extension of Genesis. Other societies might be praised, but America was the "freest, the most enlightened, and the most prosperous" in the world's history (Elson, 1964).

The imperatives which a divine national identity placed upon education were apparent in the treatment of racial, religious, and nationality groups. Mankind was divided into separate immutable races with inherent characteristics. In the hierarchy of races, Negroes were the most degraded: gay, thoughtless, unintelligent, and subject to violent passions. While slavery was usually regarded as an evil, especially in textbooks published after the Civil War, Negroes continued to be seen as inferior, lacking those qualities necessary for full citizenship. Native Indians were similarly inferior to whites; they were either "noble savages" or, if they resisted the march of progress, simply savages. In either case, their extinction was presented as inevitable. Catholicism was condemned as a false religion. Subversive of the state, inimical to morality, the Church fostered tyranny, superstition, and greed. The image of Jews changed during the 19th century from a distinctly religious to a racial group. By the century's end, they were portrayed as incapable of full assimilation into the American melting pot. Their quest for material goods had taken on sinister overtones, identified with urban vices and contrasted to rural morality.

The national identity of countries outside the United States was similarly viewed as a product of racial characteristics. The Irish were impulsive, quick tempered, violent, fond of drink, and impoverished. The French were more complicated: frivolous and Catholic, yet could claim Lafayette and Napoleon. Worst of all were the Southern Europeans: racially homogeneous, indolent, and Catholic. Italy was a vast ruin ruled by superstition and the Papacy; Spain and Portugal were bigoted, the home of the Inquisition. While other nations, especially England and Germany, received more generous treatment, 19th century textbooks taught American children harsh stereotypes of the newcomers populating their land with increasing frequency. The lesson was clear: in America there existed a hierarchy of Americanism. In their classrooms, children learned that the best Americans were white, male, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant.

The lessons of the classroom did not recognize the validity of cultural pluralism, and throughout the 19th century the thrust of public education was to reject the legitimacy of distinctive ethnic, religious, and nationality values. In New York City, the Public School Society abolished a school established for German children and rejected appeals for one for Italians. "When foreigners are in the habit of congregating together they retain their national customs, prejudices and feelings," the society reported, and are thus "not as good members of society as they would otherwise be." Children in the German school "retain their national costume, manners and feelings, while those German children who mingle promiscuously in other schools lose all trace of nationality." And, indeed, this was the highest goal of the schools: to eliminate all traces of nationality. In isolated rural areas or where an immigrant group gained political control over the local school system, distinctive cultural values might be taught or a foreign language accepted as the language of instruction. Invariably, however, pressure--often from former immigrant groups themselves--tended to eliminate or prevent any allegiance to dissenting or "non-American" values. Teaching in German in the public schools, for example, was discontinued after 1875 in St. Louis, Louisville, St. Paul, and San Francisco. A number of states passed legislation making English the required language of instruction in public schools and occasionally private schools. The assumption that cultural uniformity was the only basis upon which public education could exist made private schooling the only alternative open to dissenters, and even this was frequently opposed. Cultural homogenization was not the exclusive purpose of schooling, but as Kaestle (1974) suggests, "it dominated the thinking of schoolmen."

Americanization and Schooling

The drive toward cultural homogeneity in the public schools reached its fullest expression in the Americanization movement of the decades surrounding World War I. The movement was a complex phenomenon, incorporating the trends of the previous century, enlarged upon by urban and industrial instability and the tensions of war, but also invoking the desires of minorities, black and white, to become part of the American mainstream. The basic theme of Americanization was the danger to society posed by those who fail to assimilate and who thus effectively manifest their disloyalty. The xenophobia of these years was no aberration, for as John Higham (1966) has written, it "illuminates darkly some of the large contours of the American past," mirroring America's national anxieties and its bounds of tolerance.

The attacks on immigrants during the first decades of the 20th century reinforced the notion that national group identity was incompatible with citizenship. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe had seen many immigrants return to defend their homelands; of those who stayed, many organized in support of their countrymen's efforts. The initial concern in the United States was that these activities would draw America into a European conflict. As the country moved toward involvement, however, Old World allegiances were looked upon as threats to preparedness and the war effort; the hyphenate problem became a test of national unity. Fear that foreigners would corrupt American values and would act as centers of anti-Americanism were not new. What was novel to the nativism of the early 20th century, however, was the application of racial categories to European nationality groups.

The years 1890 to 1915 saw a sharp increase in foreign-born newcomers, the 15 million arrivals almost equaling the total number of the rest of the 19th century. But more striking, since the percentage of foreign born in the population remained stationary, was the geographical shift in the sources of migration. Whereas the British Isles, Germany, and Scandinavia had been the largest contributors, now the majority of immigrants came from Austro-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Greece, and other southeastern European countries. By 1900 a prime topic of social science research and popular investigation was the difference between the old immigration (northern and western Europe, largely Protestant, and often dispersed in Midwestern and rural parts of the United States) and the new (southern and eastern European, Catholic or Jewish, and heavily congregated in northeastern cities). "Everywhere," Higham (1966) writes, "the thought of European immigration now suggested strange images of Mediterranean, Slavic, and Jewish types, rather than the familiar German, Irishman, or Scandinavian."

The social implications of these images were remarkably summarized and propagated by the U.S. Immigration Commission, appointed in 1907 to study the effects of immigration on American life. The commission's report issued in 1911 in 42 volumes offered statistics on occupations, school achievement, illiteracy, disease, crime, childbearing, rates of assimilation, and naturalization. The commission's data were remarkably complex. Its summary was remarkably clear: The immigrants from southeastern Europe were innately inferior to the old immigration from northwestern Europe, and the newer group was less capable of being Americanized. The old immigrants were presumed to have come to settle; the new were "birds of passage," having little interest in America and simply desiring an economic stake to return home with. The new immigration, the commission argued, showed a high propensity to crime and high rates of illiteracy--marks of their inherent racial characteristics. Southern and eastern Europeans were more unskilled, less suited for work in the industrial society than previous immigrants. Their willingness to accept low wages and to live in impoverished conditions pushed the native born out of work, increased the industrial accident rate, undermined wage scales, and generally led to a deterioration in the conditions of labor. In sum, the old immigration had strengthened America; the new was leading to unmitigated disaster (U.S. Immigration Commission, 1911).

Ideas such as these laid the basis for the campaign for 100% Americanism in the schools, at work, and at leisure. Although never a formal system of ideas, 100 Percentism demanded conformity and national loyalty, requiring an evangelical commitment to duty. Opposition or doubts about government policy was seen as an immediate threat to the "American way of life." In the schools this meant a renewed emphasis upon the shaping of the foreign born and their children to a predefined notion of citizenship. "The education of the immigrant," reported one U.S. Bureau of Education publication, was "not primarily for the sake of the immigrant, but...a most necessary step to make democracy secure." In countless communities, classroom Americanization activities occurred, evening English and citizenship classes opened or expanded, and special school-based community programs began. Becoming an American meant speaking, reading, and writing English with a knowledge of the rights, duties, and privileges of American citizenship dependent upon that language. During the war, these concerns intensified. Schools became overtly political and ideological. Children were extensions of the war effort, raising farm crops in victory gardens; saving scrap metal, newspapers, and magazines; and taking physical education or military drill as part of the preparedness campaign. In Milwaukee, where Germans and socialism were strong, public school teachers were forced to sign loyalty oaths, and foreign languages were eliminated from the elementary school curriculum. By 1919, fifteen states had made English the sole language of instruction in all public and private elementary schools. New York and other states required that all public school teachers be citizens; Nebraska extended the legislation to private schools (Hartmann, 1948).

Many states began funding evening Americanization classes, either for the first time or on a greatly expanded basis. New York and other states made evening school attendance of non-English speaking persons between the ages of 16 and 21 compulsory. In Detroit, the board of education called the evening school the most important place for foreigners to "meet and learn American ideals and political life." Between 1914 and 1916 that city more than doubled its evening school expenditures and enrollment. Cooperating with the U.S. Bureau of Naturalization, Detroit's Board of Commerce, and other local industrialists, the Detroit School Board had handbills and posters distributed in factories, placed appeals to attend evening classes in pay envelopes, and asked ministers and priests to participate in the drive to boost attendance. Some employers made night school a condition of work or promotion, or otherwise strongly urged their employees to attend. The Board of Commerce published a free textbook on local government, while the federal courts were persuaded to accept satisfactory completion of the citizenship courses as partially sufficient for naturalization.

What was taught in these naturalization and evening classes was an extension of what had already become common to the public school curriculum. "Textbooks for immigrants," Tyack (1974) writes, "stressed cleanliness to the point of obsession, implying the readers had never known soap, a tooth brush, or a hair brush." Immigrant women were told "dirty windows are bad." Evening school readers presented an array of job opportunities, explaining the requirements of the work, the benefits to be derived, and the necessary steps to apply for a job. However, the occupations presented tended to be those available in rural and small-town America rather than those of the city; blacksmiths, cobblers, and tailors leaped out of the books as examples of opportunity for the newcomers. In evening schools, the foreign born were warned to avoid the corruption of the political machine and the ward boss, while importuned to move from the city to take advantage of small-town and rural America. Instruction in behavior was invariably reinforced by inspirational discussions. One lesson began:

> This country is the United States of America. It is the land of freedom and liberty, because the people govern themselves. All citizens love their country, because they know that this freedom was earned by men who gave their lives for it. (Lazerson, 1971; Tyack, 1974)

The Americanization of the foreign born at least implied that most of the newcomers could eventually enter the melting pot, becoming citizens provided they chose to be Americans. For America's black population, the prospects were bleaker. Harsh stereotypes and discrimination, Jim Crow legislation, and the application of pseudoscientific findings institutionalized second-class citizenship for blacks. By the first decades of the 20th century, the public schooling of black children often incorporated the following assumptions:

> Educational tests showed that black children had low mental levels and therefore were unfit for rigorous academic learning.
>
> Economic discrimination meant that blacks could not get good jobs. Black education should thus be for jobs actually available in the labor market: domestic service for girls and unskilled menial labor for boys.

> The immoral environments and families in which black children grew up meant that education for blacks should emphasize basic moral values. (Tyack, 1974)

These assumptions were never accepted by the black community. While black leaders divided over what constituted the most appropriate education for blacks, they were often outspoken in their rejection of the notion that all education for their children should be for second-class citizenship. Black colleges and a few black schools to which black leaders were intensely committed, and over which they had control, were the basis for the creation of a middle class from which came many leaders in the mid-20th-century fight for equal citizenship. At local levels, conflict over what type of education was most applicable for the citizenship of blacks often centered around whether public schools were to be integrated or segregated. Sometimes the issue was phrased in terms of integration of black children into white schools as essential to equal treatment with whites and the only means of preparing both races for a more integrated society. Sometimes, however, blacks fought for separate but equal schools--places where their children could be taught by black teachers and where they would be free from the hostility and prejudices of white children and faculty. The politics of these conflicts varied greatly; court action against school boards, pleas directed at the public, lobbying of legislatures, and school boycotts were all used to force a citizenship education based on equal opportunity and equal citizenship for nonwhites (Meier & Rudwick, 1976).

The assumptions of 100% Americanization and discrimination against blacks were harsh and the measures implemented sometimes extreme, particularly in communities where groups like the resurgent Ku Klux Klan of the early 1920s gained prominence. But it would be a mistake to understand Americanization and second-class citizenship simply as imposed phenomena. Many educators resisted the harsh stereotyping, rejected the tendency toward sharply differentiating between the unacceptable Old World past and the American future and between black and white, and reacted against the creation of feelings of shame among their students. In any given classroom, what citizenship meant could be complicated. While textbooks might portray one set of values or denigrate a particular ethnic or racial group, students and teachers might acknowledge other codes or reject the lessons of the curriculum. Often allegiance to common values was part of the compromise which allowed Polish, Irish, Jewish, Italian, Chinese, Slovak, black, and WASP youth and teachers to share the same school and classroom. The decentralized structure of American education in the 19th century opened schools to informal community pressures. As ethnic groups gained political and economic power during the 20th century, the number of teachers from these various groups increased; they successfully erased the most flagrant examples of stereotyping and discrimination--toward their own group at least.

Moreover, many native and foreign born saw schooling for citizenship as essential to minority achievement. In the midst of a heated controversy over the teaching of foreign languages in 1889, the governor of Wisconsin raised issues of immediate concern to all minorities:

> I want the little German boy and girl, the little Norwegian, the little Bohemian and little Pole, the children of all foreign-born parents, to have the same chance in life as my children. Without the knowledge of English language they cannot have this chance....I plead for the children of foreign-born parents for the reason that I personally know many who were born in this country who are handicapped by ignorance of the language of the country....Advancement in life for them is out of the question without a knowledge of the language.... (Welter, 1971)

It was clear that success required competence in language and numbers, an ability and willingness to follow time schedules and fill out forms, the adoption of thinking styles congruent with American industrialism. For white and nonwhite together, as Tyack suggests,

> the urban public schools--with their stress on language and mathematics, their norms of punctuality and standardized performance--helped to bridge the rural folk cultures of their parents and the expectations of those who held power in American society. (Tyack, 1974)

Minorities in America rarely rejected the advice or the suggestion that they become as much like their neighbors as possible. What they sought were mechanisms to provide access to America's material benefits without being forced to denigrate their past. As the sociologist W. I. Thomas said, they wished an Americanization which did not require the "destruction of memories" (cited in Gutman, 1973). Ethnic leaders were thus often in the forefront of the less harsh, "softer" Americanization measures. Through the ethnic press and voluntary societies, they urged the learning of English, attendance at public day and evening school, and the internalization of an industrial work ethic. Black Americans pressed for better facilities, boycotting inferior segregated education and discrimination within integrated schools. Through support for black colleges, they challenged assumptions that their race could not learn. As W. E. B. Du Bois put it, to be both black and American did not seem impossible. But it was also not easy (Du Bois, 1903; Meier & Rudwick, 1976).

Citizenship and Work

Education for work, preparation for what was once understood as a calling, had not been central to 17th- and 18th-century schooling. Well into the 19th century, schools were not closely tied to the world of work. They were only one of a number of routes to occupational entry, and rarely the best or most frequently followed; apprenticeships and on-the-job experiences in a household-based economy remained the most

210

common forms of vocational training. "The way to occupational success for the ordinary man," as Kaestle (1974) has pointed out for 18th-century New York, "was not through the schoolhouse door, but in the workshop of a skilled artisan." Where schoolmasters taught vocationally oriented subjects--accounting, navigation, surveying, for example--they competed with other ways of gaining that knowledge. Nor were the skills learned in school necessarily useful. Even literacy was not required for success at many 18th- and 19th-century occupations. For the wealthy, extended schooling was a reflection of leadership, neither required nor functionally related to vocational ends, except for ministers and, to a much lesser extent, lawyers. Schools taught habits of good conduct and morality that would translate into later success. The key was the habits and values, not the fact that one learned them in school.

During the 19th century these assumptions were modified, as Americans adapted to the demands of industrial capitalism, and the schools mediated between rural, preindustrial populations and the urban-industrial work place. Preindustrial work patterns were casual, dependent upon the seasons and land in agriculture, and upon independent control over hours and products among artisans. Household and group cohesion dominated expectations and shaped the rhythm of labor. Intense involvement was followed by idleness; a host of rituals and festivals interrupted work schedules. These were the patterns that native migrants, European immigrants, black slaves, and American Indians carried with them.

Industrial capitalism, however, demanded a new morality, one that depended upon consistency and regularity and the individualistic ethic of self-control, self-discipline, and self-improvement. Many of the phrases that described this morality were not new; their meanings were. Once the term industry had simply referred to hard work. By the mid-19th century it was coming to mean "devotion to a methodical work routine" (Dawley & Faler, 1976). As Oscar Handlin has noted, "the dictatorship of the clock and schedule became absolute," a fact poignantly described by a New York City garment worker at the turn of the century:

> The Clock in the workshop, --it rests not a moment;
> It points on, and ticks on; eternity--time;
> Once someone told me the clock had a meaning,--
> In pointing and ticking had reason and rhyme...
> The reason of old--the old meaning is gone!
> The maddening pendulum urges me forward
> To labor and still labor on...
> The clock--I shudder--Dost hear how it draws me?
> It calls me "Machine" and it cries [to] me "sew!"
> (Gutman, 1973; Lazerson, 1971)

Industrial capitalism did not triumph immediately or without conflict. The implementation of technology and capitalist social relations of production varied over time and from place to place. Traditional work patterns thus continued in certain regions, among particular groups, and within occupations (McLaughlin, 1977). Moreover, the new ethic was contradictory: individualism and achievement versus subservience of self to the production needs of industrial work settings. On the one hand, family and group were subordinated to individual achievement; on the other hand, the subservience of self to the requirements of the workplace enhanced such achievement. Furthermore, since America's labor force was constantly being renewed by premodern migrants to the cities, industrial work routines were always in conflict with the values of significant numbers of workers.

Critics called the tensions thus engendered the disorganization of working-class and migrant life. This was only partially accurate, for the conflicts were complicated by the very strength of nonindustrialized families and culture, the "tough familial and kin ties [that] made possible the transmission and adoption of European working-class cultural patterns and beliefs to industrializing America" (Gutman, 1973). Social disorder, street gangs, youth neither at work nor at school, industrial protest, and occasional food riots were more than assorted acts of criminality, more than simply the moral failings of the poor. Rather, they revealed conflicts between strong cultural traditions and the functioning of the economic system. Out of these tensions also emerged benevolent societies, ethnic and racial churches and political organizations, working-class saloons, and communal festivals as cushions against the demands of the industrial workplace.

Cultural conflict was an essential basis for the expansion of schooling during the 19th and early 20th centuries. For those who viewed themselves as moral stewards of society or were its economic leaders, schools became a mechanism to create an inner-directed, sober, and deferential work force of the future. For those who themselves aspired to success, the adoption of more acceptable codes of conduct was imperative. For their children, schools provided a means of occupational achievement. But like the messages of individual achievement and subservience in work settings, the message of schooling was often contradictory. Urged to seize opportunity and be aggressive and self-centered, schoolchildren were simultaneously told to be obedient and learn their place in the hierarchical society. Caught in the contradictions of an economic system that demanded both individualism and subservience, which separated self-development from work, the school's role as a cultural mediator required that it simultaneously socialize the young to individual self-development and prepare them for work environments which discounted individual growth. Moreover, schools had to rationalize the system in which hard work and thrift were necessary for success but did not guarantee it, in which some would be economically successful and others not. The most widely used school text, the McGuffey Reader, phrased it this way:

> Work, work my boy, be not afraid;
> Look labor boldly in the face;
> Take up the hammer or the spade,
> And blush not for your humble place.
> (Elson, 1964)

By the beginning of the 20th century, preparation for work as an essential feature of citizenship education and the school's responsibility for that preparation were fundamental assumptions of American education. They received their fullest expression in the vocational education movement. Education for work as an essential goal of schooling was not new to the early decades of the 20th century. But the notion of work had, during the latter part of the 19th century, undergone dramatic alteration. The expansion of industry, the factory specialization of labor, and the emergence of what to many observers appeared to be a permanent proletariat raised considerable question about the self-fulfillment to be found in the occupational structure and the degree of opportunity in that structure. What emerged was a belief that Americans could no longer rely on the workplace as a source of training in adequate social values or as a jumping-off place for social and occupational mobility. Nor, it was argued, could schools assume that generalized training in thrift, industry, and perseverence would naturally lead to appropriate behavior at the workplace. Work, which had once been viewed as the essential basis of an ethical and aspiring society, was increasingly seen in terms of jobs that were unsatisfying in themselves and were as often limiting rather than expanding for the individual (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Gilbert, 1977).

Vocationalism was only one of a number of mechanisms for combating the dilemmas caused by work in a modern society; another was the new emphasis on consumption, leisure, and--especially for women--care of the household. But in trying to teach job skills, and in articulating a belief that the value of schooling lay in its ability to prepare youth for the job market, the vocational education movement reshaped the assumptions of American education and the appropriate ways in which schools trained citizens. That the concern was with citizenship as much as with productivity could be seen in the report of the Commission on National Aid to Vocational Education of 1914, the most influential document of the movement. The commission declared:

> It is safe to say that industry in its highly organized form with its intense specialization, is in the main narrowing to the individual worker, and while "hands" alone may satisfy the immediate demands of industry, the failure to recognize and provide for human progress and development is producing a restless and discontented people. Out of this unrest comes a demand for a more practical education for those who toil ....Everywhere it is the opinion of those who are studying the conditions of society that the lack of practical education is one of the primary causes of social and industrial discontent. (Lazerson & Grubb, 1974)

Citizenship in a Pluralist World

In the decades since 1940 Americans have partially modified their views as to what the nature of citizenship education should be. They have moderated the fierce Americanization of the World War I era, their resistance to recognition of the ethnic backgrounds of students, and the sharp dichotomies between citizenship education for blacks and for whites. One aspect of that modification was the emergence of the intercultural-education movement of the 1930s and 1940s.

There were, as Nathan Glazer (1977) has pointed out, two themes in this movement. The first theme centered on the assumption that one should not be ashamed of one's heritage. The second was that we should all be tolerant of racial, religious, and cultural differences. The theme of tolerance outweighed the celebration of heritage and diversity. "In effect, intercultural education was America's answer to Hitler's preaching of group hatred" (Glazer, 1977). The movement was the basis for a wave of interest in intercultural organizations, curricula, and publications. In one sense, of course, the movement was defensive, an attempt to portray the United States as a society inherently different from and superior to the Nazism of the 1930s and 1940s. It was also clear that the movement did not envision a commitment by the public schools to present or preserve a complete picture of America's varied ethnic cultures. It was a middle ground

217

which tried to combine (a) the commonalities of American life and an unwillingness to allow minorities to "cling to ways of living which are incongruent to democratic practice" with (b) the recognition that individuals "should be free to practice and perpetuate such of their group's traditional values, folkways and customs as do not conflict with democratic principles" (textbooks cited in Goodenow, 1975). The stress was thus on the past contributions of ethnic groups and the vulnerability of American society, as a strong national entity, to ethnic and racial discrimination. The intercultural movement was thus committed to national unity, but it argued in an organized way for a larger sense of America, one which made the citizenship education of the schools dependent upon a recognition that America had been created out of diverse origins (Goodenow, 1975).

The intercultural-education movement was difficult to sustain during the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s. Whatever attention was paid to America's past in the schools had to be limited by a recognition that differences were no longer to be a feature of American life and that, above all else, the test of a free society required unity and loyalty. There were challenges to those assumptions, mainly in the efforts by black Americans to establish equality for themselves. But much of this continued to be predicated on earlier assumptions--the desirability and necessity of having all people, regardless of race or ethnic background, integrated into the mainstream of American life. The message through the 1950s remained the desirability of conformity to accepted patterns of behavior. The significance of *access* for those discriminated against should not be underplayed, however; as the tensions and conflicts of the decade showed, black integration into the mainstream could be taken as a possible radical restructuring of American society.

But not until the 1960s did an ideology emerge which articulated a pluralist vision of society that stood in sharp contrast to those of previous generations. The issue went beyond tolerance to become one of a positive assertion of multiethnic differences. As a curriculum guideline prepared by the National Council for Social Studies puts it:

> Ethnic diversity should be recognized and respected at individual, group, and societal levels.
>
> Ethnic diversity provides a basis for societal cohesiveness and survival.
>
> Equality of opportunity should be afforded to members of all ethnic groups.
>
> Ethnic identification should be optional for individuals. (Glazer, 1977)

The assertion that ethnic diversity should be the essential basis upon which citizenship education takes place represents a substantially new theme in American educational history. It is based on an intensified self-awareness and militancy among ethnic groups and is motivated by a strong sense that the educational system has failed minorities. Its major emphasis is upon the importance of group identity for the cohesiveness of the group and the mental health and achievement of the individual. The movement also seeks state support for its goals.

While much within the multicultural citizenship-education movement has roots in the past, it is nonetheless a significant modification in the theory, if not yet the practice, of American education. Legislation at the federal and state levels as well as informal responses to pressure have led to a growing concern that the study of ethnic groups should be an integral part of education. When this concern is added to the growing movement for bilingual education, something new seems to be emerging on the horizon. Whether such proposals and the assumptions which underlie them will in fact result in a redefined view of how citizens are to be educated, and what indeed constitutes citizenship, remains to be seen. Certainly the current movement in multicultural education is fraught with complexities and ambiguities. Many of the movement's leaders themselves are ambivalent about how far group roots and the continuities of group traditions into the present should be pressed. Moreover, groups are hardly the same in the relationship of their past and present. The dilemmas created by federal and state legislation, which tends to treat very different groups in similar ways, will not be easy to resolve. But most important, the complex relationship among American commonalities, ethnic and racial distinctiveness, voluntary organizations, state involvement, and individual choice are clearly in a state of flux. How these are to be integrated into American notions of citizenship remains open. That they are in a state of flux, however, is in itself a good sign.

References

Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. Schooling in capitalist America: Educational reform and the contradictions of economic life. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Cremin, L.A. American education: The colonial experience. New York: Harper, 1970.

Cremin, L.A. Traditions of American education. New York: Basic Books, 1977.

Dawley, A., & Faler, P. Working class culture and politics in the industrial revolution: Sources of loyalism and rebellion. Journal of Social History, 1976, 9, 466-480.

Du Bois, W.E.B. Souls of the black folk. Chicago: McClurg, 1903.

Elson, R.M. Guardians of tradition: American schoolbooks of the nineteenth century. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964.

Gilbert, J.B. Work without salvation: America's intellectuals and industrial alienation, 1880-1910. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.

Glazer, N. Public education and American pluralism. In J.S. Coleman et. al., Parents, teachers, and children: Prospects for choice in American education. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Education, 1977.

Goodenow, R.K. The progressive educator, race and ethnicity in the Depression years. *History of Education Quarterly*, 1975, *15*, 365-394.

Gutman, H.G. Work, culture, and society in industrializing America, 1815-1919. *American Historical Review*, 1973, *78*, 531-588.

Hartmann, E.G. *The movement to Americanize the immigrant*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.

Higham, J. *Strangers in the land: Patterns of American nativism, 1860-1925*. New York: Atheneum, 1966.

Kaestle, C.F. *The evolution of an urban school system: New York City, 1750-1850*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Kaestle, C.F. "Between the Scylla of brutal ignorance and the Charybdis of a literary education": Elite attitudes toward mass schooling in early industrial England and America. In L. Stone (Ed.), *Schooling and society: Studies in the history of education*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

Lazerson, M. *Origins of the urban school: Public education in Massachusetts*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Lazerson, M., & Grubb, W.N. *American education and vocationalism: A documentary history, 1870-1970*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1974.

McLaughlin, V.Y. *Family and community: Italian immigrants in Buffalo, 1880-1930*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977.

Meier, A., & Rudwick, E. *Along the color line: Explorations in the black experience*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976.

Ravitch, D. *The great school wars: New York City, 1805-1973*. New York: Basic Books, 1974.

Rudolph, F. (Ed.). *Essays on education in the early republic*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Smith T.L. Protestant schooling and American nationality, 1800-1850. *Journal of American History*, 1967, *53*, 679-695.

Tyack, D.B. The kingdom of God and the common school: Protestant ministers and the educational awakening in the West. *Harvard Educational Review*, 1966, *36*, 447-469.

Tyack, D.B. (Ed.). *Turning points in American educational history*. Lexington, Mass.: Ginn & Co., 1967.

Tyack, D.B. *The one-best system: A history of American urban education*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Tyack, D.B. Pilgrim's progress: Toward a social history of the school superintendency, 1860-1960. *History of Education Quarterly*, 1976, *16*, 257-300.

U.S. Immigration Commission. *Report*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1911.

Welter, R. *Popular education and democratic thought in America*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.

Welter, R. (Ed.). *American writings on popular education: The nineteenth century*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

COLLOQUIUM ON HISTORY OF CITIZEN EDUCATION

Authors

R. Freeman Butts
Department of Education
San Jose University

Clarence J. Karier
Department of History
University of Illinois

Marvin Lazerson
Department of Education
University of British Columbia

Reviewers

John H. Best
Department of Education
The Pennsylvania State University

William W. Cutler, III
Department of Educational Foundations
Temple University

Allen F. Davis
Department of History
Temple University

Michael B. Katz
Department of History
York University (Toronto)

Christopher Lucas
Learned Societies in Education
University of Missouri

Observers

Max Beck
Information Analyst
Citizen Education
Research for Better Schools, Inc.

Florence Davis
Document Coordinator/Editor
Citizen Education
Research for Better Schools, Inc.

Elizabeth Farquhar
Education Program Specialist
U.S. Office of Education

Shirley B. Heath
Graduate School of Education
University of Pennsylvania

Donald R. Knouse
State Supervisor of Social Studies
Delaware Department of Public Instruction

Louis M. Maguire
Director of Development
Research for Better Schools, Inc.

Barbara Z. Presseisen
Director
Citizen Education
Research for Better Schools, Inc.

Observers (continued)

Ernst L. Presseisen
Department of History
Temple University

Nicholas M. Sanders
Research Coordinator
Citizen Education
Research for Better
Schools, Inc.

Joan D. Wallace
Editor
Citizen Education
Research for Better
Schools, Inc.

Judith Wilson
Instructional Materials
Coordinator
Research for Better
Schools, Inc.

Moderator

Russell A. Hill
Senior Research Fellow
Citizen Education
Research for Better
Schools, Inc.

BIOGRAPHIES

R. FREEMAN BUTTS is Distinguished Professor of Education at San Jose State University and visiting scholar at Stanford University. He received the M.A. degree in educational administration in 1932 and the Ph.D. in history of education in 1935, both from the University of Wisconsin. Following a year of postdoctoral study at Columbia University, Dr. Butts joined the faculty there, his Columbia career culminating in his appointment as William F. Russell Professor in the Foundations of Education and as associate dean for international studies. The recipient of many honors for his professional distinction, he is a member of numerous learned societies, a consultant/advisor to many organizations, and a much-published author and editor.

CLARENCE J. KARIER is professor of history of education at the University of Illinois. A graduate of Wisconsin State Teachers College, he received the M.S. degree in school administration and in 1960 the Ph.D. in history of education, both from the University of Wisconsin. Following service in the Korean war, he taught citizenship and history in junior high school at Marinette, Wisconsin, for 4 years. Dr. Karier held a joint appointment in history and education at the University of Rochester, where he helped develop the history of education program. In 1967-68 he was visiting professor of history and educational policy at the University of Wisconsin. Joining the University of Illinois faculty in 1969, he served as chairman of the Department of Educational Policy Studies for 4 years. Currently Dr. Karier is president of the History of Education Society. The author of *Man, Society and Education* and *Shaping the Educational State*, and coauthor of *Roots of Crisis*, Dr. Karier has published widely in such areas as American liberalism, the testing movement, elite values in American culture, and psychoanalysis and education. His current research interest concerns the relationship among literature, art, psychology, and educational thought and practice in 20th-century America.

MARVIN LAZERSON is professor of education at the University of British Columbia and is also a consultant to the Childhood and Government Project, University of California Law School, Berkeley. He holds the A.B. and M.A. degrees from Columbia University and received the Ph.D. in history from Harvard University in 1970. While at Harvard he was a Samuel Stauffer Fellow at the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center for Urban Studies and subsequently taught in the education and social policy program at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. He has also been a visiting professor at Stanford

University and the University of Washington. Dr. Lazerson is the author of Origins of the Urban School (1971) and co-author of American Education and Vocationalism (1974). He has also written several articles on education. Currently he is working on a historical study of ethnicity and education and on the development of family-based social policies. Professor Lazerson's major interests are the history of education and the development of educational and social policies directed toward families, children, and ethnic groups.